Down to business: Blair or Barnier?

Down to business: Blair or Barnier?

During the fourth plenary session, members of the Convention began to address some fundamental questions as to the future instruments of the Union and the balance of power between different institutions. Responses will shape the Union of the future.

Towards a change of gear in the Convention debate?

Two new relevant elements should be stressed when looking at the future development of the Convention’s debate, both of which are important for the final outcome of this exercise.

First, the Communication of the European Commission to the Convention defines new territory for the debate and new terms of reference for the exchange and confrontation of different positions. In fact, it would be more appropriate to say that the Commission has finally proved itself ambitious enough to speak out sensitive but key issues underlying what has been the rather abstract debate so far. Although it will advance more detailed papers addressing institutional matters later – the Communication conveys one key message: if the Union wants to fulfil the fundamental missions it will have to deal with in future, ranging from foreign and security policy to economic cohesion across the continent, it needs to be equipped with the means to succeed. Failing that, the Commission clearly implies, outlining ambitious tasks for the Union is an exercise in rhetoric. This is something which European citizens have clearly expressed their frustration with.

This is the reason why it was refreshing to hear Olivier Duhamel MEP, during the Convention plenary, questioning President Giscard d’Estaing about his opinion in relation to the divergence between those, like Tony Blair, who openly favour a strengthening of the European Council and of the Council’s Presidency (to the obvious detriment of the Commission’s room for manouvre and initiative) and those, like the Commissioner responsible for institutional reform, Michel Barnier, who call for more powers to be entrusted to the Commission, as the only body able to provide the enlarged Union with a clear sense of direction on common political matters.

The suspicion is that Mr Duhamel did not really expect a clear reply. Indeed President Giscard cannot be blamed for having distanced himself from the crude alternative submitted to him. He said that conclusions will be drawn at the end of the Convention process, since positions evolve and it would not be appropriate to anticipate what the final approach will be.

However, Mr Duhamel was right in finally putting the issue on the table. The impression is widely shared that debates during the plenary of the Convention have not been so far helpful in addressing sensitive issues in a consistent way, allowing for in-depth comments and real confrontation. It would be unfair to place the responsibility only with the Presidium. New procedures have been introduced over the last two plenary sessions including some room for reactions and, yesterday, reply to reactions. The problem is rather in the agenda of these meetings, still far too broad, and probably in the very different experience and preferences of members of the Convention.

For such democratic debate to succeed in delivering a technically solid output, however, there is a need for more focus on the essential issues to be addressed. These include the appropriate balance to be found between the Council and the Commission in sharing political authority. Some think that these are ‘theological’ arguments, and that the right level of debate falls somewhere between the macro-political architecture and the nitty-gritty of legalistic Treaty reform.

Peter Hain, Representative of the British Government, declared that too much time should not be spent in exploring the details of the complex EU legislative process and of the variety of measures to be adopted. Solutions for better legislation should be found pragmatically, using the most appropriate means to clearly defined ends. This would add to the legitimacy of the Union in the eyes of citizens. Although this is correct, it misses the core-issue at stake: what kind of Europe we want, what Europe should do and how.

It is hard to believe that the previous plenary sessions really fulfilled their mandate in defining the missions of the Union. If some broad indications indeed emerged, they are still rather vague and, above all, quite contradictory. Moreover, the debate on the most appropriate instruments to carry out these loosely defined tasks, scheduled to take place on this occasion, led to considerable criticism of the puzzling range of measures (twenty seven!) that are available to the Union under the three pillars, but fell short of indicating any precise way to overcome this confusion.

The question is whether the Convention process is ripe for the quantum leap from largely declaratory statements or minimalist common sense considerations, to engaging with uncomfortable matters and defining positions thereupon.

Addressing core-issues

A few encouraging indications of the latter trend could be detected during this plenary. The need for ensuring the overall consistency of specific proposals was emphasised by the Representative of the German Government, Peter Glotz, who mentioned by way of example two potential contradictions underlying the current debate.

First, one of the main themes debated in this plenary is the monopoly of the power of legislative initiative on the part of the Commission. Many felt that the progressive development of the Union in to a democracy beyond the nation-state (an evolution not accepted by a minority of members) implies that the right of initiative is at least shared between the Commission and elected bodies such as the European Parliament.

Mr Glotz and others asked whether, following this first step, the Council would call for the power of initiative too. Would that make the Council too strong and weaken the Commission? Would that be appropriate considering the ambiguous nature of the Council, both legislator and intergovernmental executive? Most importantly, would small Member States accept breaking with the Commission monopoly, regarded as a guarantee of the pursuit of the common interest by an independent body? Would it be still thinkable to extend qualified majority voting – a reform of decision-making largely supported in the Convention – once proposals originate in national capitals?

Mr Glotz pointed at another unresolved dilemma, indirectly touched upon by Mr Duhamel. The hypothesis of appointing the President of the European Council for two and a half or five years, making of him the President of Europe, seems to be collecting increasing consensus among large Member States’ governments. Overall, the idea met with mixed reactions in the plenary. Some members argued that such public figure would personify the symbolic element of European integration; others felt that such an appointment would not correspond to truly democratic standards, as it would occur within the small circle of Heads of State and Government. The real question, however, is how the President of the European Council would interact with the President of the Commission. Would this relationship at the top of the EU ‘executive branch’ lead to tension and struggles? Would it imply the marginalisation of the political role of the Commission? What about the role of the High Representative in expressing the position of the Union internationally?

The position of national parliaments

Among the other major points addressed during the plenary are the role of national parliaments and the question of allocation (or delimitation, depending on the approach) of competences. As to the former, th e view is widely shared that national parliaments should have more say on EU legislation and politics in general. Proposed solutions differ as to how to achieve that. The proposal for a third parliamentary chamber with national MPs is losing ground. Most members of the Convention believe that national parliaments should check governments’ behaviour in the Council much more closely. The proposal was advanced that, if the Council was divided into an executive body for policy coordination and a legislative body, the latter should consist of specifically appointed national ministers receiving clear mandates from national parliaments. Others believe that members of national parliaments should sit with government representatives in the Council.

A majority in the Convention backs the creation of a parliamentary committee involving national parliamentarians to monitor the respect of the principle of subsidiarity in EU legislation, before acts are enacted. It is not yet clear whether a legal or a political body, or a combination between the two, would be best suited to adjudicate on conflicts concerning the exercise of competences in the light of subsidiarity once legislation is in force.

Competences and instruments

Turning, finally, to the matter of allocation of competences, the rejection of a rigid catalogue seems acquis. The view is taking ground that it is not possible to allocate entire policy areas to one level of government. In fact, looking at the way the Union works, the concept of ‘intensity’ of EU intervention seems more appropriate than that of competence. This is the approach taken by the Commission, by establishing a link between the intensity of EU intervention and the instruments to be adopted, for the sake of legal transparency and democratic accountability.

Commissioner Barnier translated this approach in very concrete terms, taking the example of security and defence policy. When it is a matter of deciding upon military interventions, intergovernmental tools are the most appropriate. Crisis-management situations can be best managed by mixing ‘Community’ and intergovernmental tools. The development of a European armament industry and related R&D should be promoted through the Community method.

Commissioner Antonio Vitorino developed these comments further and outlined a three-step procedure, as an alternative to a rigid delimitation of competences. Firstly, the basic objectives enshrined in Article 3 TEU should be redrafted and clarified. Secondly, the intensity of EU action should be related to what is required to achieve those objectives. Thirdly, the different degrees of ‘intensity’ of such interventions should be reflected in a limited range of available instruments.

The plenary also addressed some important matters concerning the mandate and the procedures of Working Groups.

Giovanni Greviis Senior Policy Analyst at the European Policy Centre.

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