The author states that, for decades, Germany secured its fundamental interest - a peaceful co-existence with its neighbours, by sacrificing some of its own interests for the European Union. Germany was also the only state to possess a foreign policy outlook that was both pro-European and transatlantic.
However, under the administration of Chancellor Schröder, the tone and substance of Germany’s European Policy evolved in two ways, continues Guérot. First, within Europe, the "national" or the "German" component was accentuated. Second, during the war in Iraq, Germany made a break with its traditional foreign policy when it stood by France in opposing the United States. Within the government, the population, and political parties, the idea that "there can never be enough Europe" also began to lose its magic.
The paper outlines numerous challenges facing the German EU Presidency. Among others, these challenges consist of helping Europe emerge from the deep Constitutional crisis in which it is embedded and of re-energising the enlargement project. Unfortunately, Guérot believes that there is a large gap between expectations for the German EU Presidency and Germany's actual ability to manoeuvre.
Because of their close relations, the author concludes that Germany’s European policy can only be discussed within the framework of its relationship with France. In order to re-energise the European project, the traditional "Franco-German engine" will have to act in close cooperation with other large and small EU states. This in turn will necessitate a clear and modern definition of Europe's interests as a whole.
