Turkey and the EU: a realistic framework for accession

Turkey and the EU: a realistic framework for
accession

This year will decisively shape the future
relationship between the European Union and the Eastern
Mediterranean. At the Copenhagen European Council in December 2002,
the EU is most likely to agree to the accession of Cyprus by 2004
(along with nine other accession candidates) and accelerate
negotiations with Bulgaria and Romania with a view to their
possible accession by 2007/08. The EU will also probably agree to
complete the screening exercise with Turkey as soon as
possible.

The EU will, however, only take a positive
decision concerning Turkey if – thanks to Turkey’s cooperation – a
political settlement is reached on the question of Cyprus and the
whole of the island is able to join the EU in 2004. Turkey must now
be fully aware that the EU has to go ahead with Cypriot accession
whatever the outcome of intra-Cypriot talks on reunification. The
EU will continue to shrug off any Turkish threats of integrating
northern Cyprus as empty and counter-productive. Turkey will not
want to sacrifice its perspective for membership for the sake of
maintaining a “puppet regime” in northern Cyprus. It will therefore
prevail on the Turkish Cypriot leader Rauf Denktash to accept a
deal for the whole island to join the EU by 2004.

Greece has a vital interest in Turkish EU
membership. It has finally, thanks to the Greek Prime Minister
Costas Simitis and his foreign minister George Papandreou,
recognised this and re-directed its foreign policy accordingly. In
2000/01, bilateral relations with Turkey improved substantially.
Following the discreet diplomacy between the Turkish foreign
minister Ismail Cem and Papandreou, 10 bilateral agreements have
been concluded in the last two years. The two countries have also
opened the way for electricity and gas interconnections, Greece and
Turkey have established a joint task force on EU issues and the two
countries have started talks on the Aegean dispute. Moreover the
Greek and Turkish foreign ministers have undertaken a joint
initiative on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

Greece would be the major beneficiary of Turkish
accession. It would no longer find itself isolated at the EU
periphery. It would be able to cut its defence expenditures by half
(to less than 2% of GNP) and it would get a further boost to its
economic development. During the coming 12 months Greece will be
able to influence EU – Turkish relations, as it will assume the EU
Presidency for ESDP and EMU affairs as of July 2002 (in place of
Denmark).

Europe needs time

Turkey`s accession to the EU is unlikely to
happen before 2013. The EU will not be ready before that date. It
will need some 10 years to fully digest the accession of 10 new
Member States in 2004:

The EU will first need to:

• reassess its internal functioning and decision making;
• the new treaty will only enter into force as of 2006;
• adjust agricultural and cohesion policies to the new internal
  balance of interests;
• draw the lessons from free labour movement fully achieved only
  by 2011.

The next six-year financial perspectives, upon
which the EU will have to decide in 2005/06, will expire in 2012.
This exercise will prove extremely difficult in view of the shifts
in cohesion policies, the provisions for two additional Member
States – Bulgaria and Rumania – which might heavily drain on EU
budgetary resources, and pre-accession funds for Turkey.

The EU will not wish to complicate its budget
perspectives 2007-12 by making provisions for Turkey’s membership
during that period, as Turkey is bound to weigh heavily on the
future EU budget (additional expenditures in the order of more than
10 billion per annum).

Turkey needs time

Turkey will not be ready either before another
10 years of intensive preparation. It w ill need above all a mental
revolution in order to become a much more European-like society. It
has to free itself from the “oppressive yoke” of state and military
tutorship, from a still pervasive authoritarian style, so that it
can finally become a pluralistic Western society where the
individual prevails and the role of the state is dramatically
constrained. It has to learn the culture of “self-criticism”.

These changes require a new generation of
politicians and a new political class that is devoted to the public
good and not to personal enrichment. They require a revolution in
the educational system, with more emphasis on critical
analysis/creativeness and less on memorising texts/lectures. Turkey
spends only about 2% of GDP on education, less than half of what
the EU 25 spends, and continues to have an illiteracy problem with
women. Consequently, its educational standards lag far behind those
of any of the other present and future EU members.

Turkey needs to understand that there is no way
of “imposing” itself as a new member. Its approach to EU membership
requires more humility and less “arrogance”. As long as leading
Turkish politicians publicly declare that the EU will only become a
“global” player, develop an effective energy policy and close
relations with the Middle East and Central Asia with Turkey as an
EU member, Turkey is not politically mature for membership.

Add to these basic preconditions the need to
transpose the EU acquis into Turkish legislation and – more
important – to effectively implement it, to go ahead with
large-scale privatisation of public companies, utilities etc., to
take a less nationalistic and protective attitude towards “foreign”
investment and to fight rampant corruption more effectively. Turkey
must substantially step up the dialogue and exchange between
Turkish and EU society and thus join the “European mainstream”. So
must the EU!

Preparing for a lasting marriage

Turkey needs to undergo a profound change of
political culture before it will be ripe for EU membership. This
change is much more important than the more superficial reforms
rendered necessary by the adoption of the EU legislative acquis.
Turkey is already relatively well advanced with the adoption of
important parts of the EU acquis, thanks to the customs union that
has been completed in 1996. It should therefore not be difficult to
wind up accession negotiations within three to five years.

Accepting the hypothesis that membership is not
possible before 2013, it would not be wise to start negotiations
before 2007, for signature of the Accession Treaty in 2011 and
accession in 2013. The EU should not let itself be dragged into
premature negotiations. This is bound to lead to mutual
frustration. Turkey will have to live for more time in the
uncertainty of whether and when it will become an EU member. It
needs to revamp its society independently from its relationship
with the EU. The faster it succeeds in doing so the better for
itself and a speedy accession.

Neither the EU nor Turkey seems presently fully
prepared for a “lasting marriage”. In the EU, doubts continue to
linger about how Turkey would fit as a full-scale Member State
(size, religion, geography, mentality, budgetary impact, education,
etc.) In Turkey, there is an understandable impatience and
frustration about being retained for 15 years in the ante-chamber.
On the other hand, there is pride and fear about a possible
rejection.

These doubts are, however, much stronger on the
EU side, as is shown by the spring 2002 Euro-barometer: 46% of EU
citizens, but only 23% of Turkish citizens are against Turkish EU
membership. (In the case of the EU the negative stance is no higher
than against membership of the countries of former Yugoslavia,
which shows that the religious aspect is not fundamental).

The most effective way to bridge this wide gap
of perceptions is for the elites from both side s to engage in a
thorough and frank dialogue on the underlying issues and to jointly
formulate the “pre-conditions” that would turn Turkish membership
into success rather than disaster.

This should be the focus during the coming four
years so that hopefully negotiations can start on a realistic basis
and without further second thoughts and ambiguities.

Eberhard Rhein is a former Commission official and is a
senior advisor with The European Policy Centre

For more analyses see The European Policy
Centre’s

website.