France, Germany and a “Hard-core” Europe

Summary by EURACTIV:

France, Germany and a “Hard-core” Europe

According to Charles Grant, French thinking on the future of the EU tends to focus on two concerns:

• the decline of the Franco-German relationship, and its threat to French influence;
• the fear that EU enlargement will lead to a looser Europe with weaker institutions, that is more likely to succumb to Anglo-Saxon economic, social and cultural norms.

He refers to a provocative article published in

Le Monde(20 June 2001) by four leading pro-European thinkers of the Socialist Party, Jean-Noel Jeanneney, Pascal Lamy, Henri Nallet and Dominique Strauss-Kahn, in which a two-speed Europe is proposed as a solution to the challenges posed by enlargement – an idea put forward earlier by German Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer. Mr Grant, however, believes that a two-speed Europe is “an unworkable idea which – even if it were feasible – would be bad for the EU”.

The authors of Le Monde argue that if the EU lets in large numbers of Central and East European countries, it will no longer be capable of developing the political will required for stronger social, industrial and foreign policies. They also fear that the Nice model of “enhanced co-operation” will only lead to overlapping core groups. Therefore, they say, France should offer Germany a “strengthened union for two”, promoting economic, cultural, educational, scientific, diplomatic and military co-operation. This tandem could then appeal to others to join them.

However, Mr Grant believes that this would not work for several reasons:

• Many EU members are against the idea of a “two-speed Europe”: the UK, the Nordic states, but also Spain and Italy;
• The candidate countries would be disappointed when joining the EU to discover that they have been excluded from a new club;
• Since most members oppose a “two-speed Europe”, France and Germany could only act outside the scope of the EU treaties, creating a huge divide between two groups of Member States. It’s unlikely that Germany, committed to its role as a champion of the accession states, would risk such a rift;
• It is unrealistic to suppose that the EU can develop a hard core in foreign and defence policy without Britain, as the EU’s recent moves towards a common defence policy depended largely on the British, and Germany is not a credible military partner;
• Franco-German leadership cannot be relied upon to set the EU foreign policy agenda, for the various Member States have their own interests and expertise which the EU needs to draw upon if it is to build effective foreign policies;
• A “two-speed Europe” would pose huge technical and judicial problems: it would need new institutions, weakening the Commission, upsetting the smaller countries. What would be the role of the Parliament and the Court in the new system? Would members of those institutions from non-core countries vote on core-group business? The result would be greater institutional complexity;

Mr Grant concludes that France needs to accept the fact that the EU has change since its set-up. “Just because France and Germany ran the EU from 1950 until the mid-1990s, it does not mean that they should or can do so forever,” he says. Especially in an EU with 25 members, France nor Germany will be able to dominate as they did in the past. Even though they will remain the two most influential powers, Mr Grant states that the French should “adjust to a Europe of more fluid, issue-focused alliances” and try to develop closer ties with Central European countries.

Read the entire article:

Time to Abolish the EU’s Rotating Presidency, by Charles Grant.

Charles Grantis director of the Centre for European Reform.

For more Centre for European Reform Articles go to the

CER website.