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Post an EU jobThe EU symbolically opened membership talks with Turkey in October 2005, but a number of stumbling blocks remain on Ankara's road to EU accession, in particular concerning trade links with Cyprus, freedom of expression and the rights of the Kurdish minority.
Ever since the foundation of modern day Turkey in 1923, this country with a predominantly Muslim population has been a secular democracy closely aligned with the West. Turkey was a founding member of the United Nations, and has been a member of NATO since 1952, the Council of Europe since 1949, the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) since 1961 and an associate member of the Western European Union since 1992.
Ankara chose to begin co-operating closely with the then European Economic Community (EEC) in 1959, and Turkey's prospective membership of the EEC's successor, the European Union, has been a source of much debate ever since.
Turkey's relationship with the EEC was legally sanctioned in 1963 when it signed an Association Agreement with the EU. This is the first preliminary step on the path to full membership. Since then, Turkish hopes have been put on hold, paricularly following its invasion of Cyprus in 1974 and the military coup d’etat of 1980.
A major turning point for Turkey's EU prospects was the decision reached at the Helsinki Summit in December 1999 to grant official candidate status to the country. In the period between 1999 and 2004, Turkey took great steps in order to meet the Copenaghen criteria, especially regarding stable institutions, the rule of law, human rights and respect for and the protection of minorities. A key step in this process was the signing of the protocol on the de facto abolition of the death penalty.
The European Council decided in December 2004 to open accession negotiations with Turkey in October the following year. Nevertheless, practical negotiations on the 35 chapters of the acquis communautaire only began in June 2006.
So far, only one chapter (science and research) has been provisionally closed. Eleven more have been opened, but eight remain blocked over Turkey's failure to implement the Ankara Protocol, which states that access should be granted and ports opened to products coming from the Republic of Cyprus (for a full overview of the state of the negotiations, see EurActiv LinksDossier
on 'Turkey accession and Cyprus'). According to Turkey's chief negotiator Egemen Bagiş, five chapters are being blocked by France, three by Austria and Germany, and two by Cyprus.
The reform impetus has also been waning in Turkey as a result of the increasingly critical stance of key players like France and Germany, which are sceptical of Turkey's credentials as a European country and its ability to fulfil the accession criteria.
At the request of governments meeting in the European Council, a framework for Turkey's EU membership negotiations was established by the European Commission. The document was released on 29 June 2005.
The negotiating framework, which has been described by Enlargement Commissioner Olli Rehn as "rigorous", rests on the following elements:
Throughout Europe, the arguments that surround Turkey's projected accession revolve around a series of issues, ranging from demographic through geographic to political. One commonly raised point is that, if and when it were to join the EU, Turkey would become the EU's most populous member state. Turkey's current population is estimated at 74 million, and demographers project it to increase to 80-85 million in the next 20 years. This compares with the largest current EU member state Germany, which has 83 million people today, but whose population is projected to decrease to around 80 million by 2020.
Another argument is rooted in the age-old debate on whether it is possible to establish geographic borders for Europe, and whether Turkey 'fits' within these borders. This is seen by many as a dispute that rests on philosophical and intellectual prejudgements, especially since the Treaty of Rome is widely accepted to aim for the construction of a union of European states based on shared common values.
Perhaps the most sensitive of all arguments centres on cultural and religious differences. Since the EU identifies itself as a cultural and religious mosaic that recognises and respects diversity, supporters of Turkey's EU bid believe that, as long as both Turkey and the EU member states maintain this common vision, cultural and religious differences should be irrelevant.
The EU member states' concerns over Turkey's human rights record as well as global and regional security-related issues have also been key factors behind Turkey's prolonged application process.
The future of the divided island of Cyprus (see separate LinksDossier on Turkey accession and Cyprus) has also been a major sticking point. The Council's December 2004 decision entailed a compromise formula on the Cyprus issue, under which the affected sides were expected to work towards a solution to the conflict before the 3 October 2005 launch of membership talks with Ankara.
However, the conflict still remains unresolved, and Cyprus is a decisive factor in the negotiation process. Cyprus demands official recognition by Turkey and access to Turkish harbours and airports. Turkey demands the isolation of Northern Cyprus be brought to an end and emphasises that it was the Greek side of the island that rejected the UN's plan in 2004. Turkish EU Minister and chief negotiator Egemen Bagiş claimed that "the Cyprus problem was not a prerequisite for the membership of Cyprus itself. Therefore it should not be a prerequisite for the membership of another country".
The 'no' votes in referenda on the EU Constitution in France and the Netherlands during the first half of 2005 have been detrimental to Turkey's EU bid. Although subsequent research and surveys have failed to prove that enlargement in general, and Turkey's candidacy in particular, were key factors behind the public's rejection of the Constitution, the summer of 2005 still witnessed an increase Europe-wide of scepticism towards Turkey's European prospects. Whilst the climate for enlargement seems to have changed with the advent of the Lisbon Treaty (EurActiv 09/10/09), it did not modify European leaders' and the public's perceptions of Turkey. In particular, France and Germany are now proposing that Turkey's full-fledged EU membership be replaced with a 'privileged partnership' (see 'Positions').
According to the European Commission's progress report of 14 October 2009, Article 301 on 'insults to Turkishness' is "no longer used systematically to restrict freedom of expression. However Turkish law does not sufficiently guarantee freedom of expression in line with the European Convention of Human Rights (ECHR)".
The softening of Turkey's relationship with Armenia is also seen as a precondition for its membership. Whilst recognition of the Armenian genocide does not appear to be a precondition for membership any longer, the opportunity to discuss the issue freely is. The recent rapprochement between Ankara and Yerevan is welcome in Brussels (EurActiv 01/09/09).
The Commission report also views positively the opening of a wide-ranging debate on cultural, political and economic aspects of the Kurdish issue, but it stresses the need for concrete measures here, underlining how broad interpretation of anti-terror legislation "has resulted in undue restrictions on the exercise of fundamental rights".
Another problem is the continuing interference of judicial and military power in Turkish executive and legislative powers. This is problematic if viewed with historical hindsight. The weakness of the boundaries that divide Turkish powers seems to be confirmed by the Ergenekon trial, which saw 300 personalities involved in conspiracies aimed at weakening the government and possibly leading to a coup d’etat.
Domestic support for EU membership is in decline as the issues seem to increasingly difficult to resolve. The Turkish public is growing more and more tired of the negotiation process. A recent Eurobarometer survey showed that only 44% of Turks think EU membership would be a good thing, compared to 66% in spring 2005. A survey by the German Marshall Fund of the US, published in June, confirmed this tendency.
Turkish politicians are increasingly making use of this sentiment, especially with a view to the upcoming elections. One expression of this is the criticism expressed by Turks regarding Pope Benedict's comments on Islam of 15 September 2006.
Enlargement Commissioner Olli Rehn stated that "there is a pressing need to reform the legal and constitutional framework governing the closure of political parties. We simply cannot afford yet another unnecessary constitutional crisis stemming from outdated rules not in line with European standards".
In an exclusive interview with EurActiv (EurActiv 21/11/08), Commissioner Rehn also envisaged the possibility of creating temporary or permanent derogations on the subject of free movement of workers to appease France.
Rehn summarised the situation thus: "There are three main concerns. First, deepening is important. That's why we need the Lisbon Treaty. Secondly, concerning the labour market, we have policy instruments to avoid problems in this area. Concerning the cultural and religious resistance, although I can somehow understand it, I have less sympathy for it because for me the EU is not a Christian club but a community of values related to liberty and freedom."
European Commission President José Manuel Barroso said "the accession talks with Turkey are pursued on the basis of a mandate handed down unanimously by the member states," adding: "If one - or several - member states want to modify this mandate it is up to them to try to get it changed, and accept the consequences."
Barroso makes clear that current talks should go on, but in a 2008 address to the Turkish Assembly he tried to boost the reform impetus in Turkey, which appears to have waned somewhat due to the remaining political and legal hurdles (EurActiv 11/04/08).
The Independent Commission on Turkey, headed by Peace Nobel Prize Laureate Martti Ahtisaari, found that "negative reactions since 2004 from European political leaders and growing hesitation by the European public about further enlargement have given Turkey the impression that it is not welcome, even if it were to fulfil all membership conditions. Moreover, the process itself has been hindered by the effective blockage of more than half of the negotiating chapters".
This negative political attitude seems to have frustrated the commitment of reformers, the independent commission concluded.
Turkey has described the idea of a 'privileged partnership' as insulting, since this definition does not even have a legal basis.
Turkish chief negotiator on EU accession, Egemen Bagiş, stressed that Turkey is perfectly in line to fulfil the chapters of the acquis, noting that in ten years Turkey had moved from being the 27th largest economy in the world to 16th place.
"We can become one of the top economies and top countries of the world, even without becoming a member of the EU. So EU membership is very important anchor, but it's not our only option," Bagiş said.
Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu said the Irish 'yes' to the Lisbon Treaty creates the legal conditions for future EU enlargements (Euractiv 05/10/09) and pleaded passionately for his country's accession to the Union. He also stated that Turkey can help Europe to become a major player on the international stage if it is admitted to the club.
Germany is critical of Turkish EU-membership. German Chancellor Angela Merkel said "accession is not a one-way street" and Turkey must fulfil the criteria. During the 2009 EU election campaign, she said she would prefer Turkey to receive a privileged partnership from the EU, rather than full membership, echoing recent comments made by French President Nicolas Sarkozy (EurActiv 08/05/09 and 11/05/09).
Merkel's stance crystallised in Germany after the September 2009 federal elections: the new coalition partner of the CDU, the liberal FDP, is critical of Turkish accession, unlike the former 'grand coalition' partner, the SDP.
Meanwhile, Germany remains Turkey's most important economic and commercial partner within the EU. The volume of bilateral trade, worth 14 billion euros annually, has doubled in the past ten years. Nearly 14% of Turkey's exports go to Germany, while 17% of Germany's total exports go to Turkey. There are nearly 1,100 German companies operating in Turkey today, and over three million German tourists visit Turkey each year. There are an estimated 2.5 million Turks living in Germany today, and 600,000 of them have already become German citizens.
France appears to have become increasingly sceptical on the issue of Turkish EU membership. While former President Jacques Chirac had been a vocal albeit lukewarm supporter of Ankara's ambitions, the referendum on the EU Constitution brought to the fore the French public's reservations.
French President Nicolas Sarkozy is firmly opposed to Turkish membership of the EU, claiming that "Europe has been lying about its borders. Turkey is in Asia Minor and not in Europe". Sarkozy believes Europe should suspend accession talks with Turkey and instead work towards a "privileged partnership".
Paris and Ankara signed an action plan in 1998 which introduced a strategic dimension to French-Turkish relations. French companies are listed as the biggest investors in Turkey, although France ranks only fifth in terms of volume of investment. Turkey exported 2.12 billion US dollars' worth of goods to France in 2002, while the value of its imports totalled 1.76 billion US dollars.
France ranks as the fourth-largest source of tourism for Turkey. Meanwhile, the largely anti-Islamic far right has been making significant advances on the French political scene - against a backdrop of growing public reluctance to admit new members to the EU.
The United Kingdom remains a strong supporter of Turkish EU membership. In a major foreign policy speech on 26 October 2009, UK Foreign Secretary David Miliband stated that turning Turkey away from EU membership would be "unconscionable" (EurActiv 27/10/09).
Turkey is a significant trading partner of the UK. In 2002, Britain was Turkey's third-largest export destination and sixth-largest source of imports. Total bilateral trade for 2002 amounted to 3.7 billion pounds.
Italy remains one of the strongest advocates of Turkish EU accession, and this support spans the whole political spectrum. President of the Republic Giorgio Napolitano stressed that "Turkey represents an added value for Europe. It is necessary to continue negotiations for entry without unnecessary obstructionism".
Silvio Berlusconi, Italy's prime minister, is also supportive of Turkish accession and claimed that he would try to win over reluctant states (EurActiv 13/11/09).
Greece, Turkey's historical foe, keeps its distance from debates on whether Turkey should join the Union or rather become its 'privileged partner'. Officially Athens says that Turkey's EU integration is welcome, given that by getting closer to the club, Ankara needs to respect its rules. Nonetheless, problems remain concerning territorial and airspace quarrels between the two countries and they maintain a clear distance on the Cyrpus issue (EurActiv 28/08/09).
The Republic of Cyprus stressed that Ankara would negatively affect its EU accession bid if it did not begin complying with its obligations to normalise relations with Nicosia by December 2009 and added that that there must be consequences when there are no improvements on the Cyprus issue for a number of years. Cypriot Foreign Affairs Minister Markos Kyprianou stated: "If eventually Turkey comes to believe that it belongs more to the East than the West, this will have consequences for its EU relations" (EurActiv 29/10/09).
Poland, which joined the EU as a full member on 1 May 2004, has been wary that Turkey, once accepted into the EU club, would draw massive subsidies and would also be too big a country for the Union to swallow. Nevertheless, Warsaw has also repeatedly expressed full support for Turkey's EU membership bid.
Luxembourg's Prime Minister Jean-Claude Juncker said: "It must also be possible for us to introduce different treaty relations for new members."
He added: "Not all EU member states need go along with, and incorporate, EU policies with the same degree of intensity. I believe that if it moves in the direction of 35 to 40 member states, the EU needs to devise a new form of membership intensity."
Turkey counts as a key ally for the United States, and thus Washington believes that the EU should take in the largely Muslim Mediterranean nation as a full member. For the US, Turkey's EU membership would create a stable role model for the whole Islamic world.
In his April 2009 trip to Turkey, US President Barack Obama, speaking to the Turkish assembly, said: "Let me be clear, the United States strongly supports Turkey's bid to become a member of the European Union." He also pointed out Turkey's strategic energy role (EurActiv 07/04/09).