According to the author, the recent statements by Algerian President Bouteflika and Russian President Putin expressing interest in the construction of a 'Gas-OPEC' has raised concern in Europe that Russia is further striving to "use energy as a lever to undermine European diplomacy". For their part, the Russian and Algerian leaders insist that their co-operation is intended to optimise their benefits and those of their customers alike.
Darbouche traces EU concern back to the Russian-Ukrainian gas dispute of 1 January 2006 as the moment when Europeans realised the "extent of their energy dependence on a 'partner' apparently ready to go to great lengths to restore its influence in its own immediate neighbourhood".
However, it was in August 2006 that fears over a possible 'cartelisation' of the gas market were first raised. This followed the signing of a Mememorandum of Understanding between Gazprom and Sonatrach, which between them account for nearly 40% of Europe's gas supplies (26% from Russia and 12% from Algeria).
The author says that it was "the discretion and the opacity surrounding the conclusion of the agreement which sparked this anxiety", and that it has been a subject of concern for those European countries heavily dependant on either source since then.
Darbouche concludes by saying that Russia-Algerian co-operation appears, prima facie "to be a move aimed at co-ordinating not just their upstream activities but also the downstream, including controlling gas prices and volumes." However, he believes that the "triadic relationship between Russia-Algeria-EU shows that a gas cartel is an unlikely eventuality and that fears of a gas OPEC have been exaggerated." This, he argues, is largely due to the fact that Russia and Algeria lack a shared geopolitical ground in their relations with the EU.
