EU Sicherheits- und Verteidigungspolitik[en][fr] 

The Maastricht Treaty of 1992 was the first to contain provisions on the EU's responsibility for all questions relating to its security, including the eventual framing of a common defence policy. The Treaty defined these tasks as part of the Common Foreign and Security Policy. The Treaty envisaged that the EU, having no military capabilities of its own, will request the Western European Union (WEU) to elaborate and implement planned military measures on its behalf.  

The 1997 Treaty of Amsterdam incorporated the WEU's "Petersberg tasks" ("humanitarian and rescue tasks, peace-keeping tasks and tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking") into the Treaty on the European Union. This laid the treaty basis for the operative development of the ESDP.

In December 1998, at an Anglo-French summit in St Malo, the leaders of the UK and France decided on the need for a "capacity for autonomous action, backed up by credible military forces". The conflicts in Bosnia and Kosovo added impetus to discussions about the need for a European defence force.

At the Cologne Summit on 3 June 1999, European leaders agreed on a common defence strategy. Their stated desire to incorporate the dormant WEU into the EU by the end of the year 2000 was effectively achieved by the Marseilles Declaration of November 2000.

The Treaty of Nice (2000) entered into force on 1 February 2003. It contains amendments which reflect the operative development of the ESDP as an independent EU project.

The 15 Member States of the EU formally decided to create a rapid reaction force (RRF) of 60,000 men at the Nice European Council (December 7-9 2000).

In its final report of 16 December 2002, the Defence Working Group of the European Convention proposed the creation of a European Armaments and Strategic Research Agency that would incorporate closer forms of cooperation which already exist in the armaments field between certain Member States (OCCAR, LoI).

At their mini-summit on 29 April 2003, the leaders of France, Germany, Belgium and Luxembourg attempted to lay the groundwork for an EU military alliance. However, the event was widely seen as divisive and conducive to a two-speed Europe. 

Le but principal de la PESD est de fournir des actifs militaires et civils pour la prention des conflits et la gestion des crises internationales. Puisque l'UE cherche ýpromouvoir le r¬ement non violent des conflits, elle insiste sur l'importance, ý–àdes capacit`militaires, du deloppement de ses capacit`civiles dans quatre secteurs prioritaires (la police, l'Etat de droit, l'administration civile et les capacit`de protection civile) adopt`par le Conseil europ. de Feira en juin 2000.

La PESD cherche ýenforcer et ýonsolider l'alliance de l'UE avec les Etats-Unis et le Canada dans le cadre de l'OTAN et elle observe les principes de la Charte des Nations Unies. Le but de la PESD n'est pas de remplacer mais de complår l'OTAN.

Bien que la PESD fasse partie de la PESC et tombe ainsi sous le deuxi% pilier (intergouvernemental) de l'UE, une PESD r3sie devrait promouvoir l'int²ation.

L'objectif n'est pas de cr2 une armÍ europ.ne. Les forces arm3 nationales restent sous le contrnÍ des commandants nationaux et ne seront dirig3 que par un commandant supr% militaire pour la duràde toute mission de l'UE. La premie opation militaire historique de l'UE en dehors du continent europ. (au Congo) s'est doulàdu 12 juin au 1er septembre 2003. Sous le nom de code d' opation Artemis, l'opation a i lancàýa demande de l'ONU. La force multinationale de l'UE, forte de 1 400 hommes, áit sous le commandement de Jean-Paul Thonier, un géral fran)s.

• Convention: according to the EU's draft Constitution, "The Union shall have competence to define and implement a common foreign and security policy, including the progressive framing of a common defence policy." Member states "shall support the Union's common foreign and security policy actively and unreservedly in a spirit of loyalty and mutual solidarity." Several governments, especially the British, are insisting on retaining a national veto over issues pertaining to foreign policy and defence. The proposals do not call for majority voting on foreign policy unless heads of state and government, acting unanimously, order the ministers to take a vote. Defence is ring-fenced even further, with references in the draft Constitution to the primacy of NATO. Joint moves on foreign policy and defence will be by consensus only. The EU already has a common foreign and security policy, on paper. Agreement on the Middle East road map is an example of where Member States have agreed. Iraq is an example of where they have not.
• Commission: to support ESDP, the Commission outlined the long-term needs for a competitive European defence equipment industry in March 2003. Cost efficiency of defence spending, the maintenance of a competitive defence and technological industrial base, better access for EU manufactured goods to third country market, ethics and fairness in the arms trade, security of supply, and also the need to respect Member States' prerogatives are all important considerations in this sensitive area.
• Council: the EU has stated that it wants to be able to deploy a rapid reaction force (RRF) of up to 60,000 men as part of its crisis management tools. They want access to NATO's planning, intelligence and logistical capabilities to fill in the gaps in their own capabilities. They refuse to allow any non-EU Member State to have a veto over the proposed activities of the RRF.
• US: the Bush administration view of the development of ESDP is that NATO will have the right of first refusal over any tasks that the EU wants to undertake. It is also only willing to support EU action on the so called Petersburg Tasks and that any action taken must be planned at NATO.
• Turkey: as a NATO member, Turkey has not been prepared to allow the EU access to NATO planning, intelligence and logistical capabilities if it does not have a say over the operations that the EU wishes to carry out.
• Russia: does not object to the EU's development of ESDP. There are suggestions that it is beginning to accept that this is developing within a transatlantic context, not a purely European one. However, Russia is keen to play a role in any new European security structure that develops.