EU Insider: Trouble on the Border

EU Insider: Trouble on the Border

Will the candidate countries lose their sovereign rights to
control their borders when they join the EU?

BRUSSELS, Belgium – A new “threat” has recently
emerged on the horizon for Euro-skeptics: the European Commission
has issued a new plan that–in the long term–envisages the
creation of a European Border Guard System. In practice, that would
mean that, at some point after joining the EU, Poland’s
borders with Belarus would be patrolled by mixed groups of, for
example, Poles, Germans, Dutch, and French guards.

For the time being, this is just a proposal,
raised by the Commission some weeks ago, and supported by many of
the ministers from member states as well, but not by all. When the
EU Justice and Home Affairs Council discussed the issue last week,
the majority seemed to be ready to swallow it in the long term,
though the Scandinavian trio were more reluctant. Nonetheless, it
is a topic that is now on the table and worth considering, because
the logic behind it should override skeptics’ fears that
sovereignty might be lost.

But, first of all, one thing needs to be
underlined: Brussels has certainly not proposed that after joining
the EU – say, in 2004 or 2005 – German or Dutch soldiers would
immediately take up positions along the Union’s new
borderlines. The plan paints a picture of gradual evolution, with
several phases.

In the short term, the only change would be the
introduction of a manual describing in detail new upgraded and
harmonized minimum standards for all of Europe’s border
guards, from Stockholm to Athens, from Helsinki to Porto. Border
guards would be trained and educated to follow common practices,
with a European Border Guards Academy being established. Then, in
the medium term, exchanges of experts, advisers, liaison officers
would become more frequent, and guards would conduct joint
exercises. And finally, yes, the process would be crowned by the
gradual creation of mixed European border-guard units to patrol all
of the EU’s external borders.

All very well, but is this necessary and is it
logical? Well, it is a consequence of things generally considered
to be fundamentally positive: the free movement of goods and people
or, in other words, the right of Polish cars and lorries, after
Poland’s accession, to travel as freely across
Germany’s border with France as they would from Krakow to
Katowice. The notion is attractive, but it has its
consequences.

The most obvious are changes to visa policies.
If there are no border checks within the EU, its member-states
cannot, therefore, maintain different visa regimes. Clearly, all of
them need to apply the same restrictions and accept the same
papers. The same goes for the asylum policies, not to mention the
need for close cooperation between national police forces and the
separate national judiciaries. After all, organized crime and
terrorism can also move freely.

Shared border controls are a logical part of
this complex picture. It is clear that, if there are no internal
checks (and the intention is to have none), than the importance of
external borders becomes proportionally higher. After all, one
border crossing could potentially give access to a whole community
of twenty or more countries.

And that is where the question of trust comes
in. There is trust involved in letting other nationalities patrol
your historic borders. But that is nothing compared to the trust
involved in our neighbors entirely abandoning their border
controls, placing all their confidence in one other country’s
border guards. So, sovereignty would not be lost by accepting
international border guards; it would simply be pooled with others
who accept the same principles.

At present, though, there is a reluctance to
accept that level of tr ust. That is understandable: after all,
there is a lack of shared experiences. International border guards
would build up trust. It is a logical reflex for a Belgian to feel
more secure if he knows that Belgian border guards are patrolling
the EU’s borders with Ukraine, Belarus, or even Macedonia or
Serbia. (And it should be remembered that this would be a
reciprocal arrangement: once the system is operating smoothly,
Czech, Slovak, Hungarian border guards would work at Finish-Russian
checkpoints and guard Portugal’s maritime border.)

And one last point: an international border
guard service would ease the burden on countries on the EU’s
periphery. That is only logical – after all, if the new EU members
are expected to guard the EU’s common territory on its
borders with Ukraine, Serbia and Belarus, then the other member
states should contribute somehow, with equipment, with personnel,
and yes, with hard cash. And that is also what the
Commission’s plan calls for.

There are signs that the Union’s current
member states are increasingly reluctant to make huge financial
sacrifices, adding to uncertainty about the future of the common
agricultural policy or regional subsidies. Money could therefore
potentially be an obstacle to the border-patrols plan. But more and
more people in Brussels believe that home affairs and the law are
critical areas where more integration is needed. It is evident to
everyone that a key to strengthening law and order and the
public’s sense of security is more efficient cooperation
between member-states. As we know: criminality doesn’t respect
borders – particularly when there are none. International external
border controls could prove to be a core element in enhanced
cooperation.

Gyorgy Foris is a regular columnist for TOL. He is
based in Brussels.

To read more about the candidate countries,
please visit

Transitions Online.