The EU’s “one-eyed” enlargement strategy

The EU’s “one-eyed” enlargement strategy

The European Policy Centre has published two very interesting comments from Alan Mayhew and Fraser Cameron on the enlargement of the European Union. I tend to agree with both of them. Nevertheless, their juxtaposition provides a rather worrying – although justified – picture of the present situation. The element I would like to add to their analysis is the fact that we are now beginning to pay the price of a flawed strategy.

To understand this, one needs to come back to the last two important reports of the Commission. The first one concerned the state of the negotiations in 2001, the second proposed a negotiating position for the agricultural, structural and financial chapters. These texts reveal a lot.

The report of 2001 on the state of the negotiations

This report presented three essential elements. For the first time, the Commission quite clearly supported a scenario of massive widening – the immediate integration of ten new Member States into the Union (the “big-bang” approach). It also stated that widening would not pose an immediate financial problem for the European budget. Finally, it announced the conclusion of the enlargement negotiations for the end of 2002.

I believe the implications of these three elements were not adequately analysed. There will be difficulties in completing the negotiations in 2002. We have kept the most difficult topics until last. The reforms implemented in the context of Agenda 2000 were too weak, especially in the field of agriculture. In addition, elections are expected in France and Germany.

In particular, to reach a positive conclusion, the report minimized, in quite a systematic way, the difficulties of implementing the famous European acquis in the candidate countries. This was obvious from an economic point of view. This is also the case, more surprisingly, from the political point of view. There are countries where the treatment of certain minorities is certainly neither satisfactory nor respectful of EU standards.

In conclusion, there has always been a two-track approach in the enlargement strategy – regarding economic and political conditions. This explains why the EU authorities have insisted that each applicant would be judged according to its adhesion capability on an individual basis. The 2001 report made this official position ridiculous and worsened the situation by not acknowledging this formally. Very clearly, political criteria have taken priority over economic criteria.

There was a real weakness in the report on the acquis, but it was worse when dealing with the financial perspectives. Admittedly, the Union can remain within the financial prospects 1999-2006. However it is then necessary to avoid any concessions to the candidate countries in the agricultural domain. This will not be easy, and will also place them in a difficult situation. Even on this best assumption, the European Union will find itself in an inextricable financial situation during the period following the enlargement.

The most serious weakness of the report however concerns the institutional consequences of the “big-bang” approach, which corresponds more or less to a doubling of the number of Member States. This massive enlargement will aggravate the consequences of the deficiencies of the Treaty of Nice regarding the decision-making process. When we combine this with the previous observations – the need to adapt the acquis, especially in the agricultural field, and the financial perspectives – we begin to discover the depth of the challenge.

On this point, the Commission did not even consider it useful to say anything. From 1995 to 2000, it has persistently underlined the need for an in-depth adaptation of the institutions before the enlargement. After Nice, its silence in this respect has become dea fening.

The 2002 propositions – the final negotiating chapters

The propositions of 2002 present other problems. Admittedly, they have some advantages. They offer the candidate countries progressive access to direct agricultural payments (as we will see, this is, however, a bad answer to a good question). The Commission was right to deal with this problem, even if the mechanism itself is wrong. At least the existence of the problem is acknowledged. The propositions also strengthen the role of the cohesion fund in the structural policies.

On the other hand, these propositions have serious defects. In the budget field, the analysis of the financial situation stops at 2006. In the field of agriculture, the approach in particular presents several serious deficiencies. Offering rights to direct payments in the candidate states, will encourage future opposition to a reform which is however essential. More immediately, it perpetuates a system precisely at the moment when the enlargement is aggravating its deficiencies. It does not stress enough the need for an agricultural policy of a structural nature, concentrating less on agricultural activity and more on alternative rural activities.

From the political point of view, the proposals are open to three serious reproaches, and I can only strongly support Mayhew.

First, they highlight the unbalanced character of the negotiations. The applicant countries had to make concessions on the purchase of land without knowing the subsidies regime for their farms, whereas this has an obvious impact on the price of land. Furthermore, they must now negotiate without knowing what the future model will be in the current Member States. Lastly, and most importantly, the Commission is proposing lasting and unjustified discrimination between the current and future Member States. This can only poison the ratification debate, and sow the germs of future conflicts. Such conflicts, in a poorly adapted institutional structure, are bound to cost a lost – financially but also politically.

A one-eyed strategy

When one sees with only one eye, one misses the perspective. It is difficult not to qualify the approach of the Commission as a one-eyed strategy. It succeeded in a very difficult endeavour – fracturing reality in two different ways: in time by ignoring all medium-term budgetary problems, and in space by proposing two distinct agricultural regimes for the future European Union.

Clearly, the Commission is not the main culprit in this situation. Had its propositions of the previous ten years been followed, the Union would be now in a much better situation. Nevertheless, by now minimising the challenges, and even by denying them, the Commission fails completely in its mission of providing a prospective analysis. What would have happened if it had done the same thing under Delors and ignored all the efforts required by the introduction of the single currency? Or ignored all problems after the launch of the single currency?

The source of this political impasse is to be found in the European Council. For years European governments have maintained the illusion that enlargement will be carried out without substantial financial and structural efforts by the Member States. Everyone wants enlargement, but nobody wants to pay for it. This approach is nonsense, and will create in the long term serious misunderstandings in public opinion – in the Member States as well in the candidate countries. By condoning this, the Commission increases the risk. We are approaching enlargement as Germany approached reunification. This is not a recipe for success.

Connecting with public opinion

There is of course a need for better communication, as Fraser Cameron emphasises. While acknowledging this, what message should be communicated in such a context? Denying basic realities is generally considered to be a very bad approach to effective marketing.

Fundamentally, enlargement has been badly prepared. A lot of good things have been done in the last ten years. In fact, the enlargement has already partly been realised. EU enterprises have heavily invested in the candidate countries. People travel a lot. Trade is flowering. But the structural preparation has been mismanaged. On the institutions, the European Council did nothing in Amsterdam, and it did badly in Nice. On policy, the European Council more or less blocked all ambitious reforms in Berlin. Where is the positive vision to promote? All we are left with is biased and incomplete propositions. Where is the positive message for public opinion in the candidate countries? If we do not correct the course, it will be difficult to be convincing.

We can spend millions of euros to enhance the greatness of the European project, but that will not compensate for the awful messages repeatedly conveyed – in spite of the official mantra – by the heads of government. Propaganda is no substitute for political courage.

Franklin Dehousse is Professor of International Public Law at the University of Liège and Director of European Studies at the Royal Institute for International Relations, Belgium

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