Schutz kritischer Infrastruktur: Kommission will nur untergeordnete Rolle spielen[en] 

EU officials and experts met at a New Defence Agenda meeting on 27 June 2005 in  Brussels to debate 'Strategic priorities for protecting Europe's infrastructure against terrorism'. Among the themes discussed were prevention versus protection and the differences in approaches and budgets between USA and the EU.

• What sort of involvement should the EU Commission have in the protection of critical infrastructure?
• What can realistically be done?
• What budgets are available?
• When and how will the EU define what is critical and what is not? 

In contrast to the US big budget approach, which in the upcoming five year period is set at 62 billion dollars, Magnus Ovilius, senior administrator at the Commission's DG Justice, Freedom and Security, took a different line:

"We don't need to spend a lot of money," he said, arguing that  there was a need to start out by carrying out a threat assessment to establish where and when funds could be spent in a relevant manner. For the period 2007-2013 the Commission is proposing a 140 million euro programme. 

Overall Ovilius argued that the role for the EU should be limited: "Responsibility for managing risk will lie primarily with the owners and operators. Bureaucrats in Brussels don't need to dictate what should be done on the ground. We shall apply the principle of subsidiarity." 

He also stressed that the EU should limit itself to dealing with installations [such as power plants] that have a potential crossborder effect. That will be a guiding principle for establishing a list of installations to be protected. Such a list will however never be made public because it could serve as a "blueprint" for potential terrorists.   

The Commission will come up with a communication at the end of 2005. This will lay the ground for a programme to be implemented in 2006 and will cover not only terrorist attacks, but also the consequences of natural disasters to infrastructure.   

Answering a question on whether the European Parliament should not be protected as a piece of critical infrastructure, Olivius said that protecting chemical plants in Flanders against an attack was more relevant.  

José Antonio Hoyos Perez, principal administrator of the Commission's DG Energy and Transport, said that liberalisation of the energy sector, which is to be completed in 2007, is likely to increase the number of physical connections of energy networks, which will mean that "an attack on the weakest link" will have bigger repercussions. 

Ian Abbot, director of policy and plans division of the EU military staff, stressed the importance of fear and public perceptions of danger: "Psychology is more important than the number of dead (following an attack). We need to strike a balance between fear and forgetting," he said, stressing the need to quickly re-establish the normal operation of infrastructures after an attack. Abbot listed energy, health, water, sanitation and telecommunications as areas that need to be protected.