In early 2002 Antoinette Primatarova joined the Bulgarian NGO Centre for Liberal Strategies. At the CLS she is carrying out research on different projects linked both to the EU in general and to Bulgaria’s accession to the EU in particular. From 1993 to 2001 Antoinette Primatarova served in different positions within the Bulgarian diplomatic service. From 1993 to 1997 she worked as Bulgaria’s Ambassador to Sweden, Norway and Iceland, from 1997 to 1999 as Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs and from 1999 to 2001 as Bulgaria’s Ambassador to the European Communities.
The Commission's monitoring report on Bulgaria’s progress has been interpreted in different ways. Some highlight it as being constructive criticism whereas others consider it to be a last warning. Who would you tend to agree with?
I would prefer a different wording. The relation between the European Union and Bulgaria at this final stage before accession is a relation between partners committed to a common goal. Bulgaria joining the EU in 2007. Both criticising and warning presuppose a different type of relation – an unequal one between let us say a schoolmaster and his still minor pupil that is not fully aware of the master’s noble goals.
In the framework of partnership and a shared common goal the monitoring report is simply a useful road map – a survey of the tasks that still have to be accomplished. Thus, the way one reads the Commission’s report reflects the way one frames the relations between Bulgaria and the EU.
In Bulgaria there is a strong tendency to interpret the Commission’s reports in the evaluation-type language of ‘criticism’ and ‘warnings’. On the one hand, the Commission’s reports are considered as a welcome straitjacket on the Bulgarian political elite because of its high legal status. On the other hand, there are still Bulgarians who do not actually believe that the EU wants Bulgaria. They tend to interpret the reports as a straitjacket on Bulgaria in general.
Outside Bulgaria, there is a strong tendency to consider the relations between acceding countries and the EU as a schoolmaster-pupil relation, too. This explains the use of the same evaluation-type language and the many different metaphors - 'yellow card', 'red light' etc.
My impression is that the Bulgarian government does consider the monitoring report as a useful road map for the work that still has to be accomplished and that the Commission considers the time framework for following the roadmap as realistic, even if somewhat strained.
Maybe both in Bulgaria and outside Bulgaria the pessimistic readings of the monitoring report stem from an obsession with the accession date. As long as the accession date is not confirmed, many people tend to interpret any assessment of the present situation as putting the accession date and even membership into doubt. It might be helpful to understand that monitoring will go on beyond accession as well. After all, the Commission presents yearly monitoring reports on all member states with regard to their compliance with the acquis.
You mentioned the date scheduled for Bulgaria’s accession to the EU: would you say that 2007 has become less feasible after this report?
2007 is no less feasible after the report. Indeed, both before and after the release of the monitoring report there has been a lot of speculation in Bulgaria that the report puts 2007 seriously into question.
There is a simple explanation for this “pessimistic” reading of the monitoring report. It is linked to the extrapolation of the Commission’s October 2005 report during the process of political bargaining after the June general election. The result of this bargaining was a tripartite coalition government, a kind of a ‘grand coalition’ in which the two big partners and pre-election opponents [the Bulgarian Socialist Party and the National Movement Simeon II] run the risk of losing domestic credibility.
In this situation Bulgaria’s accession to the EU had to serve as the coalition’s political legitimacy. The October report became an essential element in the construction of legitimacy. Public opinion was left with the impression that the October 2005 report would be Bulgaria‘s D-day, that this report would recommend the lifting or the triggering of the safeguard clause (allowing for the postponement of Bulgaria’s accession to 2008).
Insiders always knew that monitoring would go on beyond October 2005 and that there would be further reports but the general expectation created during the summer months was for a green light in October.
Once it became clear that there will be no green light at this stage, the immediate interpretation was that the report must be a virtual red light. Even without elections the Commission wouldn’t give the much-hoped for green light at such an early stage - 15 months in advance of the scheduled accession day.
I don’t expect the April or May 2006 monitoring report to conclude that Bulgaria could not be ready by January 1 2007 and thus to recommend a triggering of the safeguard clause. Bulgarians should stop caring mainly about whether the safeguard clause would be triggered or not. The domestic debate should be much more on being well prepared for membership.
Do you think Bulgaria could be well prepared for membership by the time of accession?
Preparedness should be assessed (as the Commission does) both with regard to Bulgaria’s ability to fully benefit from EU funds and with regard to Bulgaria’s ability to fully contribute to the functioning of the internal market and the security of the EU.
As regards Bulgaria’s preparation for EU membership, the turning point was 1997 and the process has been going on since then. Any delays due to the pre-election and post-election months of 2005 must be seen against this background - a slow-down of a few months, far from bringing the process to a grinding halt. It is much more important to be aware that the preparation process will not end with a watershed – be it a monitoring report with a clear recommendation for the accession date or the accession date itself.
Especially as regards Bulgaria’s ability to fully benefit from EU membership, the process of fine-tuning Bulgarian domestic policies with EU policies will continue even beyond accession. This process is and should be mainly a Bulgarian concern.
I would say that EU membership is the absolutely necessary but not sufficient precondition for the further improvement of people’s life. There is a need in Bulgaria to concentrate more and more on the complementary domestic agendas. The challenge is not to neglect reforms in areas that are not covered by EU policies and where there are no European road maps - the broad field of education, healthcare, pensions etc.
As regards Bulgaria’s ability to cope with the requirements of the internal market and the European area of freedom, security and justice, the agenda is predetermined by the existing acquis, it is quite explicit and I am confident that Bulgaria will cope with it.
The Commission does not expect any miracles from Bulgaria. Bulgaria has simply to build on its track record. I have the impression that this is not always understood and that both ordinary people and politicians tend to see January 1 2007 as a watershed, a day of awakening in a new perfect reality.
Bulgaria will not be a country of a dream realm by January 1 2007 but membership will make delivering both on the European agenda and on the domestic one much easier. With the track record already achieved, Bulgaria will be able to tackle any remaining shortcomings much more easily as a member of the European Union.
