Sinn Féin : "Il y a toujours un plan B"[en] 

From your perspective, what is the current state of play in Ireland as the referendum draws near? 

While the opinion polls have the 'yes' side ahead, it's clear that the shift in undecided voters is significantly more to the 'no' side. I don't think anyone would be betting with any certainty on which way the referendum would go. All is to play for. 

What responses are you getting from voters you meet on the campaign trail? 

I've been canvassing for four weeks, and at least half of the people we're talking to are deeply confused about the treaty, and unhappy and frustrated at how short the government's information campaign has been. They feel they haven't had enough time to grapple with the complexity of these issues. 

We're also finding that many people who would traditionally have voted 'yes' are concerned about a number of issues, notably the lack of positive reasons to vote 'yes' from the government and other large parties. The government is instead spending all its time telling people what will happen if they vote 'no'. There is a sense out there that the government is being bullish, even bullying, in some of its approaches - saying that Ireland will be the pariah of Europe and that we'll lose jobs as well as foreign direct investment - and people are reacting against that. 

There's also quite a wide level of awareness that France and the Netherlands rejected the Constitutional Treaty, a text that Bertie Ahern [former Irish prime minister] said is almost identical to the current Lisbon Treaty. People are asking us why the French rejected the previous treaty, and we tell them that the main issues concerned democracy and public services. 

Break it down for us. Why is Sinn Féin opposed to this treaty? 

We believe it's a bad deal for Ireland, the European Union and the developing world. 

Firstly, Ireland: We believe the institutional changes are bad for small countries like us. The loss of a commissioner, the reduction in voting strength – these and other changes represent to us a bad deal for European democracy but especially for smaller states. Ireland has a strong record of punching above its weight at the EU level, but at a time of expansion within the Union we think it's vital that Ireland keeps the institutional and procedural clout that it currently has. 

The 'yes' side argues that Lisbon will in fact strengthen the position of small countries because of expanded QMV, equal loss of a commissioner and other measures. How would you respond? 

We believe that while in theory everybody is affected equally negatively by the loss of a commissioner, larger states are compensated by the increase of voting strength at Council level through new QMV procedures. 

For example, the way in which a blocking minority will operate – if you're developing a piece of legislation at the Commission table, you will be more conscious of which of the larger states can form a blocking minority, whereas the wishes of one or two or three smaller states won't be present in the mind of those drafting legislation. 

Also, there is no empirical evidence to support the claim that this will streamline the Commission. We've been told again and again that this efficiency measure was required after enlargement, to trim down the unwieldy Commission. There's not a single shred of evidence to back that up. 

I think this proposal is less about efficiency and more about breaking the connection between member states and commissioners. We all know that commissioners are supposed to be independent and represent the European ideal, but we also all know that the interests of individual member states find their way into the early drafts of legislation via their commissioners. 

Sinn Féin argues that the Treaty will affect Irish neutrality. Can you explain why? 

Our definition of neutrality is based on international law, which means not only what you do with your troops, but what you do with your territory, your defence spending and whether you're a part of military alliances. 

While Ireland will maintain a veto in terms of sending troops abroad, we are very concerned that over a series of treaties, there has been a slow but clear movement towards the build-up of a European defence capability. Those of us who have worked in Brussels know that there are many supporters of this, and we feel more of this stand-alone European defence capability is being put in place by the Lisbon Treaty. 

Talk to us about tax – a key element of the 'no' campaign. 

The arguments that we put forward from the beginning have nothing to do with the Irish veto on tax, which will remain if the Treaty is ratified. What concerns us is the Simplified Revision Procedure in Article 48, which we feel weakens the ability of the government to defend its position in relation to tax. 

At present there are two lines of defence for preventing the transfer of tax power from the Oireachtas [Irish Parliament] to the EU institutions: the veto at Council level, but also the existing procedure for revising treaties, which currently requires a new Irish referendum on any shift of tax matters from unanimity to QMV. 

We feel that the new Procedure in Article 48 could deny the Irish people a referendum on future tax revisions. Therefore the state would lose its second line of defence in the face of huge European pressure to bring in a common corporate European tax base – something we believe momentum is building for. 

During its campaign, Sinn Féin has mentioned the need to 'retain Irish influence in the EU'. If Lisbon is defeated, how would that be achieved? 

When we talk about retaining Irish influence, we mean our opposition to losing a commissioner and voting strength at Council level. 

Many people argue that if Ireland were to vote 'no', it would undermine our standing in the EU - Ireland would thus be forced to operate at the margins and as a result, we would lose some of that informal or soft power we have at an EU level. 

We would argue to the contrary: if we vote 'no', then the political heads of the EU, if they want to continue with this reform process, would have to listen very carefully to what the Irish say and respond accordingly. 

Look at the French and Dutch, who both rejected the Constitution. They weren't isolated, they didn't become the pariahs of Europe. Having said that, the European institutions and other political players didn't really listen to what the people were saying. As a result, the changes that were made between the Constitutional text and the Lisbon Treaty were quite cosmetic. 

We would argue that if Ireland votes 'no' it would be the third 'no' in a row and the European institutions would have to sit back and really listen to what we are saying. The Irish government would then have a strong position from which to negotiate a better deal, not only for us but for other member states whose populations clearly would have voted 'no' if they had been giving the opportunity. 

So you see a continuum between the French and Dutch rejections of the Constitution and a potential Irish 'no'? 

I don't think you can see it as anything else. One of the really interesting things about the French rejection is that large groups of people who were expected to vote 'yes' voted 'no', particularly from the centre-left, that large section of Socialist voters who chose not to listen to their party. You can see a similar pattern emerging in Ireland. Whether this will be big enough to block the passage of the referendum is another matter. 

You mentioned a 'better deal' could be sought for Ireland. What would that better deal be? 

Simple points: keeping a permanent commissioner, maintaining voting strengths at their existing level, a protocol explicitly recognising the neutrality of member states like Ireland, a mechanism explicitly recognising public services and protecting them from liberalisation. We also want Irish opt-outs from Euratom, the European Defence Agency and any other defence-related expenditure. 

The other big thing is that there are a number of elements in the Treaty which we believe will allow the Commission to accelerate an already aggressive international trade agenda - we feel this could be devastating for the developing world. So we want clear commitments to prioritise fair trade over free trade. 

Finally, on a broader level, many people have argued that it's Ireland's duty to vote 'yes' to this Treaty, given how much the country has profited from EU membership. Commission President Barroso has said that there is 'no plan B' in the event of an Irish 'no'. Is it possible to be against this Treaty and still pro-EU? 

First of all, it's a fundamentally undemocratic proposition to suggest that there is no plan B, or to try and bully people with that very emotional kind of language. The point of a referendum is for citizens to freely and democratically decide if they like or don't like something, and there's an obligation on all politicians, whether in Ireland or anywhere else, to listen to what the people say. 

There's always a plan B – in politics as in life. The question is whether there is a will to have a plan B, and the political consensus is saying very clearly that there is no such will at the moment. If there's a 'no' in Ireland, that will could emerge very quickly.