Limits of Turkey’s “strategic” partnership with the USA: Issues of Iraq, democratization and the EU

Limits of Turkey’s “strategic” partnership with the USA: Issues of Iraq, democratization and the EU

Turkish government, which has long time considered its “geopolitics” as an asset in its relations with the West, was comforted by the attachment of a strong strategic emphasis to US foreign policy towards Turkey in the aftermath of September 11 attacks. This emphasis was particularly important in the light of the recent economic crises, which left the country desperately in need of aid from international financial institutions. Turkey was also relieved since the notion of “strategic partnership” clearly embodied a sense of tolerance and understanding for Turkey’s 15-year war against the terrorist group PKK and its clampdown on Islamic groups, as the US witnessed its worst terrorist attack in its history. Turkish Premier Bulent Ecevit’s visit to Washington DC in January 2002 was therefore hailed as the confirmation of Turkey’s “new strategic partnership” with the US.

Contrary to the prominent opinions, which has supported and called for an enhanced US-Turkey strategic ties in the post-September 11 era, this paper intends to challenge the validity of the concept and argues that the strategic partnership between the US and Turkey carries significant restrictions and deficiencies. First, there are limits to improve economic ties between the USA and Turkey to form a full-fledge partnership, and second, even the political leg of this partnership which is almost taken for granted in the light of mutually spelled out interests, is not as rock-solid. Still, this concept is not only increasingly put forth by the US opinion makers to secure Turkey’s support for the US-led war against terrorism, but it is also consistently pronounced by some influential circles in Turkey as an alternative to Turkey’s quest to join the EU, which is part and parcel of domestic power struggle speeded up since Turkey was declared a candidate country for the EU membership in 1999.

The Question of Iraq

US’ policy towards Iraq exposes the limits of Turkey’s “rediscovered” strategic alliance with the US in post-September 11 period. Since the Gulf war of 1991, Turkey has found the US policy towards Northern Iraq worrisome and always maintained its doubts about the objectives of the American policy towards the Iraqi Kurds. Yet, it chose to act together with the US in an attempt to influence the developments in the region.

Now, as a military operation against Iraq is back on the agenda, the Turkish government faces hard choices, and however reluctant it may be, it has to make a decision. It seems that the position of Turkey in a war against Iraq is important both for the success and legitimacy of such an operation, given the increasing reluctance of the Arab allies of the US. So far, confusing signals have been sent by the Turkish side. While Turkish President Ahmet Necdet Sezer and the Chief of General Staff Huseyin Kivrikoglu publicly warned the US against the risks involved for Turkey in an Iraqi operation, Premier Ecevit gave the impression that a bargain could be stroke.

The question remains if Turkish support is forthcoming for an eventual American operation to topple Saddam. Both the government in Turkey and public at large have doubts about the wisdom of waging another war on Iraq. Turkey does not raise objections against removing Saddam from power, yet uncertainties in a post-Saddam Iraq raise serious concerns. Despite all this, undergoing a serious economic crisis and relying on the American support for the continuation of the loans from the international financial institutions, the Turkish side is bound to be supportive of a war against Saddam.

However, the political and economic costs of such a war would be a huge burden on Turkey’s shoulders involving both short-term and long-term repercussions. On the economic front, a war against Iraq would c ause Turks to continue to lose millions of dollars for an unforeseeable future, who have already lost a considerable amount as a result of the sanctions imposed on trade with Iraq since the Gulf War. Moreover, a renewed fighting and instability in the Iraqi side would adversely affect Turkey’s southeastern economy that has been improving in the recent years through border trade with Iraq. The disruption of regional economy would be a blow for the Turkish government who tries to win the support of Kurdish population living in the region, after the defeat of PKK’s military uprising. In addition, a war in the region would hit already shaky Turkish economy suffering its worst economic crisis in recent decades. It would certainly slow down the flow of foreign capital when it is most needed to boost confidence in economy and, no doubt, will hit tourism revenues, the last stronghold of Turkish economy, amounting to 10 billion dollars income annually.

Aside from the economic problems, the chief Turkish concern is disintegration of Iraq in the wake of a war that may pave the way for the establishment of a Kurdish state with ‘undesired’ repercussions on the Turkish side. As the Americans spell out deploying the Afghan model by which Taliban regime was destroyed by a coalition of the armed opposition groups in Afghanistan, the Turkish concerns about the role to be played by the Kurdish groups in the war against Saddam and in the post-Saddam Iraq gradually increase. If Kurdish groups in the North were used to topple the Saddam regime with a strong boost by the American troops, the Kurds would be the main beneficiaries of the operation.

As the Iraqi case displays, the idea of a new “strategic” cooperation between Turkey and the US, brought up in the aftermath of September 11, is likely to contain serious problems and risks for Turkey. The case also demonstrates that the strategic interests of two countries in the Middle East and Central Asia do not always correspond.

It is uncertain how long Turkey can go along with US strategic priorities in its regional relations, as its bid to join the EU, which is not very favorable to US’ Middle East policy, moved ahead. A good example of this setback is the reaction in Turkey against the recent intensification of Palestinian-Israeli conflict. The Israeli occupation of Palestinian territories and the consequent destruction of Palestinian homes and civilian deaths particularly in Jenin led a public fury against Israel in Turkey. Moreover, strong criticism by Premier Ecevit, along with other top officials in Turkey, cast doubts about the sustainability of Turkey’s strategic relations with Israel. Ironic coincidence of Turkish government’s decision, on the other hand, to grant a 675 million USD tank modernization project to Israel at the beginning of Israeli occupation of Palestinian cities highlighted the delicate nature of Turkish-Israeli “security cooperation”. However, without inclusion of Israel into the “new Turkish-American strategic partnership”, the whole idea would lose a crucial ground.

Political Reforms and the Position of US

Put Iraqi question aside, post-September 11 framework brought some elements of comfort for the Turkish state. Primarily, it led to the belief that Turkey emerged once again as a “model country” for the Muslim world with its democratic and secular regime in the face of radical Islamic challenges. Equivocally, the conception of Turkey as a role model also provided the justification for those in Turkey who try to block political reforms required as part of Turkey’s accession process to the EU, as the idea implied that there was hardly be any need for further political reforms. In this sense, this particular group came out as strong advocates of a new partnership framework between Turkey and the US.

However, the promotion of Turkey as a democratic and secular Muslim country is ill conceived simply because the issues related to democracy, secula rism and Islam are the problems contemporary Turkey has yet to resolve. Thus, the model needs to be established at home before exporting to the Muslim world. Nonetheless, it is not surprising that the “new” Turkish model receives support from the conservative/republican groups in the American administration and public opinion leaders in the US as well as the Turks who consider Turkey as a regional power with just enough degree of democracy and human rights in the face of perceived risks emanating from Islamist and Kurdish nationalist challenges.

As the top priority of US administration has been the fight against terrorism within the past couple of months, which even led to building coalitions with authoritarian governments, the importance of human rights and democratization on the US foreign policy agenda has rapidly diminished. It would, therefore, not be realistic to expect a “sincere encouragement” of the US republican administration for Turkey’s further democratization, which seems to consider democracy as a “risk” in Muslim countries in the face of “popularity” of Islamist leaders. Questioning the “wisdom” of pursuing a liberal democracy finds its echo among the Turkish state elite who constantly refer to “Turkey’s particularities” to opt for a “limited democracy”. Such coincidence of opinions concerning the wisdom of democracy “in times of threats”, which is a constant state of affairs in Turkey due to its sizable “internal enemies”, precipitates the “search for a new strategic partnership with the US” as promoted in recent months.

Prospect for Democracy and Human Rights: With US or EU?

For the US, aligning with conservative/pro-status quo forces in Turkey is a policy option. This has in fact been simultaneously promoted in Turkey by those who see the alliance with the US (and Israel) as a way to keep Turkey out of EU, and maintain the status quo. For the proponents of this view, choosing the path of the US (and Israel), would enable Turkey to become a significant player in the region and be highly regarded in Turkic and Islamic world as a model country, without risking the Kemalist nature of the regime or giving in the Kurdish demands. This line of thinking suggests that Turkey can “manage” its “democratic deficit” through maintaining and enhancing the strategic role.

However, such a framework is likely to be detrimental to US’ long-term engagement in Turkey. The very first sign of this is a debate initiated by liberal academics and intellectuals in Turkey on the political outcomes of Turkey’s “newly envisaged” strategic cooperation with the US. It has been argued that the US does not seem interested in supporting reforms for democratization and human rights, and that a “new strategic partnership” as advocated by the EU-skeptics would have adverse effects on the prospect for democracy and human rights in Turkey. The liberal reformists argue that as long as the US regards Turkey as a strategic asset that prioritize security over civil liberties, it is unlikely that Turkey would be able to form a functioning liberal democracy, and overcome the resistance of the conservative establishment to political reforms.

The conservative EU skeptics’ preference of the US over the EU as a “strategic partner” raises concerns within the liberal reformist groups that Turkey’s further engagement with strategically-minded US (and Israel) may empower pro-status quo forces in Turkey in return for Turkey’s support to deal with US’ regional foes like Iraq and Iran. As the country is desperate to get out of its economic and political impasses, the reformists, who press hard for change against all odds with a sizeable social support behind them, are likely to get alienated from the US if the US aligns itself or is perceived as aligning with pro-status quo forces in Turkey. It is therefore up to the US administration to make its position clear on both Turkey’s quest for the EU membership and its support for democratization and human ri ghts in order to not lose sympathy of the reformists.

Conclusion

It may sound rather absurd to argue for a strategic partnership between USA and Turkey as the relations between the two countries have had a strategic dimension based on the need for determining mutual interests for more than 50 years. However, if the recent talk of “strategic partnership” by the Turkish side refers to a new form of alliance that goes beyond traditional cooperation in military, political and economic issues, then it can be inferred that this new idea is part and parcel of the search for an alternative to the EU. Recent remarks of General Kilinc, the secretary general of all powerful National Security Council, who called for an alliance with the US, Russia and Iran, demonstrated that search for alternatives to the EU is on the agenda of the officials who have strong influence on the decision making process of the Turkish state. There is certainly a powerful lobby in Turkey that advocates US as an alternative to the EU as a long-term partner. Could such thinking find a corresponding audience in the current American administration? My answer to this question is an unfortunate yes.

is visiting Fulbright Fellow at the Department of Government of the Georgetown University, Washington D.C.

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