A strong President for a strong Commission

The election of the President of the Commission is key to providing much needed political leadership to The Union and to enhancing public awareness of and participation in the political debate in Europe.

Preamble

In an enlarged European Union, the role of the Commission in pursuing a coherent range of long-term political objectives and in ensuring the respect of EU law will be essential for the political cohesion of the continent. At the same time, the need for more democratic legitimacy and accountability should be met by enhancing the politicization of the debate on the future priorities for European integration. The election of the President of the Commission is key to providing the political leadership required to steer the process of integration and to perform a credible role in reconciling diverging interests, while guaranteeing respect for the rule of law in the Union.

Key recommendations

1. The key recommendations contained in this paper are as follows:

1.1 European political parties participating in European elections should designate their candidate for the position of President of the Commission.

1.2 The President of the Commission should be nominated by the European Parliament acting by simple majority and then receive the approval of the European Council acting by qualified majority.

1.3 The nominee President should select the members of the Commission with complete autonomy. The number of Commissioners should not be fixed by Treaty.

1.4 After approval by the European Council, acting by qualified majority, the President and the other members of the Commission should be appointed by the European Parliament acting by simple majority.

1.5 A member of the Commission should resign at the simple request of the President.

1.6 The European Council should have the right to call for new European elections if the European Parliament dismisses the Commission. Whether this right should be granted to the European Council on a permanent basis requires further discussion.

1.7 The responsibility for the implementation of legislative acts should be clearly entrusted to the Commission, with the European Parliament and the Council of Ministers playing a supervising role.

1.8 The role of the Commission in setting the agenda of the European Council should be enhanced.

The executive power in the European Union

2. Calling for the election of the President of the Commission implies that the European Union would benefit from the establishment of a sort of ‘premier’ position, providing political leadership and performing those functions carried out, at the national level, by heads of government.

For this innovative proposal to be soundly based, however, a comprehensive definition of executive power is required, together with an assessment of the current distribution of executive functions within the original institutional framework of the European Union.

3. Broadly speaking, the executive power is entrusted with three basic tasks:

• defining key political priorities and providing strategic guidelines for their achievement;
• ensuring the overall coherence of government policies and the functional coordination between the various administrative branches;
• enacting delegated legislation and overseeing policy implementation.

Bearing in mind this large set of responsibilities, it should be stressed that a unitary executive authority does not exist in the context of the EU. Executive functions are shared between the Commission, the European Council and the Council of Ministers, with the cooperation of national and regional administrations as to policy implementation across the Union.

4. Within this frag mented and relatively blurred inter-institutional framework the Commission plays a multiple role, on the basis of Article 211 of the Treaty establishing the European Community (TEC), ranging from initiating the legislative process to ensuring respect for the Treaty and of derived legislation, from enacting executive measures to supervising policy implementation. Moreover, the Commission is essential for ensuring the overall consistency of policy developments at the European level and for the conciliation of divergent national and institutional interests.

Beyond the formal allocation of powers, however, two elements should be stressed:

• the effectiveness of the Commission in carrying out its core tasks largely depends on nurturing constructive relations with the other actors involved, namely the Council of Ministers, the European Parliament and national administrations;
• the body enjoying the highest political authority in the Union is the European Council and not the Commission.

Therefore, any move towards enhancing the leadership of the President of the Commission through elections requires a careful assessment of the implications for the current inter-institutional balance.

European politics must be brought closer to the citizens. Personal leadership can play an important role in showing that political choices matter to people and in pushing ahead the overall EU framework. Some features of this framework should, however, be adjusted for this development to take place.

Leadership

5. According to Article 4 of the Treaty on the European Union (TEU): “The European Council shall provide the Union with the necessary impetus for its development and shall define the general political lines thereof.”

This definition of the central responsibility of the European Council corresponds with the range of tasks normally fulfilled by leaders at the national level. In that context, leadership entails:

• the ability to portray collective values, history and identity;
• the authority to define the common interest and to fix the related strategic priorities, including showing people a ‘road they would not otherwise travel’;
• the capacity to communicate effectively with the public and thereby motivate main political choices.

6. In the European context, it is clear that deep-rooted differences in history and political traditions still prevent the development of a strong sense of common identity as a basis for leadership. Long-term priorities, though sometimes inspired by the Commission, are nevertheless defined by the college of Heads of State and Government meeting in the European Council. Finally, as to the capacity to communicate, the absence of European mass media is a serious obstacle to establishing a direct relationship between the peoples of Europe and the top of EU institutions.

7. This diagnosis casts a shadow on the scope for developing real political leadership at the EU level, since it is arguable that leadership can be expressed only in the presence of an appropriate institutional and ‘cultural’ context. The current institutional structure of the EU does not seem suitable for producing individual leadership. With respect to culture, different attitudes are expressed in Member States such as Germany and the UK towards strong personal leadership: subject of suspicion in the former, cherished in the latter. There is no sign that such a form of leadership would be accepted at the European level.

Leader, executives and political parties

8. When assessing what changes are needed in order to develop leadership at the EU level, two further crucial relationships should be explored: between the leader and the college of ministers and between the leader and political parties. The features of the political system emerging from this network of relations are key for the leader to be able to perform.

Looking at the constitutional systems of Member States, very broadly speaking, two models can be identified:

• Leadership of the party/parties:
  • legitimacy is indirect as the popular vote goes to the parties who then appoint the Head of Government;
  • decision-making in the government is collegiate; the organisation of the college of ministers is horizontal, with the Prime Minister primus inter pares and the ministers chosen by the party or the coalition of parties;
  • the Prime Minister relies very much on the support of the winning party or coalition. The executive will be even less leadership-prone in the absence of a majority system.
• Individual leadership:
  • the leader receives a direct investiture from the people and is therefore relatively less constrained by party affiliation;
  • the team of ministers is selected by the leader who exercises full authority over them and their work;
  • the party and the leader reinforce each other in setting out a consistent programme that they will implement once in power.

9. The main features of the two models offer important insights into the real scope for leadership in the institutional and political framework of the EU. Some preliminary observations can be made on this basis.

The first general consideration is that the election of the President of the Commission should be flanked by other far-reaching institutional reforms shaping the system in such a way as to allow the President to exercise leadership. In the absence of these wider reforms, the elements of which are outlined below, the election of the President of the Commission risks triggering a backlash in terms of public credibility and overall legitimacy of the system.

On the other hand, one should not underestimate the impact that popular investiture itself could have on the authority of the President with respect to national leaders and other EU institutions. While taking this into account, it seems, nevertheless, appropriate to define some ‘conditions for sustainable leadership’ and push for a systemic shift in the institutional context, as opposed to an isolated reform inconsistent with the larger framework.

The present institutional framework

10. The present institutional and political framework of the EU does not favour the emergence of leadership and, in particular, does not provide the President of the Commission with the political means to exercise leadership.

• Appointment: the President is nominated by the European Council by qualified majority (QM) (Nice Treaty) and must receive the approval of the European Parliament. The Council appoints the members of the Commission by QM by common accord with the nominee President and “in accordance with the proposals made by each Member State.” The President and the college shall then receive, again, the approval of the Parliament and be finally appointed by the Council acting by QM. (Article 214 TEC)
  The appointment by QM in the Council is a step forward. What really matters, however, is that the President of the Commission owes his legitimacy solely to Member State leaders and to the European Parliament, and not to any sort of popular investiture, direct or not.
  In the matter of the college of Commissioners, the Nice Treaty represents a step backwards, as it requires the selection of Commissioners on the basis of the proposals submitted by Member States: nobody who is not included among these names can be nominated.
  Conclusion: no direct investiture, double indirect source of legitimacy – basically two real bosses as opposed to one, the Parliament, in parliamentary systems – and a very limited role of the PC in appointing the members of the ‘executive’.
• Authority of the President: the Treaties of Amsterdam and Nice increased the authority of the President over the college, by defining the formal features of a hierarchical executive. Against this background it is, however, in dicative that, if the President ‘requests’ – not decides – the resignation of a Commissioner, then this decision would require the “collective approval of the Commission” (Article 217 TEC). The implicit weakness of this power is clear and, indeed, it is doubtful that the President commands real authority on Commissioners who are basically designated by other bodies – Member States governments.
• The size of the ‘executive’: it is understood that, in the absence of concrete powers to determine and enforce the priorities of the college, the President of the Commission will find it more difficult to perform his role with a large number of Commissioners. In this perspective, the decision to be adopted once the 27th candidate joins the EU, according to the Nice Protocol on enlargement, will be crucial.

It is evident that, if the representation of each Member State, or almost all of them, is the logic inspiring the composition of the Commission, then the idea itself of a cohesive, politically determined presidential executive is undermined.

The dilemma between full representation and efficiency is particularly sensitive. Clearly, the idea of electing a political President of the Commission would be quite inconsistent with the representation of all Member States in the college. Where, in federal-type structures, are all constituent parts equally represented in the government?

From consensus to competition: politicizing the European debate

11. Once some specific aspects of the current provisions are underlined, a quick look at the wider political picture helps to identify the ‘conditions for sustainable leadership’. From a systemic standpoint, the most fundamental implication of the passage from the current appointment procedure to the election of the President of the Commission and the constitution of a ‘presidential cabinet’ is the shift from consensus to competition.

The advantages of consensus in the first decades of European integration are well known. Consensus was not a matter of choice but a matter of necessity, as the basic requirement for Member States to accept the progressive deepening of integration.  

The progress of qualified majority voting, replacing unanimity, put strains on the willingness of Member States to extend EU competencies to wider policy areas (as demonstrated by the current debate) since the potential for political controversy increases. Would electoral competition in the appointment of the President of the Commission and, consequently, of the other Commissioners, also put at risk the central role of the Commission in the Community method?

Two competing considerations can be made:

• increasing competitiveness in the system enhances its efficiency but diminishes its acceptability to some of the players;
• conversely, electoral competition could raise the popular acceptability of the President and of his college provided that the electoral programme is implemented and expectations are fulfilled – this would, undoubtedly, contribute to filling the legitimacy gap in EU integration.

12. The most immediate way to enhance the degree of competition and politicisation within the Union, as a basis for strong personal leadership, would appear to be the direct popular election of the PC, on the model of the President in France. In the light of the arguments outlined above, however, it is reasonable to believe that this procedure would represent too much of a break with the present delicate inter-institutional balance and would put too much political pressure on the President of the Commission.

It would therefore be more appropriate for European political parties participating in European elections to play an intermediary role in the selection process so that each of them indicates the candidate for President. Competition would be in this case along party lines across Europe, and not between Member States. While this already happens on some issues within the European Parliament, it would represent a major innovation in the realm of high politics, including the election of the President of the Commission. This would require a common political programme and logically imply a common electoral system and transnational lists.

Conditions for sustainable leadership

13. Once the political and institutional context is set, the following ‘conditions for sustainable leadership’ of the elected President of the Commission are required:

13.1 Designation: European political parties should each agree a common electoral programme and indicate their candidate for President. By voting for a party, citizens will be aware that they are expressing a clear preference for the President who will, therefore, enjoy wider legitimacy and will have more bargaining power in the inter-institutional balance and with Member States.

13.2 Appointment of the President of the Commission: the President should be nominated by a simple majority of the Members of the European Parliament and then receive the approval of the European Council acting by QM. With respect to the current procedure, the primacy in the investiture would shift from Member States to the Parliament.

13.3 Appointment of the college: the President nominee should select the team in complete autonomy. It is understood that the college would reflect a parliamentary majority. The number of Commissioners should not be fixed and a rigid system of Member States’ rotation should be avoided. The political requirements for geographical balance, fair representation of small Member States and gender issues should be inserted in the Treaty, but should not be legally binding.

13.4 Final approval of the new Commission: this should require a simple majority in the European Parliament and then the final approval of the European Council by QM. Of course, this procedure leaves room for potential stalemate in the event that some governments refuse to support a leader representing political adversaries. This is, however, a risk to be taken bearing in mind that, following the democratic election of the President, the role of the European Council in this procedure should be increasingly symbolic, the political power of investiture lying in the Parliament.

13.5 A presidential Cabinet: after selecting his own Commissioners, the President should be able to exercise more effectively the powers already granted to him by the Treaty. In this context, it should be made clear that the PC has the final word on the individual resignation of a member of the college.

13.6 Inter-institutional balance: if the European Parliament dismisses the Commission, then the European Council should have the option to call for new European elections. In order to allow for the necessary flexibility, this should be an option and not an obligation. It should be discussed further whether this option should be available to the European Council on a permanent basis or only when the Commission is forced to resign.

13.7 A strong executive power: given the nature of the EU multi-level institutional framework, policy co-ordination and control over implementation will still be shared between the Commission and national administrations. ‘Comitology’ will therefore survive as a necessary network, but should be made more transparent and accountable. In the interest of efficiency and clarity of the system, it would be advisable to reduce the role of the Council of Ministers in this framework. This would be consistent with the progressive transformation of this body into the upper chamber of a bicameral legislature. The supervision of the Commission’s powers of implementation should be carried out by the Parliament and the Council on an equal footing. That will, in turn, give the Commission more margins for manoeuvre and strengthen its executive role, in line with the enhanced legi timacy of its President.

13.8 Political leadership: as indicated above, the head of the European executive should play an effective and dynamic role in outlining political priorities for the Union and indicating the means to achieve them. The executive power, however, is shared between the European Council and the President of the Commission, with a prevalence of the former in terms of overall political leadership. The election of the President should contribute to striking a new balance. Given the new electoral mandate, it would be logical for the President of the Commission to be primus inter pares among Heads of State and Government and to assume a stronger coordinating role. If this is not politically acceptable, then procedures should be established to ensure that the Commission, through its elected President, is the real agenda-setter at the highest political level in the European Union.

For more in-depth analysis, see The European Policy Centre’s Challenge Europe:

A strong President for a strong Commission.