Bioterrorismus: Experten fragen, wie gut vorbereitet sind wir eigentlich? [en] 

Featuring experts from the military, public health authorities and biological sciences as well as political leaders from the European Council and Parliament, the discussion focussed on how far international efforts to prevent and deal with any future bioterror attack had progressed.

Progressive proposals were made on the need for extensive preparation at the level of local rescue, health and police services and on how best to use the research capacities of private industry to combat biological attack.

Held under the auspices of the New Defence Agenda reporting group on bioterrorism, the conference was linked to an evening debate between EU and US officials on transatlantic co-operation in the fight against terror (see EurActiv 25 April 2005). 

More practice?

In January 2005, 'Atlantic Storm', an international exercise to determine how governments would deal with a bioterrorist attack, was staged in Washington. The exercise posited a fictitious smallpox outbreak in European and American cities caused by terrorist attack. The real-time exercise showed that governments were in no measure ready, that there were insufficient stockpiles of vaccines and that thousands would die as governments argued over sharing out the available vaccines. Some governments closed borders to people fleeing danger zones. Newspapers called the results potentially catastrophic. 

Biological and Toxins Weapons Convention (BTWC)

Annalisa Giannella, personal representative for non-proliferation to Javier Solana, European Council Secretary General, explained efforts being made to secure ratification and adherence to the 1975 Biological and Toxic Weapons Convention (BTWC). It has currently been ratified by 144 states. The BTWC bans the development or production of biological weapons other than for peaceful purposes. Problems have been encountered on how to verify compliance with the Convention and a sixth review conference to strengthen the convention is to take place in 2006.

Involve industry

Frank Rapoport, Partner in McKenna Long & Aldridge, moderating the afternoon session, advocated involving private pharmaceutical industry in preparing for biological attacks. He explained the US example of Project Bioshield. This legislation, passed in July 2004, provides for government funding to pharmaceutical companies to pay for research into drugs effective against chemical and biological attacks. There are currently plans to extend the scope of the legislation.

Mutual understanding

An issue which arose from the evening debate was an apparent lack of understanding on the part of US officials and commentators on how the European Union functions, the role of the institutions and their relationship with the member states. In response to a question on how the European Border Agency could function if borders were still controlled by the member states, Jonathan Faull, director general of Justice, Freedom and Security, explained: "the European Union is the member states."

The exchange highlighted the apparent difficulty of some US speakers in understanding the consensual nature of the European Union: the need to get agreement from member states and, on an increasing number of issues, the Parliament, before action is taken. This can be a difficult message to get through to a nation used to being led by a single President.

Most speakers felt that exercises such as Atlantic Storm were useless. Concentrating on what to do at government level in a major attack was a waste of time, opined Georges Benjamin, executive director of the American Public Health Association. 

Ian Abbott, chief of Policy Division at the European Military Staff agreed that it would be local emergency services who would bear the brunt of such an attack: the military could do little and therefore local exercises would be of more use in assessing readiness.

On the BTWC, Michael Moodie, president of the Chemical and Biological Arms Control Institute, questioned whether problems of verification would be adequately solved in the near future. He also wondered whether such an international accord, which took years to become effective, could keep up with scientific developments in the field. Mr Moodie said that there were many discussions in various fora – G8, Global Security Action Group, Interpol, WHO etc – but there was little cohesion. What was needed was a ‘self-consciously transatlantic’ effort. 

Erika Mann, MEP (PES, Germany), discussed the need for an ‘intellectual infrastructure’ to the debate. By this she appeared to mean a common vocabulary and a dialogue involving politicians and scientists. She emphasised the need for trust between nations. It was agreed that there were problems allowing scientific experts the necessary clearances to work in what were seen as security areas. 

Ian Abbott was clear that there needed to be more public communication about risk. It was necessary to develop public confidence that measures were in place to deal with any attack or any natural outbreak of lethal viruses, such as SARS (Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome) or the recent Marburg virus.

The overall consensus seemed to be that biological terrorism was not a threat that could be eliminated but a risk that had to be managed. This had to be done at international level as no country could operate alone. A chilling thought, repeated by the director of New Defence Agenda, Giles Merritt, was that of a US fire chief reported as saying that New York would be no more ready to deal with a terrorist attack now than it was prior to 11 September 2001.