Do you think the recent gas dispute between Russia and the Ukraine was avoidable? What effect has the crisis had on Ukraine? Ukrainian President Viktor Yuschenko described the current gas deal as worse than that previously offered by the Russians last December.
It might have been possible to avoid the gas crisis. But for that, there was one condition: the behaviour of Russia. That was why we had the crisis. The crisis was intentionally created by Russia.
We began negotiations on the future gas contract for 2009 in August last year, but with no results. The Russians have created a situation of time pressure and pressure of circumstances, using international public opinion in their favour in order to discredit Ukraine.
So, the nature of this crisis was multifunctional and multidimensional. By the way, this is the second crisis we have lived through. The first one was the winter of 2005-2006. The European Union has not learned its lesson since then.
There were more reasons why Russian created the crisis:
One of the reasons was to get access to the Ukrainian gas transportation system, which is the largest in Europe at 38,800 kilometres long.
The second one was to punish Ukraine. Our country professes different values, democratic values, unlike Russia. We do so thanks to the victory of democracy in the Orange Revolution of 2004. We began to experience such punishment in 2005.
[The current situation] is a continuation of their consistent policy of pressure.
Third, they tried to show EU countries, including Slovakia, who the master is. They demonstrated their ability to use gas deliveries as an instrument of foreign and security policy.
They were also trying to extract the least favourable gas price for Ukrainians as a way of undermining the Ukrainian economy.
President Yuschenko travelled to Brussels last Tuesday (27 January). He promised that the gas crisis would never be repeated, while the EU promised closer cooperation with your country on energy issues. How has the image of Ukraine as a reliable transit partner been changed by the crisis?
In the past, when Soviet gas was transported from Siberia, as well as during recent years of independence, Ukraine was always a reliable transit country. Regarding reliability, there was no problem with Ukraine as a transit country.
Problems arose only whenever the Russians tried to close the faucet at the entrance to the Ukrainian gas transportation system. Ukraine cannot implement the contractual obligations of Russians. Russia has to deliver gas to the entrance, and then we will deliver that gas to the consumer countries, including Slovakia. If there is no gas, how can Ukraine fulfill its commitments as a transit country?
By the way, except for Russia, Ukraine is the biggest transit country in Europe. Its gas transit capability is 150-170 billion cubic metres per year. Russia is currently transiting 110 billion cubic metres of its own gas through Ukraine. The capacity of our transportation system is much bigger and can carry more than it does at present.
My conclusion is that Ukraine has never, ever created problems as a transit country in carrying Russian gas to the countries of European Union. This was the case in 2006 and this January too.
As soon as Russia began to deliver gas to the entrance of the Ukrainian transportation system, we secured those deliveries for consumer countries. From 1-6 January, Ukraine exported all gas from Russia to EU countries.
However, there were no contracts [at that time], because the Russians were opposed to concluding fair ones. In such circumstances, Russia did not deliver the technical gas required for Ukraine to transport gas through its transit system. You know, we need 21 million cubic metres a day in order to pump all gas through our pipelines from the far east to the far west of Ukraine.
It meant that for six days, we needed to find 126 million cubic metres to secure the whole transit. So we took 52[m cubic metres] out of Russia and we subsidised the EU with our own additional 74 million cubic metres in terms of securing deliveries. On 7 January, Russia cut off the gas completely, so Ukraine could do nothing.
As for whether the situation could be repeated, in my mind, if Russia were to implement the contract and its international obligations, it would mean there are no problems. The contract agreed between Prime Ministers Putin and Tymoshenko in terms of transit it will be valid for ten years. Ten years is very comfortable period for all: for the producers, for the transit country and for consumers. We hope Russians will not create anything like what happened this January or three years before.
In Europe, some say the gas crisis represents a challenge for EU-Ukraine relations. What will be the impact of recent events on future EU-Ukraine relations, and EU-Russia ones?
Ukraine and Russia have different objectives in their relationships with the EU. Ukraine has EU membership aspirations and Russia does not. For both the EU and Ukraine, it is important to have Russia as a reliable, democratic and cooperative partner.
But remember that Russia was guilty of the gas crises and Ukraine had nothing to do with them. I don’t think that the current crisis will lead to the diminishing importance and nature of our relationship with the EU, because with the EU, we don’t just have an economic interest. We share other things: democracy, values and energy security interests.
It is a very important relationship. Do not underestimate Ukraine. It is at the crossroads of Russia and the EU, of Europe and Asia. So, Ukraine was, is and will be very much interested in being a reliable partner for the EU.
In Ukraine, how do you feel about Russia’s North Stream and South Stream gas pipeline projects, both of which avoid your country's territory? What about Nabucco?
Europe is making a serious mistake by relying considerably and heavily on Russia as a source of gas. This source is the biggest share of all the gas sources of the European Union: up to 27 percent. The EU imports no other source of gas like that.
If the EU becomes more dependent on Russia as a source, Russia will use this as an instrument of its foreign policy pressure and intermediation. It is a real concrete threat for millions people in European countries, as we saw this January.
Instead of looking for another routes from Russia, the European Union have to look for alternative routes, not from Russia but avoiding Russia, because European dependence is already so heavy. For example, we have to look at Central Asia, which has the biggest gas reserves - Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan.
We should build a new pipeline from Central Asia via the Caspian, via the Black Sea and via Ukraine to the European Union. Together with Nabucco, this would be very perspective pipeline. I would recommend the EU to focus on gas supply routes that are not dependent on Russia.
For us, new pipelines are no problem. For example, the North Stream cannot be competitive for our gas transportation system. North Stream will deliver an additional 20 billion cubic metres per year, whereas Ukrainian capabilities are from 150 -170 per year, as I told you.
Let's talk about security issues now, taking the situation in Georgia first. In August last year, Russia intervened militarily in the region. Due to gas, Ukraine has tough ties with Russia as well. Moscow hires a Ukrainian navy base for its own Black Sea Fleet in Sevastopol.
Imagine that once the rent deal has expired, Ukraine tries to revise the old conditions and set new, stricter ones. Don't you think Russia will try to use military means as a way of convincing you to sign a new deal that is more in its own interest than that of Kiev?
Indeed, both the Crimea and Georgian separatist regions are ethnic Russian. Moscow does not hesitate to play the nationalistic card and use the notion of defending ethnic Russians as a reason for military intervention.
First of all, I completely disagree with attempts to put the situations in South Ossetia and Abkhazia and that of Ukraine on an equal footing. The situations in the separatist regions of Georgia and part of Ukraine – Crimea - are different.
South Ossetia and Abkhazia are not under the control of the Georgian authorities. Crimea is under the full control of the central authorities of Ukraine. So, one cannot compare those situations from a military point of view. Militarily, Ukraine is one of the strongest states in Europe in terms of our armed forces and capabilities. It would be madness for anybody, including Russia, to attack Ukraine militarily. This is fantasy.
On the other hand, Russia has demonstrated its new quality. In addition to its gas monopoly and using this natural resource as an instrument of pressure, they have used open aggression against a neighbouring country for the first time in recent years. It demonstrates an aggressive nature.
The reaction of the international community should be consolidated, united and strong, and from the EU first of all. Otherwise, the international community will send the wrong message to Russia: that international law can be bridged, that the commitments of United Nations membership can be violated, as well as the commitments of OSCE membership.
In light of the gas crisis and events in Georgia, how would you evaluate cooperation between the 'GUAM' states (Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan and Moldova)? Is it still effective in these tough times?
GUAM stands for the first letters of the names of four countries – Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan and Moldova. GUAM was created in the middle of the nineties in response to our common concerns in the security area. At that time, there was a conference reviewing the CFE Treaty (Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty) that was agreed between NATO and former the Warsaw Pact countries at a time of potential mutual confrontation.
Parts of GUAM states were declared so-called 'restricted areas' due to the presence of armaments. Those concerns led us to closer cooperation with the OSCE conference. Later, this common concern was unified and transformed into the necessity of creating a kind of international organisation. In 1997, GUAM was created. It is currently pursuing many functions, but the purpose that led to its creation no longer exists.
This time, we are interested in economic projects, for example in using the energy resources that Azerbaijan and Ukraine have, in using the transportation routes for those resources and combining efforts in matters of gas and oil deliveries.
We have managed to create a free trade area of four countries, which is quite an achievement, because in the past, free trade agreements with Russia didn't work. It doesn't work in the CIS (Community of Independent States), but it works in GUAM.
We also belong to the same area, the Black Sea Area. It is important for multi-modality in transportation, like using the sea and railways. It already works. We also cooperate on such issues like fighting organised crime and non-proliferation of different kinds of weapons of mass destruction.
With the assistance of the United States, we have created a centre for dealing with organised crime. It helps the interior ministers of four countries to unite their efforts to tackle illegal migration and drug trafficking.
In 2006, GUAM was converted into GUAM Organisation for Democracy and Economic Development, with headquarters in Kiev. GUAM has a strong relationship outside, with countries like the United States, Japan, Poland and the Czech Republic. We have well defined relationship with the EU as well.
What are the expectations of Ukraine regarding EU and NATO membership? In April 2008, heads of NATO states declined to invite Ukraine to join at that time. And at the same time, in the EU, there are more frequent debates that membership might not have been the best scenario for the future, but some kind of enhanced or special cooperation, for example under the new 'Eastern Partnership' proposal.
This question is incorrect, because NATO did not refuse Ukraine membership in April in Bucharest. The leaders of the alliance stated - and it is an unprecedented statement - that both Ukraine and Georgia will be the members of alliance. This was the wording of the leaders of the alliance.
It is not just an open-door policy, which was the case before, but they instructed foreign ministers to consider reviewing the way of implementation by Ukraine and by Georgia concerning inviting [them] and [their] joining membership action plans.
It is not an invitation for membership, but a membership action plan. In this regard, the decision was not positive, but last December, ministers in Brussels decided to initiate the new format of cooperation with Ukraine on the so-called Yearly National Programmes (YNPs). YNPs are an inseparable part of the Membership Action Plans.
So, it means that this relationship, which has already been developed for three years along the lines of the requirements of Membership Action Plans, will be transformed into new high-level ties. Events in the Caucasus did affect the membership perspectives of both Ukraine and Georgia, but inevitably, soon or later, Ukraine will become a member of the alliance.
Regarding the European Union, I expect that this year we will finalise negotiations over a new agreement, which will be called an association agreement. Slovakia had a similar document before joining the EU. It means we are laying the ground for future membership of NATO and the European Union.
Let me ask you about internal politics in Ukraine. When you visited Slovakia a few years ago, you said that if Ukraine were to join EU and NATO, there would be no other political scenario than so-called 'Orange' politics. Referring to pro-Russian Mr. Yanukovych, you said that there was another scenario as well, but it was not one of the Orange camp. In recent months, we have seen tensions between Orange leaders President Yuschenko and Prime Minister Tymoshenko.
In light of all this, does Orange rule have a chance of being successful and stable in the future, after the next general elections, for example?
You mean the problems between the leaders of the former Orange team. Yes, unfortunately they emerged as early as 2005, a year after the victory of the Orange Revolution. But nevertheless, despite these problems, arguments and disputes, we managed to re-create the Orange, or so to say, democratic coalition comprising two major elements: the block of Yulia Tymoshenko, the block of Our Ukraine - with the block of Lytvin.
Last month, in December 2008, we signed an agreement on the creation of a new coalition in the Parliament, thus re-creating democratic forces which together make up the parliamentary majority. Unfortunately, there were attempts by the presidential secretariat to undermine such a development of events.
The other scenarios might have been absolutely opposite to our ideals and our values. In such a case, our opponents might have gained having the upper hand in parliament, in the country, and the country might have changed the directions of its foreign policy.
We have problems. They are the problems of personalities. But the general course remains as it was defined by the Orange team in 2004-2005. So I am optimistic.
