Towards a 'collective government' for the Union? 

Towards a 'collective government' for the Union?

The following recommendations address the need for enhancing the ability of the European Union to providing 'governing functions'. The absence of a body named 'government' does not mean that there is no need of a political authority carrying out 'governing functions', quite the contrary. For the purposes of this argument, therefore, the definition of 'executive' and 'executive powers' is deliberately limited to the sphere of 'government' and related distinctive powers. The important dimension of 'execution', that is policy implementation (including 'comitology'), while closely related, is not subject of this analysis.

Key Recommendations

• The forthcoming enlargement of the European Union and the key issues at the top of the political agenda - ensuring internal security for EU citizens, enhancing the role of the EU in shaping global governance and promoting social and economic cohesion across the Union - require a strengthening of the EU institutional framework and significant reinforcement of the political legitimacy and leadership of the Union. A 'government' of the Union is needed.
• Thesui generisnature of the Union as an evolving political actor implies that 'governing functions' cannot be allocated to just one institution. Only a much improved cooperation between the Commission, the Council of Ministers and the European Council, together with the High Representative for CFSP can provide solid foundations to a 'collective government'. In this context, each institution should play to its strengths in order to maximise the efficiency of their cooperation. It is of crucial importance that the role of the Commission in initiating policies and legislation, independently and in the pursuit of the common interest, is preserved.
• The President of the Commission should be elected by the European Parliament after European elections, and receive the approval of the European Council by majority voting. Voters should be free to choose their preferred Commission President candidate, from the different lists proposed by European political parties during the electoral campaign. After a transitional stage when the size of the Commission is capped at 20 and equal rotation between Member States is established, the President should be free to select his or her team, and the Treaty should make no reference to the size of the Commission. The President could use his powers of decision upon the internal organisation of the college in order to select a limited number of Vice-Presidents responsible for the coordination of key policy areas. In this capacity, they would also supervise the work of other Commissioners whose tasks fall in the same policy domain. These Vice-Presidents could form a smaller college within the Commission, depending on the size of the latter.
• The Council of Ministers should be streamlined and its capacity for policy coordination enhanced. At the top of the Council, the General Affairs Council (GAC) should be responsible for policy coordination and for the preparation of the European Council. It should be separated from a newly established CFSP Council. Also, a new Legislative Council should be created, and should be the only body responsible for dealing with the European Parliament all along the legislative procedure. Below the GAC and the Legislative Council, the number of Council formations should be limited to five or six. At the bottom of this structure, 'Ministerial Committees' would include national ministers preparing Council's positions, to be then forwarded to Council formations for decisions to be taken.
• A thorough re-thinking of the role and institutional position of the European Council should be undertaken. The role of the European Council in providing political leadership through strategic guidelines for the development of the Union is vital. In this context, the European Council s hould work with the President of the Commission and the European Parliament to establish a five-year political programme, on the basis of a proposal submitted by the Commission, to be reviewed every year. The European Council should also have the responsibility to deliver timely decisions and recommendations on more specific policy developments, notably in the area of CFSP.
• However, it should be clear that, when Heads of State and Government are required to take final decisions upon matters where EU legislation is to be adopted - following failure to reach agreement in Council formations - they cannot meet as European Council. A general provision of the Treaty should foresee that, when that is the case, Heads of State and Government meet as Legislative Council. If that is the case, they should abide by the voting procedures envisaged in the Treaty and their decisions would be legal acts subject to the jurisdiction of the European Court of Justice.
• The idea that members of the European Council should appoint a President of the European Council for two and a half to five years is to be rejected. The democratic legitimacy of such appointment would be weak and his powers very unclear. The elected President of the Commission should chair the European Council. The High Representative should flank the president of the Commission in this task, and promote policy development in the area of CFSP. That would avoid any risk of power struggle at the top of the Union, and would be a positive step in terms of policy coordination, effective decision-making and democratic leadership for the Union.
• The current system of rotating the Presidency of the Council should be abolished. The GAC should be chaired by a Vice-President of the Commission responsible for Policy Coordination and relations with the Council. That would enhance the Council's ability to act speedily, achieve compromise, and oversee policy developments. The GAC should include national Ministers empowered to speak on behalf of the Head of State or Government who appointed them. The other Council formations, and the Legislative Council, would elect their own Chairman for two and a half years, out of their members. The Council for CFSP, however, would be chaired by the High Representative. The Commission could well chair Ministerial Committees, acting as facilitator in reaching common positions to be forwarded to Council formations.
• The High Representative should evolve into a new Foreign Secretary of the EU. This position should be clearly separated from the position of Secretary General of the Council. He should chair the CFSP Council and the Ministerial Committee of Defence Ministers. He should be invited to participate in meetings of the Commission as observer, in order to report upon priorities in international affairs and debate with the college. He should head a newly established EU Department for Foreign and Security Affairs, to be set up as a distinct entity from the Council and from the Commission, but in close working cooperation with the latter. In this context, exchanges with national diplomatic services and cooperation with the diplomatic network of the Union and of Member States should be enhanced much further.
• The Treaty should include provisions enabling the powers, responsibilities and institutional position of the High Representative/ Foreign Secretary to be reviewed by qualified majority voting after a set period of time. The High Representative for CFSP and the related services should eventually be incorporated in the Commission, for the sake of coherent policy-making and consistency in the external representation of the Union. The High Representative should become Vice-President of the Commission with a special status and distinctive proceedings should be established whereby the 'Community method' would not apply to decisions with military implications.

Introduction

The EU is not and will not be a super-state. But a government without a state - and a community of people feeling part of it - has never existed, and many consider it will never, as it would lack the basis for its legitimacy and strength. That being said, European integration has always been an essentially political process and European decision-making is a highly political game. However, the EU does not have a body responsible for leadership, strategic policy-making, policy coordination, and emergency decisions: a government.

On the other hand, both the increased heterogeneity of a Union at 25+ Member States and the nature of the policy areas currently on the agenda for further integration - all with implications for the core of national sovereignty - demand solutions which require the Union to develop a 'government'.

The Union must show EU citizens that joint action is best suited to confront many urgent needs and to provide credible and sustainable solutions. That is true both with regard to the internal security of the Union (including cross-border issues of international crime, immigration, asylum, environmental protection etc.) and if the Union is to play a serious role in world affairs including a contribution to future global governance. Fragmentation and divergence between a range of national preferences, and resistance on the part of Member States to relinquish further their formal sovereignty, may otherwise prevail, in the absence of a more authoritative framework of reference for decision-making.

This is the assumption that inspires this paper: qualitatively new circumstances, affecting both the size of the Union and its core-tasks for the future, require strengthening the executive power in the Union.

Any reform of EU executive powers, which aims at providing the Union with an institutional framework backed by credible political authority and leading to more efficient decision-making, must lead to a sustainable, transparent and accountable mechanism which allows the various actors to play their part with effect.

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