Enlargement after Göteborg – false sense of security

Following the negative outcome of the Irish
referendum on the Treaty of Nice, the heads of state and government
have given a clear signal for the process of EU enlargement.
Negotiations with the most successful candidate countries are to be
completed by the end of 2002. Stumbling blocks remain, though: on
the part of the candidates, fulfilment of the membership criteria
remains a major condition for entry, while on the part of the EU,
solutions must be found to the Irish rejection of the Treaty of
Nice.

Following the negative outcome of the Irish
referendum on the Treaty of Nice it was obvious that the heads of
state and government would have to give a clear signal that the
process of enlargement will continue: in light of the considerable
progress made in the preparations for enlargement, negotiations
with the most successful candidates for EU accession are now to be
concluded by the end of 2002. The objective is that these countries
be able to participate in the European Parliament elections of 2004
as members. Thus the EU has not only set a concrete date for the
completion of the negotiations, something that had been called for
by the Swedish EU presidency and that gave rise to controversial
debate. In saying that the candidates should take part in the EP
elections “as members”, it also went beyond the wording of the Nice
summit.

This reaffirmation of the road map is an
important message to the candidate countries. However, it does not
necessarily create greater certainty as to when accession will
actually take place. Stumbling blocks remain, both on the part of
the candidates and of the EU. First of all, the wording of the
presidency conclusions on the road map for enlargement and the
– non-binding – accession date is linked to the
well-known conditions. For the road map to be followed as planned,
the candidates must meet the accession criteria. The degree of
progress differs among the individual candidates. The presidency
conclusions therefore stress once again that candidate countries
will continue to be judged solely on their own merits. It is thus
unlikely that the EU will make concessions to individual candidates
in the negotiations in order to meet the date target. It also
remains to be seen whether the EU will honour its commitment to
agree more quickly on common positions on open issues in the
negotiations. If the chapters on agricultural and structural policy
are to be negotiated only after the German and French elections in
summer 2002, the closing of the chapters by the end of that year is
a very ambitious target. And finally, even timely completion of the
negotiations does not necessarily mean the candidate countries will
be able to participate in the European Parliament elections as
members, because the ratification process can take a long time.

Even more important, though, is the question as
to how ratification of the Treaty of Nice will proceed following
the negative outcome of the Irish referendum. Most EU countries
will have ratified the Treaty of Nice by the beginning of 2002. The
Irish government is seeking to overcome the population’s
negative attitude by providing information about mechanisms and
decision-making processes in the Union; it has scheduled a new
referendum for 2002. But the Irish rejection of the Treaty can
hardly be regarded as an “accident” which could be rectified by
means of a second referendum.

The opposition or mere lack of interest
demonstrated by the Irish – as indicated by the low voter
turnout – stems not only from the fact that the smaller
countries are annoyed at losing influence as a result of new
decision-making structures in connection with enlargement. It also
reflects the scepticism regarding the future direction of the EU
which is wide-spread in the member countries. Large sections of the
EU population see an enlarged union as a diffuse entity with which
they cannot identify. Hence, support for enlargeme nt is not
particularly strong in the individual member states (see chart).
Not only in Ireland is the enlargement project associated more
closely with the fight for funding, production quotas and voting
rights than with the political and economic benefits for Europe and
the target of closer European integration. A lot of communicating
and convincing should have been done, and the failure to do so is
now weighing on the enlargement process. The reservations regarding
an enlarged EU could, in turn, affect the accession countries and
influence the outcome of the referenda on EU membership planned by
most candidates. In order not to endanger progress with
enlargement, politicians will have to participate in a much broader
discussion on the new structures and goals of a larger union.

In respect of the “Irish question”, a number of
different ways forward are being discussed so as not to jeopardise
compliance with the enlargement schedule. First, the Irish
voters’ reservations could be taken into account by means of
protocols or declarations (without changing the content of the Nice
Treaty, however) in order to achieve a positive vote the second
time round. This, of course, presupposes a more detailed analysis
of the reasons for rejection and does nothing to reduce the risk
that the Nice Treaty may not be fully ratified by the end of 2002,
when the accession treaties are to be signed. Secondly, there might
be the possibility – as a fallback position – of
regulating the institutional conditions for accession, especially
voting rights and the distribution of seats, in the framework of
the accession treaties, as has been done in former enlargement
rounds. Finally, one could consider the idea of merging the
ratification process of the controversial, and in large parts
inadequate, Treaty with the EU’s next major reform project
(“post-Nice process”). This plan aims to hammer out by 2004 a
constitutional system for the EU, with functioning institutions and
democratic decision-making processes, clear division of labour
between the different levels of government, and treaties that can
easily be understood. If Europe is to enjoy a stable future, the
outcome of this reform process must be convincing to the EU
population – independent of whether or not agreement through
a referendum is required.

For in-depth analysis, see the Deutsche Bank
Research

Enlargement Monitor.