The Future of the Stability Pact

Given the news that Mr Bodo Hombach, Special Coordinator of the Stability Pact for South East Europe, has resigned as of the end of the year, it is a good time to pause and consider whether or how the Stability Pact mechanism should continue. From CEPS we presented some ideas on the options at a conference of Aspen Italia on ‘The Balkans and the European Union’ in Venice on 5-7 October. The following is a slightly revised version of the short paper we presented there.

To begin with there are five simple options that are pertinent, but each has drawbacks:

1. Carry on. Inertia always has its convenience quality, but the problems in the present Stability Pact are too serious to be left undisturbed.

2. Close down. Some people advocate this, but an all-inclusive arrangement, involving non-EU states such as the US, Norway and Canada as well as all the international organisations, has its value.

3. Leave it to the EU. At some stage in the future this will be the way. But now is not the moment to encourage the US to drop out.

4. Leave it to the region. The South East Europe Coordination Process (SEECP) should be encouraged to become responsible for the process to maximum extent, but it is too weak to carry the ball all by themselves.

5. Leave it to OSCE. This was the decent burial formula for the Balladur Stability Pact, but the EU’s responsibilities for the Balkans are too important to risk off-loading responsibility this way.

Therefore it is appropriate to look for a finer approach under the heading of restructuring:

6. Restructure. This could have several distinct aspects.

6.1 Troika of co-chairs – this might group the special representatives of EU, US and SEECP. The point of the troika would be to keep US in, enhance the role of SEECP and leave the EU special representative (see point 6.5 below) unambiguous in his answerability to Solana/Patten. The EU special representative would chair the Troika, as well as have a political role for the EU. The office of the coordinator would be downsized, and have a civil servant as head of the secretariat.

6.2 Sharper regional focus – the point would be to focus on issues where the regional-international content was inherent (trade policy, movement of persons, refuge return, transport infrastructure and regulations, energy, environment, multi-country projects like SEE educational establishments, security topics etc.); down playing ambitions in aspects of the transition process which are important for everybody but essentially domestic or international at another level (macroeconomic policy – viz. IMF, good governance etc). Also explicit role of organising support for SEECP, to boost ‘regional ownership’.

6.3 Donor coordination mechanisms. G.8 High Level Group and Commission-World Bank office operate already outside the Stability Pact. Pretensions of Stability Pact to organised donor conferences should be abandoned.

6.4 Working groups, task forces etc. The huge proliferation of the now legendary and ridiculous 200 groups should be reversed. Easiest approach would be to let them FLY all by themselves, or left to DIE, some being no doubt taken over by EU, OSCE, NATO PfP, or autonomous NGO activity.

6.5 EU role in region. This needs shaping up, as corollary to downsizing the ambitions and indeed illusions of the Stability Pact.

– EU Special Representative for the region. He should in future be directly responsible to Solana/Patten according to their repective competences. His role should be refocused as the EU point man in region, available for crises in general, assuring continuity and strong deputising for Solana/Patten. One of his special concerns should be for the coherence of EU policies for different categories of state in the (best have Delegations as single houses of Pillars 1,2,3, with implications for reporting and staffing structures)region (member states, accession candidates, associates under the ‘Stabilisation and Association Agreements’, and the international protectorates).

– Zagreb process. The November 2000 summit conference in Zagreb of all the EU and the Stabiliyt Pact states was an important event, establishing that the whole of the region sees its future in the EU, and that the EU accepts and welcomes this. Thus is established the cl;ear political basis for a process, which should be further advanced, with periodic meetings at different staff and political levels.

– EU representation in region (Delegations). This needs serious strengthening. It is a tricky issue, because it touches upon the very nature of the EU’s 3 pillar system, and also the problem of obsolescent and excessive weight of all member state embassies versus EU presence. One obvious formula would be for there to be EU Delegations (not just Commission delegations) as single houses of Pillars1, 2, and 3, with major implications for reporting and staffing structures. The status quo becomes increasingly inadequate, and also embarrassing compared to the huge US diplomatic strength in evidence even in the smallest Balkan states.

Subsequent developments:

Chris Patten, the EU’s External Affairs Commissioner, and Javier Solana, the High Representative for the CFSP, wrote to EU foreign ministers late in October, suggesting that three options be examined:

“The status quo, representing a Pact which would continue to operate in the same way and with the same resources as until now.

“A refocused and reprioritised Stability Pact designed to take account of developments since June 1999.

“Deciding that developments over the last two years mean that it is now possible to wind up the Pact.”

They enlarged on the second of these three options, ie refocussing and reprioritising the pact, along three key themes: Concentration/Refocusing, Regional ownership and engagement, and SAP (Stabilisation and Association Process) Complementarity.

In terms of concentration/refocusing, they suggested that “the main added value of the Pact is its ability to bring together the countries of the region… The Stability Pact has built up a valuable network of regional experts, governmental and non-governmental, which is its chief strength and a resource for the future. This leads us to suggest that the Pact might usefully focus further on issues that lend themselves to regional co-operation, on activities to tackle problems common to two or more countries in the region.

“In this context, the Pact might also devote greater attention to areas where current international efforts require further strengthening. This would imply that the Pact’s contribution in a number of sensitive political areas, such as conflict prevention, dispute settlement, coping with inter-ethnic tensions, respect for minority rights or refugee return, might become more substantial.”

As regards regional ownership and engagement, Patten and Solana specifically suggested that the Pact should deepen its relationship with the South-East Europe Co-operation Process (SEECP),

Finally, the SAP Complementarity of the Stability Pact was put in fairly vigorous terms: “The Stabilisation and Association Process… along with the Member States and Community assistance programmes underpinning it, are the international community’s most important contribution to long term stabilisation and development of the region. Other donors and actors contributing to the region accept this. It seems to us that the activities of the Pact should always have the objective of reinforcing this process.”

They then proposed setting up a “Co-ordination Committee, including the Special Coordinator for the Pact, the High Re presentative, the Commission, the EU Presidency, and a member of the SEECP” and suggested “drawing up work plans each year, or every six months”.

The resulting conclusions of the 19 November General Affairs Council are reported below. In the meantime, it appears that former Austrian Vice-Chancellor Erhard Busek, who has been the Coordinator of the Southeast European Cooperative Initiative since 1996, is likely to be appointed as the successor to Bodo Hombach as the Special Coordinator of the Stability Pact.

For more analyses see the CEPS

Europa South East Information Centre.