Bush´s Trip to Europe 2005 – The Ball is in Europe´s Court

On hardly any occasion the visit of a US president was associated
with as many expectations as in the case of President
George W Bush’s recent trip to Europe. The point is not that
many experts would expect a major breakthrough in US-EU relations.
What matters is the symbolism of this gesture, for several reasons,
argues David Kral, chairman of the Czech
think-tank Europeum.

First, this was the first foreign trip of George Bush in his
second term since the reelection in November 2004. The aim was to
convince Europeans of his intention to overcome the rifts that
troubled the transatlantic relations since the Iraq war. The
considerations of the US President, however, go even further – to
convince Europeans to participate more actively at the
reconstruction endeavours in Iraq, and more generally, to support
his foreign policy vision which will most probably dominate his
second electoral term – spreading democracy and freedom in the
world. The fact that Europe was the first foreign venue undoubtedly
underlined how much role is Europe to play in this effort of the
new US administration. 

The second reason why this tour was so important lies in the
fact that the US president met the European leaders both in the EU
and NATO formats. So far, NATO was the main platform for the
transatlantic dialogue. The fact that Bush met with the
representatives of member states in the European Council format, as
well as his meeting with José Manuel Barroso in Berlaymont, show
that the EU is perceived as an important partner to the US that
should be talked to and listened to. An unprecedented fact was also
that the President did not chose London – the capital of
traditionally the most reliable ally in Europe – as the venue of
his first visit to the Continent. This can also indicate some
attempt not to classify the European allies as preferred and “more
preferred” but to demonstrate that the USA should view the whole EU
as a strategic partner. The Bush´s trip also eliminated some of the
concerns quite frequently heard in the EU headquarters or some of
the capitals prior to the visit that he actually wishes a divided
and weak Europe.

The third important point which brought some light into shady
Euro-atlantic relations is that both sides managed to find a common
voice concerning some of the problems that proved too contentious
and divisive between the two shores. This applies mainly to Iraq
which obviously is the most imminent problem the US administration
still has to tackle. The outcome of the Iraqi election, especially
a relatively high turnout despite the ongoing violence in the
country earned Bush additional points in negotiating a stronger
involvement of the EU in the region. Even prior to the summit, the
External Relations Council agreed, in the framework of the Rule of
Law operation, to train almost 800 judges and other judicial staff
over the period of at least a year. Bush was even able to come to
terms with one of his principal opponents in Iraq – the French
president Jacques Chirac – over the issue of concerted pressure on
Syria to pull out from Lebanon. Although the outcome on the other
issues was still very modest, there is an increased hope that the
interests of the USA and Europe (or at least its major foreign
policy players) will converge rather than diverge. Let us take for
instance the hope for the rebirth of the Middle East peace process
after the death of Yasser Arafat and the election of Muhammad Abbas
or a joint agreement on strengthening of operations in Western
Afghanistan.

All the points in which the trip of George W. Bush can be
considered a success, however, bear signs of enduring or latent
disagreements. It was mentioned how important it was that the
President paid visit to both EU and NATO. However, just a week
before the trip, German Chancellor Schröder at the annual security
conference in Munich called for the reconsideration of the approach
where NATO is the primary platform of Transatlantic dialogue and he
suggested that this role should be in the future rather taken up by
the EU. Although this idea did not find practically any support
among the conference delegates, later support of President Chirac
to this idea point to the possibility of emergence of the well
known Franco-German axis that will consistently try to achieve
this. This would be very unfortunate. Firstly because NATO
especially for the new member states but not least for many older
members remains still a relevant organisation – and vigorous
debates over the constitutional treaty mentioning the role of NATO
explicitly prove this. Escalated confrontation of the EU member
states in this respect could lead to similar divisions in Europe
that we have seen over Iraq. This would definitely not improve
transatlantic relations and only harm the credibility that the EU
is trying to restore vis-a-vis the United States as a reliable and
coherent partner. Apart from that, it should be borne in mind that
the EU and NATO are not institutionally identical and it would not
be wise to a priori include some of the non-EU members of NATO from
privileged transatlantic dialogue. This, however, does not mean
that the role of the EU in relation to the USA will not and should
not increase. Also it does not rule out the fact that NATO will
have to find responses to key pending questions – how to respond to
the challenges of changing dynamics of transatlantic relations, how
to ensure that both sides will be able to profit from its existence
and how to conciliate its role with the growing EU ambitions in the
domains of security and defence. 

In case of Iraq, although some modest involvement of the EU has
been negotiated, it is quite clear that this is not as much as the
Americans would hope for. Given the fact that the EU and the US
agreed to overcome the splits over Iraq, the involvement of the EU
should now be more substantial, including the financial
participation at reconstructing the country. Especially if Europe
claims to have the soft power that it cherishes so much. 

Apart from those issues over which the US and Europe were able
to find a common voice, it is clear that there are still quite many
that remain rather divisive. Point number one, remaining the
hottest issue at the moment, is the question how to deal with Iran.
European diplomacy embarked on a very active policy based on the
trip of the Big Troika, i.e. the foreign ministers of Germany,
France and Britain, to Tehran in November 2003, trying to push the
Iranian regime into co-operation with the International Atomic
Energy Agency and to allow the international control of its nuclear
programme. If the information allegedly leaking out of the White
House to some US media claiming that the US might be considering a
strike against Iran proved right, this could ruin the diplomatic
efforts of Europeans and surely cause another rupture in
transatlantic relations. The message of George Bush and his foreign
secretary Rice, however, made it clear that this option is not on
the table, at least not for the moment. The Big Three are now
intensively trying to persuade the US to engage in the negotiations
on the regulation of the Iranian nuclear programme but also to
offer some economic incentives such as support Iran in joining WTO
or abandoning the idea of introducing economic sanctions. The
Bush´s administration so far refuses direct involvement in the
talks with Tehran. Although the proponents of the US keeping back
are rather neo-conservative “hawks”, it is necessary to show some
understanding for this attitude. This is because the US, much more
than the EU, tend to view Iran not only as a security problem but
also as a political and diplomatic one. Extremely anti-Israeli
attitude of the regime in Tehran, its hostile views on the Middle
East peace process, its support to militant organisations such as
Hizbollah or unsettled financial issues dating back to 1979
revolution are just too important for the US to get directly
involved in diplomatic talks. Europe should také these broader
perspectives into consideration and not push too much on the
Americans. On the other hand, it should express its determination
to support the USA in case that Iran does not comply with some of
its obligations under Non-Proliferation Treaty or if it fails to
stop its uranium enrichment programme, both in the UN or by other
means, such as to agree to introducing economic
sanctions. 

The question of the proposed EU lift of the arms embargo to
China is often articulated as another rather contentious issue in
transatlantic relations. After the most vociferous opponents such
as the UK withdrew their objections it is likely that this will
eventually happen. Bush singled out his doubts about a wisdom of
this move. The lift of embargo is strongly opposed especially by
the US Congress, both from the Republican and Democrats parts. The
argument is that the primary problem is not import of weapons to
China itself (they get there from different sources) but the
concern over a possible transfer of new military technologies which
could disrupt the balance of power in East Asia. For the US, this
is again a far more sensitive issue than for the EU due to their
strong engagement in the region, let it be for the security
obligations to Taiwan or the attempt to renew the talks on Korea.
If the EU decides to move forward, it must count on possible
consequences including the limitation of transfer of modern
technologies to Europe initiated by the American legislators. This
would again be highly disadvantageous for the EU especially in its
aspiration to become an important world player in international
security field. For this reason, it must be ready to provide
certain guarantees to the United states, such as that the lifting
of embargo will be a gradual process and that the approach will be
selective to prevent the transfer of sensitive items and
technologies to China so that it could not enhance significantly
its military capacity. Apart from this, even in respect to China
the EU should stand up to its principles conditioning the sale of
arms by progress in human rights agenda.

Although Iran and China seem to be the main points where the
progress in EU-US relations was modest, there are others that
should not be forgotten. These are for instance the European
concern of limiting the global pollution. The Kyoto Protocol just
came into force, not having been ratified by the United States
despite the fact that they are one of the world´s heaviest sources
of pollution. The International Criminal Court whose statute has
not been ratified by the US either is another issue likely to
remain unresolved for the time to come. It is, though, necessary to
acknowledge that these problems are of a long-term character (the
differences were obvious already during the Clinton administration)
and unlike Iran or China do not pose imminent questions in
transatlantic relations that need to be worked out urgently.

No matter how much we thus perceive the visit of George Bush to
Europe in symbolic terms, it is obvious that it did earn some
concrete results as well. It managed to heal the wounds that
divided the US and Europe but also Europe itself over the Iraq
crisis. The whole visit proceeded in a constructive and
conciliatory spirit and showed the willingness of both sides to
look ahead and work together on solving the problems facing the
transatlantic allies. The gesture of President Bush to find a
common voice is to be taken positively. Now it is up to Europe and
its leaders to respond to this in a similar manner. The Europeans
should show understanding for the strategic objectives of the
United States, wherever they are complementary with European
attitudes. By concrete steps and proposals the EU should
demonstrate its willingness to support the United States where a
common ground can be found and articulate these positions clearly
to the outside world. This is a unique opportunity to overcome the
recent rifts by working together on concrete issues. The Americans
made the first step, now it is up to Europe how it will
respond.

To read more analyses from the same source, visit the Europeum website.