52-year old Czech Prime Minister Mirek Topolánek, chairman of the centre-right, neoliberal ODS party, will assume the EU helm from 1 January 2009.
To read a shortened version of this interview, please click here.
Last week, Alexandr Vondra (ODS), the vice-prime minister responsible for EU affairs, said the Czech EU Presidency would for the most part be 'facilitative'. Do you consider it ambitous enough, especially if you take into account the outgoing French Presidency, which was very active?
I don't think that the French Presidency did much more than simply moderate the European debate. It had to face two absolutely unpredictable events, which could happen to us as well. I mean o f course the conflict between Georgia and Russia and the consequences of the financial crisis.
It is very likely that quite a few countries will have to face serious problems. For instance, Latvian GDP growth fell from +10% to -5%. I wouldn't be suprised if we needed to solve similar problems to Sarkozy. Of course, we are talking about something which nobody wants, but we must be prepared to deal with the issue. Apart from that, we are going to practice 'standard moderating'.
I consider the plan of our presidency to be ambitious. We will come up with some new policies and try to move forward existing ones, such as energy security and the Eastern Partnership. If we put it this way, I consider our plan to be ambitious enough.
Is the Czech Presidency going to propose any important new initiatives (like France, which came up with the Union for the Mediterranean, reform of defence policy and the Immigration Pact), which Europeans can easily link to you presidency?
As I have already said, we will particularly focus on the Eastern dimension of European policy. I have discussed the issue with [French] President [Nicolas] Sarkozy and he agreed that we must somehow balance EU foreign- and neighbourhood policy between south and east. Both regions are very sensitive. Union for the Mediterranean members include North African countries and the Middle East region as well. In fact, we have to deal with a very sensitive neighbouring region, where poverty, terorism and immigration represent serious problems. However, the Eastern dimension is no less complicated.
Of course, dialogue with Russia is part of the Eastern dimension. The re-emergence of Russia represents an important element in foreign policy and a big challenge. Its policy is very assertive and it tries to intervene in EU security and energy policies. Russia wants to become a superpower again. For us, this represents a big challenge and is to some extent also kind of a 'pilot project'. Nevertheless, we have strong allies: the Swedish-Polish initiative, the whole of Central and Eastern Europe, Scandinavian states and countries like the Netherlands.
Energy security is another important challenge. In this respect, I am happy that we have wrapped up the 'energy-climate year' and we are moving on to the phase of very serious discussions on interconnection of networks, crossborder capacities, alternative supplies and diversification of energy supplies.
There will be also, on the margins of the European Council, a trio summit with countries from the Southern Energy Corridor – Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan - as well as with transit countries like Ukraine, Georgia and Turkey.
All these countries have their specific concerns in this respect. This is therefore the second biggest challenge. Next year should be dedicated to discussions on new projects. The fact that it was decided to set aside five billion euros from the EU budget surplus to finance such types of project shows that the EU realises the importance of the issue.
Our plan to start drafting Croatia's Accession Treaty is of no less importance. In my opinion, Croatia will be, for a long time, the last country with a chance of entering the EU in a short time [short period of negotiations].
Another challenge is the preparation for the December [climate change] negotiations in Copenhagen and the implementation of the financial recovery plan by the March [EU] summit. All these issues are significantly reaching beyond the Czech, and in some respects also the European, borders.
I would like to mention also the invitation for [the new US] President Barack Obama to Europe, the Washington summit and the G20 summit in London [in April], where we should promote the common position of the European Union. These issues I have just mentioned are, in my view, challenges for the Czech Republic and they give us opportunity to influence issues that we could never influence before.
After recent regional and Senate elections, the Czech government is in a weaker position. Brussels commentators have been raising concerns about how the government will manage to simulataneously lead the EU and fight for its survival at home?
We have just approved next year's budget and other key legislation. Therefore, I do not think the government is fighting for survival.
If I want to be ironic, I can say say that a caretaker government would lead the European Union even better than a government that still has to implement various steps of its government programme back home. However, I do not think this will be the case. I believe we will be able to agree on a ceasefire with the opposition during the Czech Presidency.
I also do not think that the mandate of my government is weaker than that of [Social Democratic predecessor] Jiří Paroubek's government, which was dependent on one former ODS deputy [the deputy was expelled from the ODS and then he helped the ČSSD government to survive in various confidence votes] or the government of Václav Klaus, who had only 99 out of 200 deputies.
The situation is still the same as it has been for the last 12 years, with the only anomaly, the Opposition Treaty [the treaty between the minority government of the ČSSD and opposition ODS, when the latter pledged to support ČSSD in every confidence vote; due to the clear majority in the Parliament, the ČSSD government was never overthrown during its term]. But the treaty was not such a positive thing to make me crow with delight. Seen from this perspective, I do not think the position of our government is worse than that of any government during the last 12 years. The Czech Presidency will not be influenced by this.
The Czech president has very limited powers in the field of external policy. His public appearences can, however, indirectly influence the outcome of discussions. The common argument that the president expresses himself in a 'private capacity' and not as the president of the country may not be understood by your European partners. Would you comment on this?
The position of Czech president is never completely a private one. In this sense, I hope we will be able to coordinate our policies within the first half of next year. I am talking here about foreign policy, or I should say rather home affairs, because when we became members of the European Union, European policy became more of an internal than foreign policy. This is perhaps the root of our dispute.
I am constantly trying to refute every concern among our EU partners that Václav Klaus wants to harm the negotiations. He is a democrat and a professional and if he was supposed to preside over some of the summits, especially in the foreign affairs domain, I would not see it as a risk and I keep telling this to our EU partners.
Fascination with Klaus is, as I sometimes tell them, obsessive. I warn them that they are relying more on form than on content and that they are taking notice of his statements rather than of his policy for the last twenty years. But this is rather a media thing. On the practical level, it should not cause any serious problems.
