Visions of Europe

The author, 
Kemal Dervis

, argues that the “Turkey in the EU” debate is
a part of a much broader debate about the future of Europe
itself, and calls upon the citizens of the EU as well as the
citizens of the candidate countries to engage in this
debate. In his article published in the 
Turkish Policy Quarterly

, the author stresses that the Europe of the 21st
century should be built together on solid, lasting and
democratic foundations. The author identifies three
alternative visions within the intellectual and political
discussions regarding Europe’s future: the
“minimalist” or “sovereignist” vision;
the “super-state” or “super-nation”
vision with overtones of old style nationalism some want to
reincarnate at the European level and finally the vision of
the “21st century Europeans.” It is such a 21st
century Europe that Turkey wants to help build and that
Turkey wants to be part of. Within the framework of the third
vision, Turkey can make Europe stronger and more attractive.
The Europe of the 21st century will be dynamic, evolving and
oriented to the future. It will be a Europe that is not built
“against” anyone, but will be part of a more
democratic global order.

Engaging in the Debate 

The debate on the nature of Turkey’s
relationship with the European Union has
intensified as the December 2004 meeting of the
European Council, which will decide on the
beginning of membership negotiations, approaches.
There are practical, legal, economic and
political arguments used by the various
protagonists. The fact that previous European
Councils have repeatedly confirmed Turkey’s
status as a candidate country on the road to full
membership should always be kept in mind. These
high level and unanimous decisions have created a
moral and political framework which is binding on
all participants. It is not in the interest of
Turkey or of her European partners, however, to
try to contain the debate to a narrowly
legalistic or even purely political terrain on
the road towards Turkey’s membership. The
“Turkey in the EU” debate is in fact a
part of a much broader debate about the future of
Europe itself, and we should all engage in this
debate. We want to build the Europe of the 21st
century together, on solid and lasting
foundations. Moreover, these foundations should
be democratic foundations. It is high time for
Europe to build a stronger, more
“grass-roots” democracy on a European
scale. The European project must again mobilize a
greater amount of emotional dynamism; it must
generate renewed enthusiasm, particularly among
the new generation. Such enthusiasm needs a
long-term vision, a “European ideology”
appropriate to the new century. For our joint
project to succeed, all of us, citizens of the
EU-15 and citizens of the new accession
countries, as well as citizens of Turkey,
Bulgaria and Romania, must engage in the debate
about Europe’s future and try to outline a
vision that can rally young people from Istanbul
to London, from Warsaw to Lisbon, to the cause of
a successful Europe which could play a global
leadership role in the world of the 21st century.

Alternative Visions of Europe’s
Future

It is possible to identify
three alternative visions within the intellectual
and political discussions regarding Europe’s
future. The first of these visions is what could
be called a “minimalist” or
“sovereignist” vision. In this vision
of the future, the European Union would consist
of a family of quite traditional nation-states.
European integration would not go much further
than it already has. On the contrary, the
sovereignists believe that some competencies that
have been given to the Brussels institutions
could and should be reclaimed by the
nation-states. In this minimalist vision, Europe
would essentially be a large common economic
market, with nation states cooperating in the
implementation of a common trade policy and
facilitating the functioning of the common market
by establishing some common economic and product
standards, which would include appropriate
competition policies. Outside of trade and some
other related areas, however, nation states would
retain their prerogatives and the drive for an
“ever closer union” would no longer be
desirable or operative. This minimalist and
sovereignist vision of the future may not often
be articulated in its “pure” form.
Nonetheless, it is a view of the world that
shapes the behavior of a significant number of
political actors and it has a substantial popular
following, particularly in the United Kingdom and
the Scandinavian countries.

A second, very different
vision of Europe is that of the European Union as
a “super-state” or
“super-nation”. Those who have this
vision of the future, instinctively relate the
Europe of tomorrow to yesterday’s
nation-states. Just as Bismarck assembled the
German regional states and princedoms into the
German nation-state during the 19th century, the
European Union should unite Europe by integrating
the existing nation-states into a new European
super-state of a more or less federal nature.
Because of fairly strong nationalist feelings
that survive at the level of the “old”
nation-states, and because of the strong
antipathy that exists towards what is perceived
as a centralized bureaucracy in Brussels, the
“super-state” Europeans generally do
not articulate their vision in such explicit
terms. Their arguments and actions, however, can
only be adequately explained when one understands
that their inspiration, their “point de
repere” comes from the 19th and 20th century
traditional nation-state. For them, the desire
for “an ever closer union” is analogous
to a desire to build a new nation state on a
larger, European scale. If a European super-state
is the goal, it is relatively easy to describe
the institutions it should have and the way it
should operate, simply by analogy to what exists
at the level of the traditional nation-states.
For those who see the European project as one
that creates a new European nation, the question
of defining a “European Identity”
becomes crucial. But on what can such an identity
be based? It cannot be based on language, since
there is not and will not be a European language.
European identity also cannot be based on
ethnicity; there is way too much ethnic
diversity. Even culture poses problems for those
who would like it to be a foundation for European
“nationhood”. It is not easy to argue
that Swedes, Spaniards and Greeks have the same
culture. So the super-state Europeans have tended
to emphasize religion, Christianity, as the
defining characteristic of what should become a
European nation. Because the sense of belonging
in the nation states of the past was often
derived from fear of and conflict with the
“Other”, they tend to bring up old
memories of religious wars, hoping that it will
help cement a sense of belonging to Europe. In a
historical context that “Other” is
often the “Muslim” or the “Ottoman
Turk”. In a more contemporary setting, the
“Other” sometimes becomes the United
States or even China. 

The super-state Europeans are
right with regard to their sense that the
European project is in need of renewed emotional
energy. Bureaucratic institution building alone
is not sufficient to generate the enthusiasm and
the adhesion Europe needs. The problem is that
they are essentially searching for answers and
models in the distant past and in a way that
could lead to new conflicts and exacerbate
tensions in the world, without really succeeding
in the impossible task of creating a new European
nation. 

Given that both the minimalist
vision of the sovereignists and the maximalist
vision of the superstate Europeans seems
deficient, is there an alternative vision that
would constitute a better response to the
challenges of the new century? With many others I
believe that such a vision exists. I have called
it the vision of the “21st century
Europeans”. As argued above, there is no
European “nation”, and the phase of
history we are in, very different from the 19th
and 20th century, is not and will not be
conducive to the formation, at regional levels,
in Europe or elsewhere, of new
“nations”. On the one hand,
globalization driven by technology, trade,
economics and intensified communication between
all parts of the world is breaking down
traditional “national” barriers, and,
on the other hand, local and sub-regional
reflexes have gathered strength, as an
affirmation of identity and a reaction to what is
often perceived as an undesirable degree of
global uniformity. Somewhat paradoxically, the
new regionalism has gathered strength in Europe,
partly because of the framework of security and
peace provided by the European Union. Spain, for
example, can feel fairly relaxed about the degree
of autonomy in Catalonia, because it is assured
that no outsider is interested in exploiting that
autonomy in an aggressive manner. Catalans today,
can be Catalans, Spanish citizens, Europeans and
full participants in the global economy, all at
the same time. While such harmonious development
of regional identity has not always been
possible, even in a Europe characterized by an
“ideology of peace”, witness the Basque
region in Spain or Northern Ireland, there is
little doubt that the European framework has
greatly helped in diminishing ethnic or regional
tensions and has, on the whole, facilitated
decentralization and local autonomy.

It is not possible, given the
economic and social forces at work, to foresee
the development of a European nation, in its
traditional sense. At the same time, Europe, in
whole or in part, has moved beyond the point of
no return in terms of closer integration in
several important areas. Twelve countries already
share a common currency, something that seemed a
dream only a decade ago. A very substantial part
of the legislative framework within which EU
member countries operate is already prepared at
the European level in Brussels. 15 countries
already cooperate in the Schengen agreement,
creating an area of free circulation of people.
Both internal and external challenges require
further steps in creating supra-national forms of
governance. Some degree of fiscal harmonization
is required to avoid a degree of tax competition
that would become socially and politically
unacceptable. Europe may also benefit from
greater coordination of macroeconomic policies,
particularly in the Eurozone. The free
circulation of people requires more advanced
forms of integration in the areas of health care
and education. Finally, Europeans may have mixed
feelings about global politics and the degree to
which they see a need to “balance” the
power of others, particularly of the United
States, but a majority of Europeans would welcome
a more active and influential role of the
European Union on the world stage. At the
grass-roots there is support for a more
integrated conduct of foreign and defense
policies. The challenge of the 21st century for
Europe is to invent forms of supra-national
governance that address the real problems of
today, often driven by globalization, rather than
try to copy what happened one or two hundred
years ago in a very different context. In
particular, this is not the time to define Europe
in contrast to “the Other”, whether
this other is the US, the Muslim, or China.

The Europe of the 21st century
will have to be a more complex Europe than what
underlies the vision of those who see it as a
kind of new nation-state. It will have to be
based on a multi-level and variable system of
supra-national governance. Even if European
enlargement were to stop with the current 25
members, it is very likely that some of these
members will want to and be able to go further
and faster in the degree of coordination and
integration than others. The Europe of the 21st
century will have to be built and negotiated
continuously. Within a common framework there
will be areas of enhanced cooperation, which will
overlap depending on the type of cooperation
concerned. The new proposed European Constitution
may not be perfect; but its adoption would be a
great step forward with regard to having a
workable common framework which would also allow
flexibility and diversity. Moreover the very
essence of the European project has been the
desire to overcome the antagonisms of the past
which led to so many catastrophic wars. Europe
has been a project of peace and a project
oriented towards building a future of peace.
Europe should be a global power, but a power that
stands for peace. Such a Europe should not,
therefore, have to rely on the definition of
“the Other” or on the maintenance of
old antagonisms, to develop the required sense of
purpose. The new Europe of the 21st century
cannot be built on old ways of thinking or 
against

old and new enemies. The only way Europe can move
forward is by developing a kind of supra-national
governance that is a positive contribution to
better globalization, better global governance
and more advanced forms of international
cooperation. For example, while building its own
institutions and moving ahead in defining a more
common foreign and defense policy, Europe should
offer strong support for a renewed, stronger and
more effective United Nations Security Council.
The enthusiasm of the younger generation cannot
come from old fears but from the belief that
Europe can be a powerful and influential example
of how to conduct public policy in the age of
globalization, how to build flexible yet
effective institutions at the supra-national
level while respecting national traditions, and
how to spread and strengthen the ideology of
peace. 

It is such a 21st century Europe that Turkey
wants to help build and that Turkey wants to be
part of. Within the framework of this third
vision, Turkey can make Europe stronger and more
attractive : an example of union in diversity, a
demonstration for all to see that differences in
religious faith do not need to lead to new
conflicts, an architecture of governance that
goes beyond the experience of the past and
invents new democratic institutions. The European
Union has to move in this post-modern direction
with or without Turkey. The debate about Turkey
is really a debate about Europe’s own
future. The beginning of negotiations with Turkey
will be a very important step forward for 21st
century Europe, but it will not signify the end
of this crucial debate. It will go on with the
referenda and parliamentary votes on the European
constitution. Nonetheless, it is more difficult
to invent something new than to try to replicate
what existed in the past. Europe has to meet
contemporary challenges. It is precisely by
reaching into the future and leading the way for
the rest of the world that the European project
will be able to generate again the enthusiastic
support it deserves. 

This article was originally published in
the 
Turkish Policy Quarterly

. 

Kemal Dervis

, former Minister of Economic Affairs, is Member
of Parliament from Istanbul (CHP, Republican
People’s Party) and member of the
Coordination Committee of the Economics and
Foreign Policy Forum (EDP). This article
relies in part on work done for a book written by
the author entitled “A Better
Globalization” to be published by the Center
for Global Development in Washington
D.C.