Lukashenko’s political prisoners releases reflects strategy for regime survival

Belarus’ recent release of political prisoners appears to be part of a disinformation campaign aimed at repairing relations with the EU ahead of the 2025 presidential elections. In July 2024, Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko signed a decree releasing 15 political…

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People are seen attending a demonstration in support of Belarusian prisoners of conscience in Warsaw, Poland on 18 May, 2024. [Jaap Arriens/NurPhoto via Getty Images)]

Jan Novak Euractiv 25-09-2024 16:01 4 min. read Content type: Underwritten Euractiv is part of the Trust Project

Belarus’ recent release of political prisoners appears to be part of a disinformation campaign aimed at repairing relations with the EU ahead of the 2025 presidential elections.

In July 2024, Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko signed a decree releasing 15 political prisoners, marking the largest release since the post-election crackdown of 2020. “We treat everyone humanly,” Lukashenko said before the release.

This was followed by additional pardons of 30 prisoners in August and 67 in September, which Lukashenko’s presidential office called “another gesture of humanism on the part of the state towards those who made a mistake.” 

Belarusian pro-regime political analyst Yuri Voskresensky referred to Lukashenko’s actions as “acts of mercy” and hinted that more releases could follow if dialogue with the West, particularly the EU, were established.

Lukashenko’s openness to release political prisoners, however, appears to be part of an effort to restart relations with the EU ahead of the 2025 presidential campaign, which, according to BELPOL, will take place in February 2025. 

He is willing to do anything to hold onto power. That is why he may be using these releases to persuade the EU of his goodwill in the hope of easing sanctions after the 2020 EU refusal to recognise his regime and its condemnation of Belarus’ complicity in the Russian invasion of Ukraine.  

The Belarusian regime's actions seem more like an attempt to get concessions rather than an effort to steer policies toward genuine reform. 

If the EU does lift sanctions in response to these releases, Lukashenko can frame it as his victory, claiming that his regime is strong enough to withstand the pressure even of such a power as the EU.

It can work both for his supporters, who would prefer regime stabilisation and for apolitical people, who, living within a fully controlled media environment, consider his 'victory' credible. 

However, the EU may not respond as Lukashenko hopes.

In July, the Union's diplomatic service (EEAS) released a statement acknowledging that the EU “takes note of the release of a number of political prisoners in Belarus” while emphasising the need for all political prisoners to be freed.

The statement was followed by the new European Parliament's resolution in mid-September expressing MEPs' deep concerns about the situation of the political prisoners and calling EU countries for stronger sanctions against Belarus.

In early 2024, there were at least 1,430 imprisoned people in Belarus recognised as political prisoners, although human rights defenders estimate the actual number is much higher. As of September, this figure decreased to 1,324.

Yet, the majority of these individuals, including the ones who were not included in these statistics, continue to suffer from torture, harsh working and confinement conditions, and a severe lack of proper medical help.

Moreover, new political arrests continue to occur regularly. 

In August, four people were arrested, and three more were sentenced for participating in the 2020 protests against presidential elections. One of them was a previously released political prisoner.

If the EU rejects Lukashenko’s overtures, the regime could spin a reverse narrative, accusing the EU of member states only talking about the importance of prisoners without taking real action. Official Minsk will be able not only to explain the strengthening of ties with Russia but also to demonstrate its responsiveness to China. 

The EU’s response is delicate. Engaging with Lukashenko risks undermining the EU's support for pro-democracy forces but could potentially save more Belarusians from imprisonment.

With the 2025 elections looming, this opportunity window may be the last. If not handled effectively, those opposing the dictatorship in Belarus will continue to suffer. 

This article is part of the FREIHEIT media project on Europe’s Neighbourhood, funded by the European Media and Information Fund (EMIF).

[Edited by Alexandra Brzozowski/Martina Monti]

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