EU-Turkey relations[fr][de] 

Ever since the foundation of modern day Turkey in 1923, this country with a predominantly Muslim population has been a secular democracy closely aligned with the West. Turkey was a founding member of the United Nations, and a member of NATO (since 1952), the Council of Europe (1949), the OECD (1961) and an associate member of the Western European Union (1992). Ankara chose to begin co-operating  closely with the then European Economic Community in 1959, and Turkey's prospective membership in the EEC's successor, the European Union, has been a source of much debate since.

Timeline:

• Feb. 1952: Turkey becomes a  full member of NATO .
• Sept. 1959: Ankara applies for associate membership of the European Economic Community
• Sept. 1963: The  Ankara Agreement (an association agreement) is signed to take Turkey to Customs Union and finally to full EEC membership. The first financial protocol is also signed.
• Nov. 1970: The  Additional Protocol and the second financial protocol signed in Brussels.
• Jan. 1973: The Additional Protocol enters into force. It sets out comprehensively how the Customs Union would be established
• July 1974: Turkey invades Cyprus.
• During the first half of the 1980s, relations between Turkey and the Community come to a virtual freeze following the military coup d'etat on 12 September 1980.
• June 1980: The Association Council decides to decrease customs duties on almost all agricultural products to "zero" by 1987.
• Sept. 1986: The Turkey-EEC Association Council meeting revives the association process.
• 14 April 1987: Turkey applies for full EEC membership.
• Dec. 1989: The Commission endorses Turkey's eligibility for membership but defers the assessment of its application.
• March 1995: Turkey-EU Association Council finalises the agreement on the  Customs Union , which enters into force on 1 January 1996.
• Dec. 1997: At the Luxembourg Summit, EU leaders decline to grant candidate status to Turkey.
• Dec. 1999: EU Helsinki Council decides on the  candidate status of Turkey .
• March 2001: The EU Council of Ministers adopts  EU-Turkey Accession Partnership .
• March 2001: The Turkish government adopts the  National Programme of Turkey for the adoption of EU laws.
• Sept. 2001: Turkish parliament adopts over 30 amendments to the constitution in order to meet the Copenhagen political criteria for EU membership.
• Aug. 2002: The Turkish Parliament passes sweeping reforms to meet the EU's human rights criteria.
• 13 Dec. 2002: The Copenhagen European Council resolves that if the European Council in December 2004, on the basis of a report and a recommendation from the Commission, decides that Turkey fulfils the Copenhagen political criteria, the      EU would open accession negotiations with Turkey  . In the meantime, EU leaders have agreed to extend and deepen co-operation on the EC-Turkey Customs Union and to provide Turkey with increased pre-accession financial assistance.
• May 2003: The EU Council of Ministers decides on the principles, priorities, intermediate objectives and conditions of the  Accession Partnership with Turkey .
• Jan. 2004: Turkey signs protocol banning death penalty in all circumstances, a move welcomed by the EU.
• March 2004:  Council of Europe recommends ending monitoring of Turkey .
• Oct. 2004:        Commission issues progress report on Turkey .
• 17 Dec. 2004:    European Council decided to open accession negotiations with Turkey on 3 October 2005 - with strings attached.
• 23 May 2005: Turkey names Economy Minister Ali Babacan as the country's chief accession negotiator.
• 1 June 2005: Turkey's revised penal code, first adopted in September 2004, enters into force.
• 17 June 2005: The Council reiterates the EU's determination to proceed with the enlargement process.
• 29 June 2005: The Commission presents its "rigorous" negotiating framework to Ankara.
• 29 July 2005: Turkey signs protocol to Ankara agreement, extending EU-15 customs union to the ten new member states including Cyprus. Ankara also issues a declaration on the non-recognition of Cyprus.
• 21 Sept. 2005: The EU approves its counter-declaration on Turkey's 29 July declaration.
• 3 Oct. 2005: Accession talks symbolically opened with Turkey.
• 23 Jan. 2006: The Council decides on the principles, priorities and conditions contained in the Accession Partnership with Turkey.
• 16 March: The European Parliament adopts a resolution based on a report by Elmar Brok on the Commission’s enlargement strategy paper.
• 12 Apr. 2006: The Selection Panel for the European Capital of Culture 2010 recommends Istanbul.
• 12 June 2006: The EU starts concrete accession negotiations with Turkey. The negotiating framework specifies 35 chapters. Each chapter needs to be unanimously opened and closed by the Council. The Council agrees on opening and closure of the chapter on science and research.
• 12-27 July 2006: The court ruling on “Turkishness” in the case of Hrant Dink sends an ambivalent signal to the EU and raises concerns over freedom of expression in Turkey.
• 31 July 2006: Hardliner General Yasar Büyükanit is appointed chief of the Turkish military.
• 4 Sept. 2006: European Parliament votes a report concerning Turkey’s progress on preparing for membership. The report says that Turkey had made insufficient progress in the areas of freedom of expression, minority rights, corruption and violence against women.
• 8 Nov. 2006: Commission publishes a critical report on Turkey’s accession progress.  

In its 17 December 2004 decision, the European Council recognised Turkey’s “significant legislative progress in many areas” but added that “these need to be further consolidated and broadened”. Furthermore, the report also took note of the improvements in the country’s economic stability and predictability and the strengthened independence and efficiency of the judiciary. Regarding the respect for human rights and the exercise of fundamental freedoms, “Turkey has acceded to most relevant international and European conventions”. 

Most importantly for Ankara, Turkey got a fixed date (3 October 2005) for starting membership negotiations. The Turkish side had originally hoped for an earlier date, in view of the Copenhagen summit commitment that the EU would open talks "without delay" once Turkey is deemed to have made sufficient progress in its reforms.

Under the Council’s decision, a framework for Turkey’s EU membership negotiations was established by the Commission. This document was released on 29 June. The negotiating framework, which has been described by Enlargement Commissioner Olli Rehn as "rigorous", rests on the following elements: 

• The underlying and shared objective of the talks will be Turkey’s accession. However, the negotiations will be “open-ended”, which means that their outcome cannot be guaranteed beforehand. 
• At the end of the talks, should Turkey fail to qualify in full for all obligations of EU membership as specified in the Copenhagen criteria, EU member states would still ensure that Ankara is “fully anchored in the European structures through the strongest possible bond”. 
• The accession negotiations will be conducted in the framework of an Intergovernmental Conference with the participation of Turkey and all EU member states. The policy issues will be broken down into 35 policy areas (chapters) - more than ever before - and the decisions will require unanimity. 
• The EU may consider the inclusion of long transition periods, derogations, specific arrangements or permanent safeguard clauses in its proposals for each framework. 
• Membership talks with candidates “whose accession could have substantial financial consequences” (such as Turkey) can only be concluded after 2014, the scheduled date for the establishment of the EU’s new financial framework. 
• Accession negotiations can be suspended in case of a “serious and persistent breach […] of the principles of democracy, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms and the rule of law on which the Union is founded”. Suspension would require a Commission initiative or a request to that effect by one third of the member states. The final decision would be made by the Council by qualified majority, and the European Parliament would be informed. 
• Under a compromise formula agreed at the December 2004 EU Council, before 3 October 2005 Turkey would have to sign a protocol that will adapt the 1963 Ankara Treaty to the ten new member states of the EU, including the Greek Cypriot government. For practical purposes this would amount to an implicit recognition of this government for the first time since the island’s division in 1974. “The adoption of this protocol is in no way recognition, and I’ve put this on the record,” Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan has said. The deal did not include a commitment from Ankara that the protocol would be ratified by the Turkish parliament before October 2005. As for the other key condition: Turkey on 1 June 2005 enacted the country's revised penal code.

Throughout Europe, the arguments that surround Turkey's projected accession revolve around a series of issues, ranging from demographic through geographic to political. One commonly raised point is that, if and when it were to join the EU, Turkey would become the EU's most populated member state. Turkey's current population is 71 million, and demographers project it to increase to 80-85 million in the next 20 years. This compares with the largest current EU member state Germany, which has 83 million people today, but whose population is projected to decrease to around 80 million by 2020.

Another argument is rooted in the age-old debate on whether it is possible to establish geographic borders for Europe, and whether Turkey 'fits' within these borders. This is seen by many as a dispute that rests on philosophical and intellectual prejudgements, especially since the Treaty of Rome is widely accepted to aim for the construction of a union of European states based on shared common values.

Perhaps the most sensitive of all arguments centre on the cultural and religious differences. Since the EU identifies itself as a cultural and religious mosaic that recognises and respects diversity, the supporters of Turkey's EU bid believe that, as long as both Turkey and the EU member states maintain this common vision, cultural and religious differences should be irrelevant.

The EU member states' concerns over Turkey's human rights record as well as global and regional security-related issues have also been key factors behind Turkey's prolonged application process.

The future of the divided island of Cyprus has also been a major sticking point. The Council's December 2004 decision entailed a compromise formula on the Cyprus issue, under which the affected sides were expected to work towards a solution to the conflict before the scheduled 3 October 2005 launch of membership talks with Ankara, however conflict still remains unresolved. Cyprus is a decisive factor in the negotiation process. Cyprus demands official recognition by Turkey and access to Turkish harbours and airports. Turkey demands putting and end to the isolation of Northern Cyprus and emphasises that it was the Greek side of the island that rejected the UN’s plan in 2004. 

The results of the referenda on the EU Constitution during the first half of 2005 - especially the No votes in France and the Netherlands - have been detrimental to Turkey's EU bid. Although subsequent research and surveys have failed to prove that enlargement in general, and Turkey's candidancy in particular, were key factors behind the public's rejection of the Constitution, the summer of 2005 still witnessed an increase Europe-wide of scepticism towards Turkey's European prospects.

Turkey needs to make further progress in the area of freedom of speech. More specifically the EU would like to see a reform of Turkey's penal code and the controversial article 301, which serves as a basis for the so-called "Turkishness-cases" against writers and journalists.

With Turkish parliamentary elections coming up in 2007 and domestic support for an EU membership in decline, the issues seem to be increasingly difficult to resolve. Turkey’s public is more and more tired of the negotiation process. A recent Eurobarometer showed that only 44% of Turks thought EU membership would be a good thing, compared to 66% in spring 2005. A survey by the German Marshall Fund of the US, published in June, confirmed this tendency.  Turkish politicians are increasingly making use of this sentiment, especially with a view to the upcoming elections. An expression of this is the criticism expressed by Turkey's public concerning Pope Benedict's comments on Islam on 15 September 2006.

Germany, which will hold the EU Presidency from 1 January 2007, is critical of Turkish EU-membership. Christian Democrat leader Angela Merkel says, "accession one-way streets." Turkey must fulfil the criteria. Her governing Christian-Democrat party rejects Turkish membership and wants to offer a “privileged partnership” instead of Turkish membership. Meanwhile, Germany remains Turkey's most important economic and commercial partner within the EU. The volume of bilateral trade, worth 14 billion euro annually, has doubled in the past ten years. Nearly 14 per cent of Turkey's exports go to Germany, while 17 per cent of Germany's total exports go to Turkey. There are nearly 1,100 German companies operating in Turkey today, and over three million German tourists visit Turkey each year. There are an estimated 2.5 million Turks living in Germany today, and 600,000 of them have already become German citizens.

Britain remains a strong supporter of Turkish EU membership. UK Foreign Secretary David Miliband stated in September 2007, that the EU "needs, as a clear goal, the inclusion of Turkey as a full member". Turkey is a significant trading partner of the UK. In 2002, Britain was Turkey's third largest export destination and sixth largest import source. Total bilateral trade for 2002 reached 3.7 billion pounds.

France, along with Austria, has pledged to hold a referendum on Turkey's EU accession, appears to become increasingly sceptical on the issue. While President Chirac has been a vocal albeit luke-warm supporter of Ankara's ambitions, the referendum on the EU Constitution brought to the fore the French public's reservations. 

Newly-elected President Nicolas Sarkozy is firmly opposed to Turkish membership to the EU. He said that the European Union was not only an idea but also a geographical entity and ruled out Turkish membership. Sarkozy further added that Europe should suspend accession talks with Turkey and instead work towards a "privileged partnership." Paris and Ankara signed an action plan in 1998 which introduced a strategic dimension to Turkish-French relations. French companies are listed as the biggest investors in Turkey, although France ranks only fifth in terms of volume of investment. Turkey exported 2.12 billion US dollars worth of goods to France in 2002 while the value of its imports totalled 1.76 billion US dollars. France ranks as the fourth largest source of tourism for Turkey. Meanwhile, the largely anti-Islamic far right has been making significant advances on the French political scene - against the backdrop of slightly increasing public reluctance to admitting new members to the EU-15 club. 

Commission President Jose Manuel Barroso responded to Sarkozy's remarks saying: "The accession talks with Turkey are pursued on the basis of a mandate handed down unanimously by the member states." He added: "If one - or several - member states want to modify this mandate it is up to them to try to get it changed, and accept the consequences." Barroso made clear that the current talks should go on: "It is the view of the Commission that we should continue the negotiations, and we recommend that member states should not take any definitive decision until the end of the negotiations."

Greece, Turkey's traditional enemy, has by now practically become a cheerleader for Ankara's EU membership. According to Athens, it is better to have Turkey in the club than outside. "We simply believe that if and when [Turkey] joins the European Union it will be obliged to observe these rules and values. This will by itself resolve most of our problems," said former Greek Defence Minister Yannos Papantoniou. The government of Greek Prime Minister Costas Karamanlis continues with this goodwill approach.

Poland, which joined the EU as a full member on 1 May 2004, has been wary that Turkey, once accepted into the EU club, would draw massive subsidies and would also be way too big a country for the Union to swallow. Nevertheless, Warsaw has also repeatedly expressed full support for Turkey's EU membership bid.

Luxembourg's Prime Minister Jean-Claude Juncker said: "It must also be possible for us to introduce different treaty relations for new members." He added: "Not all EU member states need go along with, and incorporate, EU policies with the same degree of intensity. I believe that if it moves in the direction of 35 to 40 member states, the EU needs to devise a new form of membership intensity."

Turkey counts as a key ally for the United States, and thus Washington believes that the EU should take in the largely Muslim Mediterranean nation as a full member. For the US, Turkey's EU membership would create a stable role model for the whole Islamic world.

Commission President Jose Manuel Barroso has said that the EU remains wedded to its commitments, but at the same time he made it clear that the European public's concerns about Turkey's prospective membership cannot be ignored. The "signals sent by the electorate [should be] discussed seriously", he said. For this end, the Commission has announced its intention to initiate a civil society dialogue across the member states about enlargement in general and Turkey's accession in particular. In 2006, some 40 million euro will be earmarked for this project. On 25 September 2006, the Commission president called for an enlargement pause after Bulgaria and Romania join the bloc. He said: “I do not think it would be wise to proceed with any enlargements before we have resolved the constitutional issue in Europe.”