By Alexandra Brzozowski | Euractiv Est. 8min 06-03-2024 (updated: 22-05-2024 ) Content-Type: Analysis Analysis Based on factual reporting, although it Incorporates the expertise of the author/producer and may offer interpretations and conclusions. [NATO] Euractiv is part of the Trust Project >>> Languages: DeutschPrint Email Facebook X LinkedIn WhatsApp Telegram With Finland, and most recently Sweden, joining NATO, the strategic situation in the Baltic Sea region and the Western military alliance’s Northern Flank is changing radically, but Russia still poses a threat above and below water. Over the years, NATO has steadily increased its control of the Baltic Sea, a crucial maritime gateway for Russia’s fleet with bases near Saint Petersburg and in the heavily militarised Kaliningrad exclave. With Finland and Sweden in NATO, the alliance will close its defence gap on the important shipping route from the north, leaving Russia with limited access and room to manoeuvre in case of a direct confrontation with Moscow. But as Moscow is still able to threaten undersea infrastructure and exert pressure on the region from its bases, experts warn that NATO must remain alert to the Russian threat. Since Russia invaded Ukraine two years ago, a series of high-profile incidents involving pipelines and undersea cables in the Baltic Sea have given NATO a wake-up call over its vulnerabilities in the region. Putin’s Nordic nightmare This week, NATO kicked off an exercise to defend its newly expanded Nordic territory with more than 20,000 soldiers from 13 nations taking part in drills lasting nearly two weeks in the northern regions of Finland, Norway and Sweden. Both Finland and Sweden have had a long partnership with NATO, being involved in exercises and information-sharing, but its formal membership will allow it to be fully integrated into the alliance’s defence plans. “Sweden and Finland’s accession to NATO provides an uninterrupted shield from the Baltic to the Black Sea and will further enhance defence planning and cooperation in the Nordic-Baltic region,” a NATO official told Euractiv. “Sweden brings advanced capabilities, including a high-tech defence industry, fighter planes, naval corvettes and submarines designed specifically for the Baltic Sea,” they added. Unlike most European countries, Finland did not stop spending on the military after the Cold War ended, while Sweden reinstated conscription in 2017, which applies to both men and women. Both countries will also bring significant assets to the table regarding air defence, land forces and naval capabilities. Finland has one of the largest artillery arsenals and land forces in Europe, which in size trumps that of defence heavyweights France, Germany and the UK. Helsinki also recently renewed its fighter jet fleet and is expected to possess 64 US-made F-35 fighter jets by 2026 that will contribute to Baltic air policing. Sweden, meanwhile, with its rich heritage of naval history, brings a navy to the table that is well-calibrated for the Baltic Sea, an air force equipped with locally developed Saab Gripen fighter jets and a ‘homemade’ defence industry. Adding to that 5G and fifth-generation infrastructure, with Finland’s Nokia and Sweden’s Ericsson dominating the 5G civil market vis a vis China’s Huawei. Don’t call it ‘NATO lake’ With all the countries surrounding the Baltic Sea, except Russia, now to be part of the Western military alliance, that has led some to label the sea a “NATO lake”. But analysts warn Russia can still wreak havoc in the region from heavily-armed exclave Kaliningrad and threaten undersea infrastructure. “If you look at a map, then geographically the Baltic Sea is becoming a NATO lake from Russia’s perspective, yes,” Minna Ålander, a Finnish Institute of International Affairs research fellow, told Euractiv. “But there is still work to do for NATO and none of this happens automatically, now everything has to be planned and exercised so the alliance is ready for any eventuality,” Ålander said. Sweden brings with it the island of Gotland, which would play a central role in helping NATO secure the region – but also be a point of vulnerability, with Kaliningrad, Russia’s vital outpost with its Baltic fleet and nuclear-capable missiles, just across the water. “Whoever controls Gotland can dominate the air and sea space of the southern Baltic,” declared Magnus Frykvall, the highest authority of the Swedish Army on the island, just over a year ago. However, analysts largely point towards Russia’s increasing limitations in the region. “I don’t think Russia would pursue NATO from Kaliningrad,” Ålander said. “Kaliningrad has lost a lot of its strategic advantage that it used to have before Finland and Sweden joined because now it becomes even a sort of vulnerability for Russia,” she said. Should Russia put high-value assets in the exclave, it would need to count on the fact that NATO can very easily destroy them in a conflict, according to Ålander. And while NATO’s new 1,340-kilometre-long Finnish border with Russia meanwhile provides a challenge for the Western military alliance, it has already been included in the latest defence plans. “For Russia, the situation is now much more complicated because if they wanted to move against the Baltic states, they couldn’t just leave the border with Finland empty,” Ålander said. “So the fact that the NATO-Russia border is now twice as long is a big problem for Moscow, actually, and they would have to reinforce the whole border,” she said. With Russia’s war in Ukraine concentrating the majority of its troops and equipment, with the Kremlin having moved contingents towards the south, it would lack the capabilities to do so. A changed Baltic defence NATO’s Baltic states have long been seen as an Achilles’ heel for the alliance, particularly exposed to the threat of being cut off if Russian land troops seize the 65-kilometre Suwalki Gap between Belarus and Kaliningrad. “Sweden joining NATO is a significant boost for the security of the Baltic Sea and the whole Alliance,” Estonia’s Defence Minister Hanno Pevkur told Euractiv. The strategic location of Sweden’s Armed Forces would allow NATO more efficient movement and freedom of action on the Baltic Sea, while the Swedish domestic industry would significantly contribute to ‘NATO’s defensive shield’, he said. “To put it simply – the Baltics can feel more secure about our backs being covered. We have a common understanding with Sweden that Russia threatens the peace and security of all countries in the region,” Pevkur said. Asked whether this makes the Suwalki Gap more defendable, Pevkur said, “It is now up to NATO’s military commanders to plan on how to make best use of Sweden’s military capabilities and unique geography.” According to military planners, NATO’s enlargement now opens up a key supply route for transiting more NATO troops to protect them faster and more effectively in case of attack. Explainer: Suwalki Gap and Lithuania-Russia face-off over Kaliningrad Lithuania has partly closed rail transit of Russian goods to and from its exclave of Kaliningrad, saying it was enacting EU sanctions but the move has angered Moscow, who promised to react, igniting fears over the so-called Suwałki Gap. LRT, a partner of EURACTIV in Lithuania, has contributed an explainer about the issue. “Both countries have very capable and fully interoperable militaries which will strengthen NATO’s posture in the region,” Lithuania’s defence ministry told Euractiv. “Baltic sea lines of communication are critical for all countries in both economic and military terms, and the accession of Finland and Sweden will benefit the security of the supply routes,” they added. However, Lithuanian defence officials stressed that “Russia is and will remain a long-term threat to NATO, and its posture in the region is planned to be increased, with (…) reestablishing the Leningrad and Moscow military districts.” It continues to strengthen Kaliningrad Oblast as a military stronghold, especially with Anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) capabilities, while Belarus is “de facto a Russian military district” that could be fully used in case of Russian aggression against NATO, they stressed. “As Russia aims at reconstituting its military and implementing the planned growth of its military presence on NATO’s borders, there are no reasons to argue that the security situation is somewhat better in the Baltic Sea region,” the Lithuanian defence ministry stressed. “For the Baltics, the impact of Sweden and Finland joining NATO is sort of plus-minus zero because they can be more easily reinforced, but because Belarus is now fully under Russian control, that sort of evens out the threat level,” Ålander said. Mind the Arctic flank Sweden and Finland joining also means expanding NATO’s presence in the Arctic, a region increasingly strategic to Russia and China. “The geostrategic importance of the northern regions and the Arctic has increased, and our allies today have a more extensive and active presence in our immediate areas than before,” the Norwegian Armed Forces told Euractiv in emailed comments. “Finland’s and Sweden’s NATO membership gives an increased opportunity, and we must be innovative on how we think – for example, through a joint Nordic Plan that ensures more efficient use of military forces, and increased overall operational capability through joint planning, management and organisation of forces,” they added. [Edited by Alice Taylor] Read more with Euractiv Sweden’s path to NATO cleared, flag to be raised in coming daysHungary's president ratified Stockholm's accession documents to join the military alliance on Tuesday (5 March) as the 32nd member, paving the way for a swift accession in the next few days after almost two years in the waiting room.
