Social Dialogue in European Union Candidate Countries

Introduction:

In the context of enlargement of the European Union and with the support of the European Commission’s Directorate-General for Employment and Social Affairs, the European social partners (UNICE-UEAPME, CEEP, ETUC) launched a project whose purpose was to take stock of social dialogue in the ten countries of central and eastern Europe, Cyprus, Malta and Turkey. In its early stages, this project consisted in carrying out a series of investigations into the institutional underpinning and representativeness of employer and trade union organisations as well as the institutional structures for social dialogue. The aim was to acquire direct knowledge about the main players in social dialogue, their organisational structures, their strategies and their problems, not only in order to have a better understanding of the social and economic developments currently in train in the countries concerned, but also and above all to give an insight into the real capacity of the social partners in these countries – especially in the countries of central and eastern Europe – to promote autonomous and politically effective social dialogue. Development of such social dialogue is essential for implementation of numerous European directives in the field of social policy. Autonomous social dialogue (without the participation of the public authorities) is also an essential feature of the European social model.

What is the legal, institutional and political situation of employer and trade union organisations in the candidate countries? What are these organisations’ strategies for action with a view to promoting autonomous social dialogue? What problems do they face? What is the current situation of tripartism and autonomous social partnership in these countries? What institutional forms exist for representation of workers’ interests at company level? What institutional guarantees are in place to ensure workers’ right to information and consultation? How do the social partners participate in the policy of their respective countries for accession to the European Union? How are they preparing themselves for their role as players in an enlarged EU?

We will endeavour to provide some responses to these central questions. However, before doing so, we thought it necessary to make a number of comments on the methodology. An initiative designed to draw general conclusions about the situation of employer and trade union organisations and about the present situation of social dialogue in thirteen different countries is bound to run up against many methodological limits. First of all, such an initiative must take account of a large number of specifics which characterise and differentiate the countries of central and eastern Europe on the one hand and countries such as Malta, Cyprus and Turkey on the other. The countries of central and eastern Europe differ in many respects from countries such as Malta or Cyprus, which have generally followed the western line of socio-economic development. In addition, the case of Cyprus has a specific complexity, linked to the political division of the island. Turkey is also a case apart, for reasons which are known. Furthermore, such an initiative must be sensitive to differences between the individual post-communist countries. These countries also differ from each other in terms of the institutional consolidation of employer organisations, the situation of trade unions or tripartite practice. It will be clear that general conclusions about the Polish, Czech or Hungarian case will probably be of limited validity for Bulgaria or Romania, and vice versa.

Another limitation of our overview arises from the evolving nature of socio-economic realities and forces in the countries of central and eastern Europe. These countries are in a state of ongoing change. Everything is in flux and almost everything is changing. The political, economic and social transformation is far from complete in these countries. Moreover, it has been designed as a project which will continue to run over the decades ahead. The evolving nature of social and economic realities in these countries clearly applies to employer and trade union organisations as well. It would be premature to consider that the employer and trade union systems currently in place in these countries have been defined once and for all.

Thus, having drawn attention to the above-mentioned methodological difficulties and limits, we will develop an approach of generalisation focusing on the issues of representativeness, institutional resources, political challenges and structural problems faced by both employer and trade union organisations. In chapter 1 we will seek to identify a number of general traits common to employer systems. In chapter 2 we will analyse the situation of the trade unions. Chapter 3 will be devoted to the issue of tripartite social dialogue. We will then address the question of representation of workers’ interests at company level, notably institutional solutions for ensuring workers’ right to information and consultation. Chapter 5 will relate to the issue of collective agreements. The last will comprise comments on the participation of social partners in the policy of their respective countries for accession to the European Union.

1. Employer organisations

The institutional development of employer organisations in western countries in the 20th century was inspired to a large extent by the growing strength of trade unions, often going hand in hand with the influence of political forces – also growing – calling for establishment of so-called social democracy as well a shift in state policy towards an ever higher level of interventionism. In the face of these major social and political trends, employers clearly understood the interest in centralising their actions in order to be better able to defend themselves and to exert more effective pressure on the state and trade unions. Yet, employer organisations in the countries of central and eastern Europe have been formed in a completely different political and historical context, i.e. in a situation characterised by a massive withdrawal of the state (a radical reduction in the involvement and responsibilities of the state in economic and social life) and the timidity or even political weakness of trade unions. Without the need to confront strong and demanding trade unions, these organisations have developed essentially as interest groups whose priority concerns are economic policy, privatisation of businesses and integration of post-communist economies in European or global economic structures.

The historical context of the formation of employer organisations in the countries of central and eastern Europe demonstrates other peculiarities. For instance, a number of employer organisations in Poland, the Czech Republic or Slovakia have been created at the instigation of and with considerable assistance from the state (sale of premises for a peppercorn price, availability of offices and/or infrastructure, political encouragement through invitations to participate in government consultative bodies, etc.). One of the reasons for this attitude on the part of the state has been the wish to put in place tripartite structures for social concertation, in line with the philosophy and recommendations of the International Labour Organisation. To allow tripartite social concertation to be conducted, it was first necessary to create a partner for the employer side. The employer organisations created in this particular political context necessarily represented state enterprises in the first instance. It is true that there have also been spontaneous and independent initiatives designed to put in place associations representing the fledgling private sector alone. But employer policy in the above-mentioned countries in the early years after the collapse of communism was dominated by organisations represe nting state enterprises. In the countries of central and eastern Europe, some employer organisations were formed as offshoots of chambers of business. In Slovenia, the creation of the two most important national employer organisations was inspired respectively by the chamber of commerce and industry and the chamber of handicraft businesses. In Hungary, the most important employer organisation (MGYOSZ) regards itself as the successor to the chamber of commerce and industry as far as representation of employer interests is concerned. Employer organisations, the creation of which was inspired by business chambers, have enjoyed substantial political support. In addition, from the outset they have received major institutional resources (offices, personnel, members, etc.).

From a historical point of view and in comparison with the development of most employer organisations in the western European countries, one can say that employer organisations in central and eastern European countries emerged in the early 1990s not as structures resulting from a real historical need felt by employers because of specific problems linked to the functioning of the economy and trade union demands, but rather as institutions expressing a rational anticipation related to possible conflicts and problems of the economy destinated to be liberalised and privatised.

Today, employer organisations in these countries have a formal presence and conduct activities in a manner which brings them much closer to western blueprints for representation of employer interests. In many cases, the specific genesis of these organisations still represents in a certain way a drag on their political credibility. If their representativeness remains generally weak, it is also because they often fail to inspire sufficient confidence among new private employers.

It is clear that analysis of the formation and institutional development of employer organisations in Malta, Cyprus and Turkey requires a different categorisation and a different type of thinking. In the case of Malta, its British colonial past, and hence the influence of the British socio-economic tradition, is certainly an important factor for explaining this situation. But Malta’s geostrategic position also provides an insight into some of the socio-economic traits that are specific to this country, notably relatively strong involvement of the state in economic life. In the case of Cyprus, Greek or Turkish socio-cultural influences have helped to co-determine the institutional framework for economic life, and employer organisations also form part of this framework. Turkey is also a case apart. Since the early 1980s this country has made significant political and economic progress, e.g. by accepting the autonomy of the social partners.

In European Union candidate countries, employer organisations are many and cover all economic sectors. They act at sectoral or regional level, then forming sectoral or horizontal national confederations. However, the degree of centralisation of employer organisations varies from country to country. In addition, the greatest diversity of employer configurations is found at national level. In Hungary and Romania, horizontal employer organisations acting at national level form complex pluralist systems, which are also marked by rivalries between different confederations. The situation is the opposite in Slovenia. In that country, employer policy is dominated by the organisation ZDS, which acts in the framework of social dialogue together with the chamber of commerce and industry. In Slovakia, Estonia, Latvia and Turkey, the national system of employer organisations is dominated by one confederation which leaves all others standing in terms of institutional resources and political significance. In the other countries, employer systems are characterised by different pluralist configurations. Polish employer pluralism tends to be unstable and conflictual. Czech employer pluralism is more moderate and cooperative.

Legal basis

In most European Union candidate countries, employer organisations are associations (in the legal sense) which represent the interests of employers (interests linked essentially to social policy and trade union demands) and the interests of entrepreneurs (interests relating essentially to economic and commercial policy). As associations, they are not subject to specific administrative verification procedures. All they need do is comply with the law on associations which, incidentally, comprise fairly general provisions in all European countries. A formal and political distinction between employer organisations and business associations exists only in countries which have specific legislative rules covering employer organisations. This has been the case in Poland since 1991 and Latvia since 1999. In those countries, employer organisations operate on a specific legal basis. The law grants them particular political privileges, for instance the exclusive right to act in the framework of tripartite institutions and in the area of industrial relations. Employer organisations may also practice economic lobbying. But business organisations, which are associations (in the legal sense), do not have the right to act in the area of social dialogue and industrial relations. It appears that Romania is moving towards a similar dualist model. A law on employer organisations was expected to be adopted in the course of 2000. In Turkey and Malta, employer organisations also operate on a specific legal basis. But these are legislative instruments which regulate the question of the formal and political status of employer organisations in a much wider context, encompassing the formal and political status of trade unions, social dialogue and industrial relations. Thus, in these two countries there is specific legal regulation of employer organisations without there being a special law on that type of organisation.

Representativeness 

The representativeness of employer organisations can be discussed in both legal and sociological terms. In the candidate countries, there are generally two types of legal regulation covering employer representativeness. Either representativeness understood as the legal capacity to negotiate and conclude collective agreements, or representativeness at national level defined by the criteria for admission to the bodies for tripartite social dialogue. In the first case, the conditions for sectoral representativeness are usually set out in labour legislation, in liaison with rules for collective bargaining. In the second, there are instruments (laws, agreements) establishing tripartism and comprising criteria which are then regarded politically as representativeness criteria – this is the case in the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Hungary for example – or this question is regulated in labour legislation, as is the case in Bulgaria and Romania for example. In Latvia, it is the law on employer organisations which defines both the representativeness of employer organisations at national level (including the right to act in the framework of tripartism) and representativeness at sectoral level (including the right to act in the area of collective agreements).

However, it is important to note that representativeness criteria, whether they relate to sectoral employer organisations or horizontal national organisations, are defined in most candidate countries in a fairly general manner and with wording that tends to be rather vague. In Bulgaria, for instance, in order to be recognised as representative at national level, a given employer organisation must bring together at least 500 enterprises and comprise at least two sectoral organisations which in turn represent at least 50 employers each. They must also have territorial structures which cover at least half the regions of the country, with at least 10 employers in each. In this country, there are currently four horizontal employer organisations a cting at national level which are officially recognised as being representative. In Romania, to be recognised as being representative at national level, a given employer organisation must cover through its member organisations at least one quarter of economic sectors and have regional structures in at least half of the regions. In that country, there are eight employer organisations which are recognised as being representative at national level. It should be noted that two new national employer confederations were created there recently.

The representativeness criteria applicable to employer organisations in European Union candidate countries generally seem to endorse the present situation of the institutional and political development of these organisations. It appears that they have been put in place not to select or eliminate, but precisely to stabilise or give political legitimacy to existing organisations. It is possible to advance the theory that the representativeness criteria are more specific and more demanding in countries where employer organisations are best developed. In countries where they are less developed, these criteria tend to be vague and tolerant. However, in Poland, where the formation and functioning of employer organisations are based on special legislative regulation, there are no specific criteria for their representativeness. The labour code gives sectoral employer organisations the right to negotiate and conclude collective agreements without laying down any criteria as to how this right is to be acquired. Membership of employer organisations in the tripartite committee is not linked to any specific conditions being met. In Lithuania, there is a similar situation in this respect. In Latvia, legislative rules on the representativeness of employer organisations have been conceived in such a way as to ensure single representation of employer interests, at both sectoral and horizontal national level. At sectoral level, an employer organisation is regarded as being representative if it covers the largest number of workers in a given economic sector. Such an organisation obtains the exclusive right to represent the corresponding employer interests. At national level employer representativeness is defined on the basis of the same logic. The organisation which brings together companies employing the largest number of workers as a percentage of the total active population is regarded as being representative and automatically acquires the exclusive right to represent horizontal employer interests vis-à-vis the state and in the framework of national social concertation.

In most candidate countries, it is considered that the representativeness of employer organisations is a fact when the corresponding claim of a given organisation is not contested by either the trade unions or the government. But Bulgaria and Romania have adopted solutions which are much more demanding than this. In those countries, confirmation of the representativeness of an employer organisation acting at national level presupposes a formal verification by a competent court, and then a decision by the government.

The representativeness of employer organisation in the sociological sense leads to highly varied analyses. In terms of the number of member companies, the representativeness of employer organisations in the countries of central and eastern Europe is generally weak. It is estimated that these organisations, taken together, bring together around 30-40% of industrial enterprises or 2-5% of the firms active in a given country. In these countries, employer organisations bring together, in variable proportions, both state-owned undertakings, privatised businesses (many of which remain under total or partial state control) and private companies. It is evident that these proportions are changing, as a function of progress with privatisation and general economic development. But the mixed representativeness of employer organisations is not merely a statistic. It also presents a n important political problem. Simultaneous articulation of the interests of state-owned undertakings and private companies obviously requires very different, sometimes contradictory, action strategies. In Turkey, the interests of state-owned and state-controlled undertakings are in principle represented by specific employer organisations, but these organisations in turn belong to the national confederation TISK, which acts on behalf of Turkish employers as a whole.

In most candidate countries, including those that have not been subject to communism, public-service undertakings are represented by general employer organisations (sectoral or horizontal). Hitherto, the trend towards creating specific associations to represent public-service undertakings exclusively has been weak. Such organisations exist in Hungary and Turkey. An organisation of this type was recently created in Romania.

Representation of the interests of small and medium-sized enterprises in the candidate countries tends to be good, although it is sometimes not very coherent and highly dispersed. In several countries (Czech Republic, Hungary, Slovakia, Malta) there are even several national confederations which represent small and medium-sized enterprises. Some of these organisations represent small and medium-sized enterprises exclusively, whereas the others represent them in a more general framework, encompassing other types of business as well. In Poland, small and medium-sized enterprises are represented at national level essentially by the chamber of handicrafts. Yet, the latter is a special case. It performs functions which go well beyond the remit and role of traditional employer organisations.

In the countries of central and eastern Europe, employer organisations seem to have particular difficulties regarding the membership of newly created private enterprises. Why do new private employers hesitate to join organisations which claim to act on their behalf and promote their interests? Several factors allow a response to this question. It is clear that their validity must vary from country to country. However, generally, it can be said that private employers prefer to act in line with individual strategies, vis-à-vis not only the state but also trade unions. Above all, they seek to achieve their objectives through individual political contacts or individual arrangements negotiated at company level.

Institutional resources

In the case of many national employer confederations in the countries of central and eastern Europe, a significant disparity can be observed between the claims they make in terms of representativeness on the one hand and the real institutional resources at their disposal on the other. For instance, the Polish employer confederation, which represents more than 70 sectoral and regional organisations, is managed by an office which is surprisingly small. STRATOSZ (Hungary), which brings together around 40 enterprises, is managed also by a small office. Some Czech confederations are also managed by a minimum number of personnel. However, there are also employer confederations which possess highly developed administrative structures. These are, notably, Svaz Prumyslu (Czech Republic) and AZZZ (Slovakia), but also the Bulgarian industrial association, IPOSZ and MGYOSZ in Hungary as well as the Polish confederation of private employers.

For employer organisations, the relationship between representativeness and the degree of institutional development is not always simple. Employer organisations which are well developed can sometimes be fairly unrepresentative, whereas organisations with a respectable level of representativeness can have modest administrative structures. The institutional development of organisations depends essentially on their financial resources, which may come from a wide variety of sources (investment income, rent, etc.) and may rely only in part on subscriptions. Thus, an organisation which has goo d financial resources in addition to subscriptions can afford to put in place broad administrative structures regardless of how many members it has. Furthermore, such an organisation can expect to attract new members, using its institutional consolidation as an advertisement for the quality of its existence and services.

Another factor to be taken into consideration in the context which interests us here is the internal operation of given organisations. In this regard, two models can be distinguished. Employer confederations may be steered and managed by a national centre which is politically strong and institutionally well developed, or they may operate as coordination bodies for their member organisations or companies. In the latter case, most of the work carried out by a given national employer confederation would be based on its sectoral or regional member organisations. It seems that the Polish employer confederations illustrate clearly these two philosophies for action: the Polish confederation of private employers acts essentially through a strong national centre, while the confederation of Polish employers has a largely decentralised system and is composed of sectoral and regional organisations which are very autonomous.

Generally speaking, the level of institutional development of most employer organisations in the countries of central and eastern Europe is fairly weak. This situation is the result of two major phenomena. First, the low level of discipline among member companies regarding payment of subscriptions. Second, a lack of interest among employers in institutional consolidation of their organisations. These two phenomena are linked. They arise from the economic culture which is in the course of developing in these countries. It is often said that employers in some candidate countries are slow to pay subscriptions to employer organisations because they are not tax-deductible. Tax-deductibility in this area is certainly not unimportant, but it does not appear to be so decisive for the institutional development of employer organisations. In Poland, the question of deductibility was settled in 1997, in line with the argument advanced by employer organisations, but this has in no way led to an improvement in the condition of the confederation of Polish employers, which is still precarious. In Hungary, subscriptions are paid irregularly or only in part, despite complete tax-deductibility. Against that, Svaz Prumyslu tends to receive subscriptions regularly, even though they are not tax-deductible in the Czech Republic. Thus, the question that needs to be asked in this context does not relate to tax-deductibility, but rather to why employers sometimes prove dilatory about paying their subscriptions to organisations of which they are after all members. Our first theory is that they do not want employer organisations to become too powerful institutionally and politically. Our second theory is that they do not want to for reasons which are linked to the issue of collective agreements and the social dialogue.

Activities

In the countries of central and eastern Europe, national employer confederations carry out a range of internal and external activities. They offer various services to their member organisations or companies. They act vis-à-vis political bodies and administrative authorities. They are most concerned about questions of economic, fiscal and commercial policy. However, some significant disparity can be noted in the action of these confederations, i.e. the disparity between the number and intensity of initiatives targeting the state or government on the one hand and the number and quality of internal activities on the other. These organisations invest the lion’s share of their institutional resources in activities linked to tripartite social concertation. They sometimes make political commitments without always being capable of meeting them through a corresponding mobilisation of their member organisations or companies .

2. Trade unions 

After 1989, most of the trade unions in central and eastern Europe emerged from reformist initiatives within the former communist trade unions organisations. These initiatives have succeded in the formation of new trade unions structures, from the level of enterprises to the level of national confederations. The trade unions, which were created in such a way, retained respective parties of the assets of the precedent trade unions organisations and a fair number of former members. Politically, they rapidly established themselves as important players in the domain of social dialogue and professional relations.

However, this analytical scheme does not apply in its entirety to the development of trade unions in Poland and Bulgaria. In the case of Poland, the history of the trade union Solidarity has specific features, as we know. After the fall of communism, it was splits within Solidarity which gave birth to several new trade unions. The case of the Bulgarian Podkrepa is in some ways an imitation of the Polish Solidarity, in the political conditions after 1989. It is clear that the formation of trade unions in Malta, Cyprus and Turkey refers to other circumstances and requires different considerations.

The trade union systems currently found in most European Union candidate countries are pluralist systems. But there are several types of trade union pluralism in these countries. In some cases, there is an ideological pluralism. In others, there are just several national confederations without there being any significant ideological differences. In Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Malta, there are trade unions which refer explicitly to Christian values. Apart from the Polish Solidarity, trade unions which make reference to religion are institutionally very weak and tend to play a politically marginal role. However, it does not appear that ideological definitions or references to values are very important for an understanding of trade union systems and trade union policy in the countries of central and eastern Europe or Malta. In Turkey, there are trade unions which refer to the Islamic religious tradition.

In the countries of central and eastern Europe, trade union pluralism is manifested in a great variety of configurations. In Hungary, there are six central national trade unions which are regarded as being representative. In Romania, there are five. In Lithuania, there are four. In these three countries, trade union pluralism was characterised in the early years after the collapse of communism by strong rivalry between the most important central organisations. Today, this rivalry is less marked. In Hungary, trade union pluralism is even becoming increasingly cooperative. In the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Slovenia, there are several national trade union confederations, but trade union policy in these countries is dominated in reality by one organisation only, which marginalises all the others. In Poland and Bulgaria, there is a bipolar pluralism. Trade union policy in those countries is dominated by two large central trade union organisations and is characterised by tensions between them. However, in recent years, this bipo larity has greatly moderated. In Latvia, the trade union landscape is dominated by the LBAS organisation to such an extent that it is even possible to speak about a trade union monopoly in that country.

Malta, Cyprus and Turkey also have trade union pluralism. In the Maltese case, there is a stable plural configuration, with institutional stability and historical roots. In Turkey, trade union development is subject to the vagaries of state policy. However, over the last decade there has been some consolidation of trade union structures in the country.

Legal basis

In European Union candidate countries, trade unions are formed and operate on very diverse legal bases. In Hungary, the Czech Republic and Slovakia, they are associations in terms of legal status. This simple legal arrangement makes it possible to create trade unions with as few as three or five persons, without too many formalities. In Bulgaria, the labour code guarantees freedom to join and create a trade union with no restrictions on the minimum number of workers. In Poland, Romania, Lithuania, Latvia and Slovenia, the creation and operation of trade unions are governed by special legislative rules which comprise detailed provisions not only on the formal conditions for their creation and operation but also on their rights and privileges. In Estonia, a new law on trade unions was expected to be adopted in 2000. In Poland, creation of a trade union in an enterprise presupposes the involvement of at least ten persons. In Romania, this requirement rises to fifteen persons. In Latvia and Lithuania, the laws are particularly restrictive regarding the formal conditions for the creation of trade unions. In those countries, the formal registration of a trade union in an enterprise requires the formal involvement of a fairly large number of workers: at least fifty persons or at least 25% of the personnel in the case of Latvia, and 20% of the personnel in the case of Lithuania. Such regulation must raise doubts about its conformity with the principle of trade union freedom and European norms in this regard. In Malta and Turkey, there are also legislative rules regarding creation, operation and the rights of trade unions. In the case of Malta, the rules encompass the entire question of professional relations.

However, it should be added that, independent of laws on trade unions, trade union rights and the principles of legal protection of trade union officials are expressed and confirmed in the labour legislation of all candidate countries. Generally, they are in line with the political requirements of the International Labour Organisation and the relevant European norms.

Representativeness

In the candidate countries, the question of the representativeness of trade unions is dealt with partially in labour legislation, notably in the context of definition of legal capacity to conclude collective agreements, and partially in legislative instruments (laws, agreements) instituting tripartite consultations. In this latter case, the conditions for access to tripartite bodies are regarded as representativeness criteria. However, the question of trade union representativeness has yet other dimensions which go well beyond any specific legal definition. First of all, the candidate countries accept the principle that trade unions represent the interests of workers, not only the interests of their members. In some candidate countries, trade unions are recognised by the law as the only institutional representation of workers in the enterprise. The question of trade union representativeness at sectoral or national level is sometimes regarded as an eminently political question arising from de facto recognition by employers or the government, independent of this or that formal criterion. Such considerations prevail in Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary for example.

In most candidate countries, definition of trade union representati veness at enterprise level follows a certain scheme which we can elucidate with the following examples. In the Czech Republic and Slovakia, the right to negotiate collective agreements at enterprise level is granted to the trade unions which operate in any given enterprise. But conclusion of collective agreements requires the effective support (number of trade union members, approval by the personnel) of at least half of the workers concerned. In Poland, the law also requires trade unions which wish to conclude collective agreements to bring together at least 50% of the workers in the enterprise. In Hungary, a trade union is recognised as being representative and may thus negotiate collective agreements at enterprise level if it can demonstrate that its candidates have obtained at least 10% of votes in the most recent elections for the works council. But, in order to be able to conclude such agreements, it must also demonstrate that its candidates have obtained at least 50% of votes in such elections. If not, the negotiated agreement has to be submitted for approval by the personnel. This approval requires absolute majority.

Regarding the representativeness of sectoral trade unions, candidate countries generally practice the two following solutions. First of all, sectoral trade unions which belong to national confederations, which are themselves officially recognised as being representative, are also automatically regarded as being representative. In other cases, trade union representativeness at sectoral level is identified on formal acquisition of the right to negotiate and conclude sectoral collective agreements. Legislative rules covering the legal capacity to conclude sectoral collective agreements generally comprise as the main criterion a certain percentage of members, measured against the volume of the population active in given economic sectors. In most cases, this benchmark is 10%. However, in Slovenia it is 15%, and in Romania 7%.

In candidate countries, the representativeness of trade unions at national level is seen on a similar perspective. Generally, this representativeness is measured against the criteria for admission to tripartite social partnership. But political or historical considerations also play a certain role here. Hungary provides a good example of simultaneous and complementary application of these two approaches, statistical and political. But there are also other examples in this regard. In Bulgaria and Romania, recognition of trade union representativeness at national level necessarily involves a regulatory instrument promulgated by the government on the basis of a prior decision by a competent court. In Bulgaria, recognition of the representativeness of a trade union organisation at national level presupposes the following conditions: at least 50,000 members; presence in a majority of economic sectors; at least 50 grass-roots sections in each sector represented, each section comprising at least five members; institutional presence in 80% of regions in the country; at least 50 grass-roots sections in each region represented, each comprising at least five members. In Romania, a trade union which is representative at national level must demonstrate a membership equal to at least 5% of the active population and cover at least one quarter of economic sectors and one half of the regions of the country. In Latvia, the agreement establishing the national tripartite council comprises a reference which expressly confirms that the trade union LBAS is the only trade union which is representative at national level. In Poland, there are no legal rules at the present time setting out the criteria for admission of trade unions to the tripartite commission. In that country, recognition of trade union representativeness at national level is above all a question of political recognition. In Estonia, trade union representativeness at national level is a question of de facto recognition. It is true that the new law requires representative trade unions to have large number s of members, a capacity to mobilise these members, an organisational capacity to articulate the interests of workers, and that they participate in public debates, but these are conditions which necessarily involve assessments of a political nature.

Representativeness in the sociological sense (number of members, number of grass-roots sections, number of economic sectors covered) is very variable in the European Union candidate countries. In Slovenia, Bulgaria and Romania, the level of trade union membership is currently between 40 and 60%. It is also fairly high in Malta and Turkey, where it is just above 60%. Against that, trade union membership is less strong in Poland, the Czech Republic, Hungary and the Baltic states. There it averages 20 to 25%. Regarding the countries of central and eastern Europe, these figures make it possible to note a fairly significant trend, i.e. that trade union membership is stronger in countries which are less advanced in terms of restructuring and privatisation of the economy. Conversely, trade union membership is weaker in the countries which are in the avant-garde of transformation policy.

In all European Union candidate countries, the level of trade union membership is on a constant downward trend. It is important to point out that this phenomenon relates just as much to Poland, Bulgaria, Hungary or Slovenia as it does to Malta and Turkey. It can be explained by a number of factors, objective and subjective. Some of these factors are of a general nature, reflecting contemporary socio-economic developments. Other are linked to the objectives and specific conditions of post-communist transformation policy.

Regarding the countries of central and eastern Europe, the first evidence in this regard is that the number of trade union members is falling in those countries, in line with the reduction in the volume of the active population. The volume of the active population is falling essentially due to massive redundancies which in turn result from restructuring of enterprises and state institutions in general. Economic restructuring often involves a division of the enterprises in question into several smaller and independent establishments, which automatically destroys the preceding trade union structures without new sections being formed in the establishments thus created. Economic restructuring is a wider process but usually goes hand in hand with privatisation of enterprises. Privatisation, too, results in a relative weakening of trade unions or loss of members. Incidentally, this phenomenon relates not only to the post-communist countries but also in Malta and Turkey.

It must be noted that trade unions in the countries of central and eastern Europe exist essentially in state-owned enterprises and persist in privatised businesses. However, in the latter case, they are undergoing a significant erosion in both the number of members and political influence. Against that, they have a weak presence in private firms, created as such at the outset. Trade unions are also relatively weak in service establishments (privatised or private).  

How can the weak representation of trade unions in private companies in the candidate countries be explained? It appears that there are at least two factors which help to explain this phenomenon. First, private employers in countries such as Poland, the Czech Republic, Estonia and Lithuania, for example, are proving particularly skilful at dissuading workers from creating trade unions in their establishments, without standing accused of infringing the freedom to join a trade union. Second, it is sometimes the workers themselves who show no interest in creation of trade unions or joining existing trade unions. This attitude is found in all candidate countries. It is linked to the general direction of our socio-economic development. This attitude is particularly prevalent among the young people now embarking in professional life.

Falling trade unio n membership in the candidate countries is without any doubt a complex phenomenon. Among the factors which explain it, there is also the fact that the popularity of trade unions in these countries is weak, notably in Hungary and Estonia. In most candidate countries, the confidence of citizens in trade unions is also weak. Workers do not necessarily regard trade unions as organisations which represent their interests. Underlying this critical or sceptical attitude to trade unions, there are certainly neo-liberal ideological influences, an individualist conception of professional careers, but also, perhaps, the situation of the trade unions themselves, which are going through a difficult period of adaptation linked to both the socio-economic specifics of post-communist transformation and the requirements of modernisation.

Institutional resources

Traditionally, trade unions have had well developed organisational structures, at national, sectoral and regional level. They operate on the basis of different financial resources, notably subscriptions paid by their members, revenues from economic activities, grants linked to participation in various social programmes, etc. The institutional consolidation of trade unions depends greatly on their representativeness and their effective involvement in professional relations. Seen from this particular viewpoint, the “institutional condition” of trade unions in the candidate countries is highly varied.

All trade unions in the countries of central and eastern Europe have been affected in recent by massive falls in trade union membership. This has squeezed their revenues from subscriptions and reduced their possibilities for action to a certain extent. Falling trade union membership certainly signifies an institutional and political weakening, but it would be wrong to regard it as a sign of the decline of trade unions in the candidate countries. Rather, this phenomenon is an important element of a much wider process of trade union restructuring, a process which is taking the form of progressive emergence of new configurations within and between trade unions on the one hand and development of a new socio-economic culture on the other. In the candidate countries, trade unions are passing through an important phase of institutional and political rebalancing. At the end of this process, the power of trade unions will probably be modest, but politically authentic and, hence, more effective.

Activities

Trade unions in candidate countries perform various activities, despite the above-mentioned institutional difficulties. The number and quality of these activities clearly depends on the resources available to a given organisation. It would be inappropriate to try to deal with this question in detail here. But what needs to be examined briefly in this context is the general development of trade union activities in the candidate countries.

Regarding this particular aspect, a significant decrease in the number of protect actions by trade unions (strikes, demonstrations, etc.) in all candidate countries, both the countries of central and eastern Europe and countries such as Malta, Cyprus or Turkey. This phenomenon certainly reflects the strategies of trade union organisations which seem to be focusing more on arrangements drawn up in the framework of various social consultations, but it is also linked to the growing difficulty experienced by trade unions in mobilising workers for specific protest actions. In the countries of central and eastern Europe, this difficulty arises partially from a growing political apathy among the population, but also from waning solidarity among workers who, in a situation of mass unemployment and generalised social uncertainty, are afraid of losing their jobs and part of their pay through involvement in trade union protest actions.

A second interesting feature of trade-unionism in the candidate countries, notably the c ountries of central and eastern Europe, is the weakness of trade union influence on transformation policy. True, the trade unions have certainly influenced elements of labour legislation in their respective countries. In individual cases, they have managed to have an influence on definition of public policies relating to the world of work. But the weakness of trade unions we refer to here concerns other aspects and other dimensions. Setting aside the case of the Polish “Solidarity”, it must be noted that the imprint of trade unions on the general philosophy of post-communist transformation, privatisation programmes, economic restructuring and policies to promote employment and reduce unemployment and combat social exclusion in these countries has been particularly faint hitherto.

3. Tripartism

Tripartite social concertation is an important element of institutional development in the countries of central and eastern Europe. It is practised in these countries with different levels of intensity, but it follows a similar institutional logic. It produces political results which are also different, depending on the country and specific political situations. In Malta, tripartism was put in place in 1988. There, it is also an interesting political experiment. Turkey has had tripartism since 1995. But the system of tripartite consultations in this country remains highly dependent on changing political situations.

The emergence and development of tripartite social dialogue in the candidate countries has been broadly inspired by the International Labour Organisation. In the countries of central and eastern Europe, tripartism was also stimulated – in the early years of transformation policy at least – by governments which saw them as a political means of helping to guarantee relative social peace. By involving the social partners in the political/institutional system for defining economic and social policy, governments wanted to ensure the support of society, in order to be better able to carry through socially difficult economic reforms. On the other side, the social partners too endeavoured to gain an incontestable advantage from their participation in tripartite consultations. Among other things, this participation helped them to present themselves as politically important players, thereby establishing or strengthening their legitimacy in the eyes of their members and public opinion in general.

Legal basis

In most candidate countries, tripartism operates on the basis of agreements concluded between the government and the social partners (trade union confederations, employer confederations) regarded politically and/or legally as being representative at national level. In Romania, Slovakia and Estonia, tripartism is covered by special laws. In Bulgaria, it also has a legislative base, i.e. the labour code. In Poland and Slovenia, the legislative solution for tripartism has been envisaged by the government for years, but disputes in this respect between the social partners themselves and indecision on the part of the government are still holding back formal launch of the parliamentary procedure. However, it should be pointed out that differences in the legal basis (agreement, law) of tripartite councils are not very important. In Slovakia and Romania, the legislative underpinning of tripartism may give the trade union and employer organisations involved political comfort, but has done nothing to alter the modus operandi of tripartite bodies and does not affect the validity (consultative) of tripartite opinions. For the time being, it is difficult to see any real difference in the operation or political weight of tripartite consultations between councils based formally on agreements and those with a legislative basis. Whether based on a straightforward agreement or confirmed in legislation, tripartism in the candidate countries demonstrates political cooperation between the government and the social partners, who se operation and political significance depends essentially on the political will of the government itself and the political credibility of the trade union and employer organisations concerned.

One problematic point of tripartite experiments in the countries of central and eastern Europe has been and continues to be the question of total or selective failure by the government to meet tripartite commitments. In some countries, the trade unions have asked for tripartism to be regulated by legislation, thereby hoping to obtain additional means of action or specific means of pressure in the event that the government fails to meet its commitments made in the framework of tripartism. Yet, it does not appear that the formal quality (law, agreement) of the legal basis of tripartism is very important in this regard. In substance, tripartite councils operate on the basis of similar rules in all candidate countries. For instance, Slovakia has a law on tripartism (since 1999), whereas tripartism in the Czech Republic is based on an agreement concluded between the government and the social partners. This does not prevent the tripartite arrangements in these two countries from being virtually identical and social dialogue there has been operating relatively well for some time. The recent improvement in tripartite practice in Slovakia and the Czech Republic has resulted above all from the change of government attitude in this particular area.

There is another factor which helps to place in perspective the importance of the legal basis (law, agreement) of tripartite bodies and consultations at national level. In all candidate countries, tripartism has from the start of its existence had and continues to have an indirect legislative underpinning in the sense that labour legislation formally recognises the existence of tripartite councils through the fact that it obliges the government to consult the social partners of various subjects such as the minimum wage, redundancies linked to corporate restructuring, working conditions, etc.

Composition and representativeness

In most candidate countries, admission of employer and trade union organisations to tripartite bodies operates on the basis of pre-determined criteria, set out in legislation or in agreements establishing this type of social concertation. At the same time, these criteria are regarded as criteria for the representativeness of trade unions and employer confederations acting at national level. In Poland, however, admission to the tripartite commission is not conditional on any formal criterion. Its composition was fixed by the government at the time when this commission was created. In theory, it is possible to widen this commission to include new trade union and employer organisations, but on condition that the organisations which already belong to it give their respective agreement: employer organisations for the admission of new employer organisations and trade unions for the admission of new trade unions. In practice, the composition of the Polish tripartite commission has remained unchanged since its creation in 1994, despite several requests for admission. A similar rule governed the admission of new employer or trade union organisations to the council for reconciliation of interests in Hungary in the years from 1990 to 1999. The composition of this council remained unchanged throughout this period.

Under the traditional formula, tripartism embraces three parties: government, trade unions and employers. When setting up tripartite councils, the candidate countries have generally followed this formula. Among these countries, Slovenia has chosen a different solution in this regard, by creating a tripartite system which includes the chamber of commerce and the chamber of handicrafts. In Malta and Turkey, chambers of commerce and industry also belong to the respective tripartite councils, together with the most important national employer confederations.

In most of the candidate countries, the composition of tripartite councils does not give rise to doubts or disputes between trade unions or between employers. In countries such as Estonia, Latvia or Slovakia, the systems of trade union organisations and of employer organisations are dominated respectively by one trade union confederation and one employer confederation, which clearly both belong to the tripartite bodies. To a certain extent, this resolves the question of the representativeness of these bodies. Against this, the representativeness of tripartite bodies is becoming the subject of debate or contestation in countries with a high level of trade union and employer pluralism. This phenomenon partially characterises Hungary, Romania and Lithuania. Bulgaria, too, has for some time had disputes about trade union and employer representativeness of the tripartite council. In Poland, the representativeness of the tripartite commission has been contested since the start of its existence.

Competences and functioning 

Generally speaking, the competences of tripartite councils in candidate countries can be divided into two major categories: consultative competences and almost co-decision competences. The first relate essentially to economic and social legislation, but also budgetary law in some countries. The second relate in principle to two specific areas: determination of the minimum wage and definition of the index for average pay increases. Tripartite councils exercise the first type of competence through consultative opinions or position papers, and the second through negotiated agreements, but which do not have any direct legal effect. They have to be confirmed by the government through regulatory instruments. In many candidate countries, the government and the social partners conclude in tripartite councils general agreements (annual or covering longer periods) relating to important aspects of economic and social policy. Such agreements provide political markers for both the government and the socio-economic players concerned.

In principle, the validity of opinions and general tripartite agreements is purely moral and political. The government and the social partners undertake to respect what they have agreed together in the framework of tripartism but tripartite social concertation, as practised in the candidate countries, enjoys no legal sanctions in the event of failure to meet commitments. That is why tripartite undertakings do not always become reality in these countries. It is often governments which disregard or fail to honour tripartite agreements in their entirety. Sometimes, application of tripartite agreements also reaches objective limits in the sense that the social partners are incapable of carrying out their tripartite commitments because of their weak representativeness or because of their poor capacity for influencing their respective members.

Tripartite opinions or agreements do not generally have any binding legal effect vis-à-vis parliaments. In line with the philosophy of tripartism, tripartite councils are above all consultative bodies vis-à-vis and for the use of governments. However, the principle is often accepted that opinions expressed by the social partners in the framework of tripartite consultations in connection with draft laws subject to consultation, but which are subsequently not accepted by the government, have to be submitted by the latter to parliament, together with the draft laws concerned. Generally, tripartite councils have no right of legislative initiative. Nevertheless, in some candidate countries they can make legislative suggestions by submitting proposals to the organs of state which do have that right.

In the candidate countries, tripartite councils function on a relatively simple institutional model. They deliberate in plenary sessions, whose frequency depends on the interests of the parties concerned. Generally, a distinction can be made between ordinary ses sions, held regularly, and extraordinary sessions, convened at the request of the parties concerned. In principle, plenary discussions are prepared the thematic working groups – permanent or ad hoc. The composition of working groups reflects the composition of the council.

Tripartite councils formulate opinions or take positions on the principle of consensus. This is consensus between the three parties concerned: government, trade unions and employers. Individual voting by members was used once by the Polish tripartite commission in the early years of its existence. For some time, this committee has also accepted the principle of consensus. In countries where tripartite councils comprise more than one trade union or employer organisation, the quest for general tripartite consensus presupposes prior coordination on the trade union side and employer side respectively, in order to identify one shared trade union opinion and one shared employer opinion, which will then be defended in tripartite deliberations in plenary sessions. In countries such as Hungary and Romania, this prior coordination has sometimes been problematic.

The state and tripartism

The state is by definition a player in tripartism. In some candidate countries, however, it is the dominant player, which does not correspond completely to the philosophy of social concertation of this type. Involvement of the state in tripartite social dialogue has several particular aspects, notably a financial aspect and a purely political aspect.

In the candidate countries, tripartite councils are financed by the state. In principle, they are situated with the government or with the ministry of labour. The government covers the administrative costs for the functioning of tripartism. The government also covers the travel and accommodation expenses incurred by the social partners for tripartite activities. In the Czech Republic and Slovakia, where the social partners are expected to cover a portion of these costs by occasionally organising tripartite sessions on their own premises, practice tends to be such that the government always takes care of the technical side of tripartite work.

At political level, tripartism in the countries of central and eastern Europe, but also in Malta and Turkey, is characterised by a strong predominance of government. For instance, the revisions of the tripartite formula in the Czech Republic and Hungary which have taken place in the 1990s not only have been initiated by the government but have also been imposed on the social partners by the government. In the candidate countries, the functioning of tripartism depends greatly on the goodwill of the government, which sometimes evolves rapidly as a function of cyclical political interests. Generally speaking, governments in the candidate countries still have a fairly ambiguous attitude to tripartism, despite the fact that they have contributed greatly to putting this type of social concertation in place. Governments in these countries have a strong tendency to treat tripartism as an instrument. They appreciate the social dialogue when it produces political results which correspond to their immediate interests. They tend to neglect it when the social partners prove to be politically demanding or intransigent.

Present situation

Tripartism in the candidate countries certainly presents an interesting political experiment. It has undoubtedly played a positive role in the formation of a consensual socio-economic culture. It still has important educational significance. If it sometimes prompts doubts and questions, it is not only because of the ambiguity of government attitude to it, which results in part from the very formula for tripartism which makes the government both the subject and object of consultations, but also because of the sometimes problematic representativeness of the social partners concerned.

In some candidate countries, a new trend can currently be seen towards revision of the traditional formula for tripartite social concertation at national level. In Malta, there has been a debate for some time on the possibility of including civil society organisations in the tripartite system, notably so-called non-governmental organisations. It has also been suggested that the state should withdraw from the tripartite social dialogue. In Poland, there are discussions on the possibility of including territorial authorities in tripartism. There, too, it there are proposals that the government should withdraw from social dialogue, ceding its place to the regions. The new social dialogue system in Hungary, which consists in several different councils (tripartite and multipartite), also presents an original experiment, despite the reservations manifested by the social partners in this context. In one way or another, social dialogue is in a state of flux in the candidate countries. This may lead to new institutional solutions which could inspire a renewal of social dialogue in western countries too.

4. Collective agreements

From a historical viewpoint, sectoral collective agreements are the fulcrum of bipartite social dialogue. The main raison d’être of sectoral trade unions and employer organisations is precisely to negotiate and conclude collective agreements on behalf of their respective members. Thus, collective bargaining practice at sectoral level is also an essential element of the European social model.

Unlike western countries where bipartite social partnership is much better anchored institutionally and politically than tripartite concertation, the EU candidate countries, notably the countries of central and eastern Europe, are characterised by a fairly well institutionalised tripartism, but which goes hand in hand with weak and problematic bipartism. This curious configuration clearly puts the political significance of tripartism itself in perspective. Acting without solid bipartite underpinning, national trade union and employer confederations are open to the reproach that they are insufficiently representative or that they are unable to translate the undertakings they give in the framework of tripartism into concrete action at the level of individual economic sectors.

In the countries of central and eastern Europe, the area of collective agreements is characterised first by a relatively small number of sectoral agreements and second by a marked preference among employers for negotiated at company level. In most of these countries, collective agreements cover only a minor portion of the active population. But there are also some exceptions in this regard.

At the legal level, labour legislation in the candidate countries in principle creates favourable formal conditions for development of bargaining practice, both in companies and at sectoral level. For their part, governments encourage trade unions and employer organisations to develop an autonomous social dialogue. If, despite this, bargaining practice in most of these countries remains fairly mediocre, it is because there are specific political obstacles or difficulties in this area.

Yet, among the countries of central and eastern Europe, there are a number which are distinguished by statistically respectable bargaining practice, but it should be pointed out immediately that this practice has many specific aspects. In Slovenia, all the important sectors of the national economy are covered by collective agreements. But this fact should cause no surprise, since conclusion of such agreements is obligatory in that country. Slovenian firms are obliged to belong to the chamber of commerce which, in collaboration with the corresponding sections of the employer organisation ZDS, concludes sectoral agreements with the respective trade union organisations. Since 1995, the Slovenian government has endeavoured to establish a system of voluntary collective agreements, but a draft law on the subject is still meeting strong opposition from the social partners, notably the trade unions. In Romania, the law obliges employers of more than 21 persons to conclude company agreements with the trade unions or with a specially designated personnel delegation if there is no trade union in a given company. By contrast, there are no legal constraints on sectoral collective agreements. In Slovenia, sectoral agreements must follow on from each other chronologically and be in conformity with general national agreements. There are two agreements of this type, one relating to state and budget institutions, the other concerning the industrial and commercial economic sectors. In Romania, conclusion of collective agreements is also preceded by a general national agreement, the latter being concluded between the trade union and employer confederations which are recognised as being representative at national level, with the assistance and active participation of the government. Slovakia greatly resembles Slovenia as regards the number of sectoral collective agreements concluded. In effect, these agreements cover almost all economic sectors in Slovakia. Unlike Slovenia, however, Slovak bargaining practice is completely voluntary. Yet, this Slovak exception, however praiseworthy in quantitative terms, is proving to be much less interesting in qualitative terms. In Slovakia, sectoral collective agreements usually comprise very general provisions and often refer regulation of sensitive questions, pay for instance, to individual company agreements.

To understand sectoral bargaining practice in certain countries of central and eastern Europe, it is important to distinguish clearly between agreements which apply to so-called budget or state institutions and agreements which apply to productive economic sectors. For instance, in Poland there are a hundred or so agreements which are classified as sectoral agreements, but the majority of these relate primarily to schools, hospitals, prisons and a host of other state institutions. There are only a dozen sectoral agreements relating to traditional industrial and commercial areas.

In the countries of central and eastern Europe, the percentage of employees covered by sectoral or other collective agreements is relatively low. The level averages 25-30%. This index is lowest in Lithuania where collective agreements hardly cover 10% of employees. The comparable figure is 25% in the Czech Republic. It exceeds 50% in Slovakia. It is exceptionally high in Slovenia for the reasons set out above. In this context, it should be added that labour legislation in the countries of central and eastern Europe makes it possible to extend the validity of sectoral agreements. But the governments in most of these countries have hitherto very rarely used this regulatory instrument.

Another particular feature of bargaining practice in the countries of central and eastern Europe concerns the content of sectoral agreements. It should be pointed out that they very often contain provisions from the labour code relating to professional relations. Thus, the social partners undertake to comply with the principles or clauses which they are in any event obliged to comply with by virtue of the law. Also, sectoral agreements often remain very vague or particularly flexible regarding employee issues. They are often limited to formulating a general framework, referring concrete and detailed regulation to agreements of a lower rank.  

What is the explanation for the quantitative and qualitative weakness of sectoral bargaining practice in the countries of central and eastern Europe? It seems that there are three types of factor which help to understand and explain this phenomenon. These are, first of all, factors linked to the general socio-economic structures and budget and pay policy in these countries. But the attitude of employers and the situation of employer organisations together with the situation and policy of trade unions are also important explanatory factors in this respect. All these elements taken together inevitably prompt a more fundamental question, namely about the degree of autonomy of the social partners in their respective actions specifically in the area of sectoral collective agreements.

The budget and pay policy in the countries of central and eastern Europe, subject to constraints linked to systemic transformation and integration of these countries in western European structures, is not particularly conducive to sectoral bargaining practices. By maintaining numerous restrictions and a range of control mechanisms, this policy to a certain extent limits the autonomy of the social partners in the area of pay negotiations. It is true that, in the first instance, it concerns regulation of pay in state institutions and undertakings, but it also has indirect repercussions on determination of pay in private economic domains.

On the other hand, it is possible to see in these countries a contradiction between policy designed to address the issue of pay increases in the framework of tripartite consultations or negotiations and the wish of the social partners, above all the trade unions, to promote autonomous pay negotiations at sectoral level. Yet, it is evident that tripartite agreements on pay must also limit the social partners’ margin for manoeuvre at sectoral level. In some cases, they may render sectoral pay arrangements superfluous.

Another general factor which has a negative influence on the development of sectoral bargaining practices in the countries of central and eastern Europe is linked to the objective difficulty of defining economic sectors as such. Whatever the legal definitions of economic sectors, the reality in central and eastern European countries in this regard is such that the economic sectors designate dynamic and evolving areas of activity. Even supposing that it is possible to find a way of identifying the limits of a given sector, there are yet other specific obstacles to development of sectoral bargaining practices. In order to be able to conclude a sectoral collective agreement, it is important that the firms belonging to a given sector find themselves in comparable economic, financial and social situations. Yet, in the countries of central and eastern Europe, firms which allow themselves to be attached to a given economic sector, on the basis of disparate criteria, differ so much in terms of their economic, financial and social situation that it is almost impossible to place them together in the same political basket and impose common pay regulation on them, for instance. A sectoral agreement that took as its benchmark the financial and social situation of prosperous firms would self-evidently place the existence of weak firms in jeopardy. Conversely, a sectoral agreement which sought to generalise the financial and social situation of poor firms would clearly be absurd and unacceptable for the employees of more fortunate firms.

Lastly, the autonomy of the social partners in the area of negotiated rules at sectoral level in the countries of central and eastern Europe is also extensively limited by the fact that labour legislation in these countries is sometimes very detail ed, as in Poland, Hungary and Estonia for example. In such a situation, the social partners have very little on which to negotiate autonomously. It therefore comes as no surprise that collective agreements in these countries take over the legislative provisions concerning professional relations almost word for word.

But the obstacles to development of autonomous bargaining practice at sectoral level in central and eastern European countries results not only from the above-mentioned objective factors. There are also in these countries specific trade union and employer impediments in this regard.

On the trade union side, an essential obstacle to the development of sectoral collective bargaining practice arises from the fact that the trade unions are poorly represented in private businesses which already constitute an important pillar of the economy in most countries of central and eastern Europe. The employer organisations bringing together private companies are often in the situation of not having equivalent trade union partners. On the other hand, trade unions have a heavy presence in state undertakings and in privatised companies (which are often under state control). Yet, the employer organisations which bring together businesses of this type are players which are not completely autonomous politically. Incidentally, the trade unions themselves are well aware of this and they are right to address the state directly, the de facto employer, in important situations. In such a configuration, employer organisations position themselves rather as intermediary players or as referees between the state and the trade unions. This fact does not encourage the development of autonomous sectoral bargaining practice either.

In Hungary and Lithuania, trade union pluralism sometimes becomes a no less specific obstacle to the development of bargaining practice. In these countries, the lack of cooperation between trade unions has already on more than one occasion prevented the formal conditions from being met for conclusion not only of sectoral collective agreements but also of company agreements. In Hungary, there is another phenomenon which runs counter to sectoral bargaining practice. The trade unions in large industrial undertakings often prefer to conclude individual company agreements, thereby disregarding the sectoral trade union organisations. In brief, trade union policy or the behaviour of trade unions in companies sometimes proves to be an obstacle to the development of sectoral bargaining practice.

Employer impediments to development of bargaining practice at sectoral level in the countries of central and eastern Europe are also numerous and no less significant that those that we have seen on the trade union side. First of all, it is important to underline that the trend among employers in this particular matter in these countries is such that private employers or boards of management prefer to conclude individual agreements in their establishments. They have reservations or sometimes demonstrate sharp hostility to the possibility of sectoral collective agreements. However, this employer attitude is not always an expression of a specific social or political voluntarism. It is often linked to the financial and social condition of individual businesses, a condition which cannot be easily generalised or outlined on the basis of any given sectoral framework. We have already referred to the phenomenon of inequality or enormous disparities in financial and social conditions between businesses in the same economic sector.

Another employer factor which has a negative influence on sectoral bargaining practice is the fact that employer organisations are not always authorised to conclude agreements on behalf of their member companies. Such cases are found in the Czech Republic for instance. In Poland, but also in many other candidate countries, companies sometimes threaten to leave employer organisations when the latter envisage embarking on cooperation with trade unions with a view to conclusion of sectoral agreements.

The poor representativeness of employer organisations, notably those acting at sectoral level, is also a specific obstacle to development of bargaining practice. In the countries of central and eastern Europe, situations are also found where sectoral trade unions seek in vain to establish an employer partner which is sufficiently representative.

Generally speaking, employer organisations in central and eastern European countries have hitherto developed much more as economic lobbies. Their priority interest is state policy in the economic, social, fiscal and commercial areas. They seek to influence this policy in line with the interests that they represent. Social partnership has not always been among their priority objectives. It is true that they sometimes show a completely positive and respectable willingness vis-à-vis social partnership and collective agreements in particular, but it is also important to recognise that their authority and their real capacities (institutional and human resources) to act in this area generally remain limited and mediocre, except in two or three exceptional cases.

Sectoral bargaining practice in Malta, Cyprus and Turkey clearly requires a different analysis. In these countries, the trade union and employer structures have some tradition and are rooted in society to some extent. Trade unions and employer organisations there have a certain routine and follow clearly marked political tracks. It is true that the general tendency for collective agreements in these countries is comparable to what is found in the countries of central and eastern Europe in the sense that Maltese or Cypriot bargaining practice unfolds essentially at company level. But the explanation for this tendency is much more simple. In the case of Cyprus and Malta, it is the British tradition, the small geographical size of the countries and the necessarily limited volume of activities which render the notion of economic sector secondary, and hence also that of sectoral collective agreements. Bargaining practice in Turkey also unfolds in a specific economic and political context. It flows on from complex political developments in this country.

5. Worker representation at company level

Among the countries of central and eastern Europe, there are only two, Hungary and Slovenia, which, after the political changes initiated in the years 1989-1990, have maintained a truly dual institutional system of worker representation at company level, i.e. trade unions on the one hand and worker committees on the other. It is evident that maintenance of these institutions has become possible due to a marked change in their operating principles and political functions, to meet the requirements of democracy and the free economy. For its part, Bulgaria has maintained the system of general assemblies of workers or their representatives (in large undertakings), but whose functions have not been clearly defined. However, this form of worker representation at company level has proved in reality to be fairly ineffective, and not much used either.

On the wave of general liberalisation of the economy, the other countries of central and eastern Europe immediately or gradually (in the framework of privatisation of state undertakings) eliminated worker committees or works councils. The new political elites regarded these institutions as leftovers from communism or as impediments to privatisation and proper functioning of businesses. The elimination (immediate or gradual) of self-management institutions in companies has, by the force of things, created a particularly comfortable situation for trade unions, which have thus obtained a sort of monopoly on representing worker interests at company level. While retaining the traditional function for collective agreements, trade unions in most countries of central and eastern Europe have also become e xclusive bodies, with a view to defending worker rights in general, and with a view to exercising the right to information and consultation (where provided for by law) in particular. Certainly, representation of worker interests at company level encompasses yet other institutional forms, but we are interested here only in the trade union functions and institutional solutions linked directly to exercise of workers’ right to information and consultation.

Labour legislation in the countries of central and eastern Europe specifies the cases in which employers are obliged to inform and/or consult workers in their establishments. In the Hungarian and Slovenian systems, it is worker committees that exercise this specific right on behalf of workers. In individual cases, trade unions also have a right to information and consultation. But the respective functions of worker committees and trade unions are legally very distinct. In the other countries, where there are no works councils or similar institutions, employers inform and consult the trade unions which, in turn, transmit and circulate the relevant information or opinions. This institutional solution for information and consultation is completely functional in companies where there are trade unions. But, worker information and consultation becomes highly problematic in companies with no trade unions. Yet, the number of such companies is constantly increasing in central and eastern European countries. Trade unions have particular difficulties to become established in newly created private companies. This phenomenon is leading to emergence in these countries – apart from Hungary and Slovenia – of a situation in which workers find themselves without institutionalised representation in their companies, and hence without institutional possibility to realise their right to information and consultation. This situation is also becoming delicate for employers. Being obliged to inform and consult workers in their establishments in specific cases, they meet this obligation via improvised means (notice board, circulars, etc.) or do not meet them at all. In the Czech Republic, some employers have found another solution. They themselves (without any legal basis) have created works councils whose only task is to act on behalf of workers in the area of information and consultation.  

Governments in the countries of central and eastern Europe have clearly identified this essential difficulty concerning realisation of the right of workers to information and consultation. Consequently, they have drawn up draft laws making provision for the introduction of obligatory non-trade-union institutions for worker representation in companies. However, their legislative proposals have met with stiff opposition from trade unions. Employer organisations, too, have generally been sceptical in this regard, arguing, as in the Czech Republic for example, that employers would prefer a simple solution consisting in having only one partner in their companies: trade union or works council. However, the prospect of these countries acceding to the European Union has caused the social partners to discover that the right to information and consultation forms part of the social acquis communautaire and is part of the European social model. Consequently, realisation of this right must have institutional underpinning.

At the present time, in all candidate countries concerned, governments and social partners are together in the process of producing laws on non-trade-union institutional forms (worker committees, works councils) designed to guarantee realisation of the right of workers to information and consultation. The Czech Republic and Slovakia have proved the most rapid and the most effective in this regard. Also, these two countries have advanced the most original institutional solutions. In the Czech Republic, works councils can now be created (since January 2001) but only in companies which employ at least 25 persons. The only function of the works co uncils will be to exercise the right to information and consultation. Such councils will be obliged to disband as soon as a trade union is created in a given company. In companies employing fewer than 25 persons, Czech workers will be able to elect a delegate, who will have exactly the same formal status and the same role to play as the works council. Slovakia envisages adopting an identical solution. But it foresees a lower threshold (20 persons) for creation of a works council.

In central and eastern European countries, trade unions have a monopoly on worker representation in the area of negotiation and conclusion of collective agreements, including agreements at company level. Yet, the weak presence of trade unions in many private companies poses a serious problem in this respect. We have already pointed out in the previous chapter that the general tendency for collective agreements in central and eastern European countries is that these agreements tend to be concluded at company level. It is important to add here that bargaining practice at company level is sometimes becoming impossible for strictly institutional reasons: more precisely, due to the absence of trade unions. To resolve this dilemma, Hungary for example recently modified the labour legislation in order to allow worker committees to conclude collective agreements in companies where there are no trade unions. But, under the new legislative provisions, subsequent creation of a trade union should automatically lead to a renegotiation and formal conclusion of a new agreement by the trade union section created. In this area, Slovakia now seems to be moving towards a similar solution.

6. Participation of the social partners in the accession process

The question of participation of the social partners in their respective countries’ process for accession to the European Union can be envisaged from two different but complementary perspectives: the institutional perspective and the political perspective. Thus, we will first examine the external and internal institutional forms of employer and trade union involvement in the accession process and will then turn a critical eye to the general political attitude of these organisations to European integration.

In the candidate countries, the social partners are generally closely involved in preparation of their countries for accession in terms of the possibilities for external institutional action. In each of these countries, there is a system of commissions, which report to government (ministry of foreign affairs in most of these countries), and which correspond thematically to the chapters of the accession negotiations. It is in these commissions that governments prepare their negotiating positions or discuss the measures to be taken for implementation of the acquis communautaire. Trade union and employer representatives together with representatives of other interests in society can participate (on invitation) in the work of these commissions.

In addition, tripartite councils also play a certain role in the framework of accession policy. In most of the candidate countries, these councils address the question of Europe in the context of draft laws relating to EU law. However, in some candidate countries, tripartite councils are involved much more substantially in accession policy. In Cyprus (Greek), the tripartite council (Labour Advisory Board) is the most important forum for determination of negotiating positions relating to the social acquis communautaire. In the Czech Republic, the council for economic and social agreement has a special working group (tripartite) which deals exclusively with the question of accession, and which is headed by the chief negotiator, the latter being at the same time a state secretary to the ministry of foreign affairs. In Hungary, where the social dialogue system comprises several councils, the question of accession is the exclusive preserve for the activities of the council for European integration. This council includes representatives of government, of trade unions and of employer organisations, but also of the economic chambers.

However, in some candidate countries, the social partners have yet other institutional possibilities to participate in accession policy. For instance, Maltese trade unions and employers can express their European commitment through a special committee (Malta European Union and Social Action Committee) and through a working group named Accession Coordination Task Force. In Poland, there is a national council for integration, which performs a purely consultative function and which reports to the prime minister. This council comprises around fifty scientific and political personalities, including the presidents of the most important trade union and employer confederations. Similar councils also exist in Slovakia and Latvia.

Lastly, the mixed consultative committees which have been created over the last few years in several candidate countries – in the framework of association agreements with the European Union – also present a form of social partner participation in the accession process. In these committees, the EU party is represented by the EU Economic and Social Committee, while the delegations of the candidate countries comprise representatives of societal organisations (trade unions, employers, various interests), in line with the political structure of the EU Economic and Social Committee. For the time being, the European Union has one of these committees with Poland, Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria and Turkey. Committees of this type are likely to be created with Slovakia and Czech Republic soon.

Regarding internal trade union and employer activities relating to European integration and accession, it should be pointed out first of all that, in this regard, trade unions in the candidate countries are generally much more active and better equipped in terms of institutional and human resources than employer organisations. This applies above all in the countries of central and eastern Europe. In these countries, it is rare to find employer confederations active at national level which have permanent organisational structures for European questions and for questions linked to enlargement of the European Union. In this area, employer confederations most frequently have recourse to outside experts. Against that, the European commitment of trade unions in candidate countries is based, in principle, on solid organisational bases. In these countries, the largest trade union confederations have permanent organisational structures (departments, committees, etc.) which deal with the question of Europe, and which circulate information and organise European training for their officials. It will be clear that weaker trade union confederations are less active in this area. Then, the European commitment of trade unions is also expressed through inter-trade union committees for European integration. These committees have been put in place with substantial assistance from the European Trade Union Confederation. They perform important tasks concerning circulation of information and publication of EU documents. The inter-trade union committee for European integration in Hungary deser ves particular mention here. It has helped not only to prepare trade unions to act at EU level, but it has also drawn up a common trade union strategy for accession. This success is all the more remarkable because Hungarian trade union pluralism does not facilitate cooperation between trade unions.

The social partners in the candidate countries generally speak in favour of total adoption of the acquis communautaire and of rapid accession of their respective countries to the European Union. They regard this accession as a means for improving living conditions and as a sort of guarantee for prosperity and economic development. However, more qualified trade union and employer positions can also be encountered in this regard. For instance, the Maltese trade union confederation (General Workers’ Union) expresses a fear that Maltese accession to the European Union will have negative effects on the small and medium-sized enterprises that are the pillar of this country’s economy. In addition, the Hungarian trade unions would be interested to see concrete analyses of any negative effects of accession, notably in the social area. They reasonably point out that enlargement of the European Union to the East, just like any other historical process, cannot have exclusively positive effects. Taking an interest in both the positive and the negative consequences of a given historical process demonstrates a wish to understand and to try to steer it to the greatest extent possible.

On the employer side, general support for accession sometimes goes hand in hand with a fear (often timid) for the competitiveness of small and medium-sized enterprises in the framework of the European single market. Underlying this fear is an awareness that most eastern European businesses have poor productivity when measured against western standards, but also an awareness that European occupational safety and health directives will involve additional costs that could prove to be a serious financial blow for a fair number of businesses, notably small and medium-sized enterprises.

However, the European commitment and participation of the social partners in accession policy raises several specific technical and political problems. The first problem relates to the level of awareness of the acquis communautaire in general, and of the social acquis communautaire in particular. This knowledge is generally insufficient, notably at sectoral and regional level. The acquis communautaire has not yet been completely translated in the countries of central and eastern Europe. Translation is under way, with support from the European Commission. The second problem is identification of the real influence of the social partners on definition of negotiating positions, etc. Yet, it does not seem that this influence is significant, despite institutionally fairly well anchored participation of the social partners in the accession process. The third problem is that of the institutional and political capacity of the social partners to implement the portions of the social acquis communautaire which involve autonomous social agreements and autonomous social dialogue. This capacity still appears problematic. However, it should be pointed out that trade unions are generally better prepared to develop a social partnership than employer organisations.

Generally speaking, the voice of the social partners in the area of accession policy is politically weak. In some candidate countries, the social partners have great difficulty in making themselves heard, because governments sometimes regard them as being unrepresentative and not very competent. They know that trade unions are becoming significantly weaker in political terms, and that institutional consolidation of employer organisations is advancing only very slowly. On the other hand, trade unions and employer organisations in the countries of central and eastern Europe speak out on the subject of accession in very general terms, often adopting official government rhetoric. Trade union and employer strategies for accession are politically vague. The nuances that can be identified in the attitudes of some trade unions and some employer organisations, as in Hungary or Malta for example, do not seem to affect official government policy.

Note: This report was written in November 2000