Severin Fischer est un collaborateur de l'Institut allemand pour les affaires internationales et de sécurité (SWP) et professeur à l'université d'Erlangen-Nürnberg. Le Dr Oliver Geden est l'un des associés principaux du SWP et a publié de nombreux articles sur la politique énergétique européenne.
"Germany's so-called Energiewende (energy transition) of summer 2011 could be the final episode of a long-running political conflict over the use of nuclear energy. The policy change in the German energy strategy, prompted by the shock of the multiple reactor meltdowns at Fukushima, has sealed the phasing-out of nuclear power generation in Germany until 2022.
Despite the fundamental revision of its energy concept the German government has emphasised its commitment to existing expansion plans for renewables and the national climate target, even under these considerably altered circumstances. By 2020 at least 35% of electricity demand shall be generated by renewable means and greenhouse gas emissions are still to be cut by 40% (compared to 1990).
The European dimension of the German energy transition has been almost absent from the national debate, despite a strong Europeanisation push in the energy business and its regulatory framework over the last decades. The reach of national energy policy is consistently overestimated, and a twofold change of perspective is therefore necessary.
On the one hand, the desired effects of national policies must always be assessed in the context of the existing European environment. On the other, it is not enough to pursue the transition as a purely German project; it must also involve efforts to modify the European regulatory framework.
Integration vs. isolation
Energy experts warn that the rapid phasing out of nuclear power could lead to an increasing probability of power cuts, especially in winter when high demand meets a reduced supply of wind and solar power.
The solution lies less within Germany, but more in cooperation with neighbouring countries to develop the European internal energy market. Greater security of supply can be achieved most efficiently by expanding cross-border transmission links and improving cooperation between all actors involved. The European Networks of Transmission System Operators (ENTSO) for electricity and gas play an important role in managing load fluctuations. Cooperation between European energy regulators also needs to be improved. Not least, the widespread negative public connotation of electricity imports from neighbouring states must be overcome. In a European internal market for electricity, such imports are no risk to energy security.
The European climate target is the key
The immediate closure of eight German nuclear power plants and the successive shutdown of the remaining nine will lead to an increase of Germany's emissions from electricity production, as fossil fuels are burned to make up at least a part of the shortfall. The self-imposed target of reducing national greenhouse gas emissions by 40% by 2020 is unlikely to be achieved under these conditions.
This is a sensitive issue in the national political arena because it appears to undermine Germany's pioneering role on climate policy. In fact, if we examine the interaction of German and European instruments, this turns out to be nothing but a problem of political communication: total electricity production in the EU is subject to joint emissions trading, where national targets will be abolished in 2013 in favour of a single European target.
So if Germany burns more gas and coal, emissions will increase in Germany but not in the EU as a whole because increased demand for pollution rights by German power plant operators will push up the price of emissions certificates on the European exchanges. In the long run this will make higher-emission power stations in the EU unprofitable and squeeze them out of the market. In other words, any additional carbon dioxide emitted by coal- and gas-fired power stations in Germany will be balanced at the European level by the use of lower-CO2 facilities.
In awareness of these interrelations, German climate policy should be directed towards modifying the European regulatory framework rather than focussing on 'voluntary' national targets. If Germany wants to play its role as climate pioneer effectively, it must push for better investment incentives for climate-friendly technologies via CO2 pricing. Because this can only function at the overall European level, national initiatives must be brought into line with EU climate targets.
Most likely, the Danish Council Presidency in the first half of 2012 will take the last opportunity for an initiative to change the EU's CO2 reduction target for 2020 from 20% to 25–30%. The climate policy decisions involved in the energy transition would lead us to expect Germany to support this move.
The 'German Model'
With its Energiewende, Berlin has adopted an overall energy concept that is as yet unique for a major industrial country. At its heart is the acceleration of a technology path that ensures higher efficiency and an increase in the use of renewable energy sources, while, at the same time, phasing out nuclear energy.
The 'German model' is being closely watched in Europe and other parts of the world, especially the aspect of its economic viability. This in turn requires a critical examination of the transition costs, which are decisively influenced by the choice of the regulatory model.
The most important instrument of the transformation to a low-carbon economy is the national Renewable Energy Act of 2000. But the export-focussed German economy has always been dependent on the structure of its markets, especially the European internal market. The success of the German model therefore depends heavily on broader European demand, which can be influenced indirectly through a stricter limitation of CO2 certificates in the emissions trading scheme or directly through European support mechanisms for renewables.
New policies to promote renewable energy across Europe would not only expand the market for German products but probably also reduce the costs of the national energy transition. If state intervention on behalf of renewables remains restricted to the domestic market then the costs for the upcoming transformation of Germany's industrial base will increase tangibly. And that would rob the 'German model' of some of its attraction.
A European transition
With the adoption of a revised energy concept and the corresponding legislative decisions German energy policy is continuing a pathway that dates back to the first nuclear phase-out decision of 2000 under Gerhard Schröder's Social Democrat/Green coalition. But the circumstances have changed considerably since then.
The steady convergence of the European internal energy market and the emergence of a genuinely European climate policy limit the influence of national policy decisions. This trend will continue in the coming decade. If the Energiewende is reduced to a purely German affair this globally pioneering transformation project threatens to fail. If it is to succeed, Germany will have to concentrate on shaping European instruments to its needs."
