From the Convention to the Intergovernmental Conference: What prospects for success?

The paper analyses the results of the European Convention and examines the prospects for the upcoming Intergovernmental Conference.

The EPC hosted a Convention Dialogue on 15 July 2003, entitled “From the Convention to the Intergovernmental Conference: What prospects for success?” featuring Alain Lamassoure, MEP, Franklin Dehousse, Director of the Department of European Studies, Belgian Royal Institute for International Relations and Christine Roger, Head of the Cabinet of Commissioner Michel Barnier. The meeting was chaired by EPC Founding Chairman, Stanley Crossick.

The three panellists agreed that the critical achievement of the Convention, aside from fulfilling its mandate of drafting a Constitutional Treaty had been the creation of a governance method, which brought together key stakeholders to draft a legal foundation, not by voting for certain proposals, but through a consensus that was achieved gradually. The EU system as a whole had undergone a “maturation,” as Alain Lamassoure pointed out, with MEPs and national parliamentarians having found a structure for dialogue in the Convention.

First Assessments

Christine Roger said that Commissioner Barnier had welcomed the Convention’s work and results as “very positive.” The Convention had made much more progress than the Intergovernmental Conferences (IGCs) at Amsterdam or Nice, precisely of the context and format in which it operated. The Convention system was better suited to dealing with those issues sometimes viciously guarded by Member States because of their impact on sovereignty, such as the extension of qualified majority voting (QMV), European security and defence policy (ESDP) and the creation of the Foreign Minister post.

The biggest advantage had been that unanimity was not needed to achieve agreement on these historically controversial issues and progress was achieved beyond this traditional “blockage point” that had hampered IGCs. The feeling that pervaded was that the Union was undergoing a “real opening.”

Alain Lamassoure said that he was not yet in the position to pass judgement on the ‘substance’ of the draft Treaty and wanted to await the developments in the coming months, as it could be likened to a football match with the “victors celebrating their success, but not analysing their still obvious faults at the blow of the whistle.” The Convention model, as a governance tool could indeed be analysed now. Members of the Convention not only represented different countries, but different institutions, European and national. Members never voted but took decisions on discussion and compromise. “We were fearful at first, but we made the Convention structure work.”

The Convention was a multi-facetted, 28-nation structure, with an agenda more ambitious and successful than any previous IGC. The fact that it fulfilled its mandate of formulating a draft Constitutional Treaty was alone a clear achievement that would have its place in the history of the European Union. “We have witnessed a ‘greenhouse effect’ for the integration movement, an acceleration and development of a process that has aided current Member States and accession countries alike.”

Any European reality would have to combine aspects of a federal system and the more nuanced, interests of the Member States. The Convention achieved this not through opposition or a simple compromise, but a “complex discussion and round of compromises that built on a deeper understanding of issues on the other side.” The question at hand was how to achieve the necessary balance between federal elements and other pressures influencing EU decision-making. Member States had a crucial role to play with respect to the budget and questions raised in the ambitious Lisbon Agenda with respect to employment policy, etc. Thus, how to combine both elements was the overarching challenge for the Convention. In this “orchestra of many instruments” one needed a conductor, a President, which had, until now, not been part of the Union’s federal structure. The Convention led members to a better understanding of the uniqueness and complexity of the European project.

Franklin Dehousse supported Mr. Lamassoure’s cautious stance on evaluating the substance of the draft Treaty. He disagreed with Ms. Roger’s view that there was clear progress from the current point, however. “We are merely at the beginning of what is a three stage process, having only completed the first phase. The next steps are the IGC and the ratification by Member States, and this path is still marked by huge uncertainties.” Referring to Mr. Lamassoure’s argument, he said he agreed with a positive assessment of the Convention method, primarily because of the openness of the agenda, where “there were no taboos” and everything, down to the institutional structure was up for debate. The fact that the Convention had been more transparent and readable, despite toward the end taking on characteristics of Member State bartering usually reserved for IGCs, would undoubtedly have an effect on the Rome IGC. Returning to the actual draft Treaty, Mr. Dehousse said that at it’s very least, the Convention had succeeded in providing a more readable text, though it had failed at making it a ‘People’s Constitution.’ Many points of substance were still unclear and needed re-examination, such as the definition of the new Presidency.

Strengths and Weaknesses of the draft Constitutional Treaty

Alain Lamassoure said that from his point of view, the greatest success came in the adoption of the ‘federal system’, clearly giving the Council and the European Parliament (EP)extended legislative powers. From a structural and organizational point of view this decision now made the European executive a mirror to national governments. This could even be bolstered if European parties created a more distinctive European profile for themselves. The creation of a European President and a Foreign Minister post, which would together with the Commission President present the Union externally, was a positive clarification of responsibilities.

While he acknowledged that some might still be unsatisfied with the fact that this was again a ‘triumvirate’ instead of a single representative, the new system did introduce much needed clarity into the Union’s external representation. Additionally, he commented positively on the decision to let certain Member States integrate more closely at their own speed and will. This new agreement should allay the fears of the ‘anti-federalists.’ While the introduction of the exit clause also served as a tranquilliser to those fearing a ‘European super state’, Mr. Lamassoure would have preferred a coupling of the clause to constitutional revision, which was not agreed. The introduction of these principles and changes to the federal elements present in the EU structure, assured that the Union “would not be prisoner to Member State interests” in the future.

The composition of the Commission, was however a discussion which did not “show the maturation of the European system.” The current European system required the respect of three basic principles, namely the equality of citizens, the equality of states and the common interest. The Commission was the first to abide by these principles and perpetuate the idea of a common interest. Likening the Commission’s executive power to that of the Court of Justice’s judicial power, Mr. Lamassoure said, that while both institutions clearly represented the common interest, the principle of Member State representation only existed in the Commission. Foreshadowing events to come, he said that given an important decision in which certain key Member States would not have a Commissioner taking part, “a riot” was likely to ensue. If this issue was not raised at the IGC, Member States could still turn the leaf around, by presenting the community with non-ratification.

Prospects for the IGC

Franklin Dehousse was convinced that the Council would still choose the Commission President after the IGC, because he has yet to see the type of coherence in the European parties that is present on the national level. Member States will also draft the ‘short list’ of Commissioners for the President to chose his Commission from. For his part, he would have liked to have seen three crucial points more clearly addressed in the Convention: the use of QMV on issues of taxation and the judicial aspects of Justice and Home Affairs (JHA), the definition of the position of the President of the European Council and a more coherent procedure for the revision of the Constitutional Treaty.

Christine Roger warned that because the revision question had not been adequately addressed (e.g. revision by QMV or requiring unanimity) the text as such might stand for 50 years although it was not necessarily intended that way. While she reiterated her support of the extension of QMV in many areas, much more still remained to be accomplished and simplified. The changes to the JHA sector were necessary and welcomed by the Commission, yet it had not been “fully simplified” yet. Ensuring efficiency and simplicity in defence matters would also have to become a priority in the coming months because the draft Constitutional Treaty did not fully explain the organizational structure this should take. The role and working structure of the President of the Council also needed a closer definition. The Community budgetary rules would have to be re-examined. Introducing limited QMV was not enough: the Convention should have pushed for an increase of ‘own resources’. Yet, despite these shortcomings, she realized that it would have been impossible to deal with all of the complexities of these policy areas in the Convention. What would help, as the Union approached these issues, would be a revival of the ‘Congress idea’ proposed by Convention President Valéry Giscard d’Estaing. This was a “principal loss” because it would have ensured concerted dialogue on these often hard-fraught issues with key decision-makers on national and supranational levels.

Discussion

Answering a question on the impact of the Convention method, that arrived at conclusions without voting, Alain Lamassoure praised the diverse structure of the Convention and the confidence in its work that had been attributed to it by the choice of many countries, to send crucial figures into the last phase of the Convention discussions, such as German Vice-Chancellor, Joschka Fischer and his French Foreign Minister counterpart, Dominique de Villepin. Thus, the “IGC already began at the heart of the Convention.” While the consultative character of the Convention was slightly altered when these major decision-makers were brought in, it was the overall consultative character of the Convention, which allowed for the comprehensiveness of result. By taking the pressure to vote or decide by unanimity away, Convention members had often been seen to influence one another’s opinions through discussion and thus arrive at a unique compromise. Certain members changed opinions entirely on specific issues.

Because of the composite nature of the Convention, the IGC would have a hard time unravelling its work in October, Mr. Lamassoure said, and expressed optimism that the ‘big vs. small country’ problem would not resurface in the IGC. The Convention had only made subtle changes to its text between the Thessalonki Summit and the conclusion of its proceedings and the same would be true for the IGC. Overall, the IGC would have less political legi timacy (while it retained legal legitimacy) than the Convention, if it returned to its ‘closed door policy making’ after it had been preceded by a transparent, inclusive Convention procedure.

Franklin Dehousse disagreed strongly with Mr. Lamassoure on this point, saying that in fact the desire to revisit precisely the most controversial issues, such as the ‘big vs. small question’ was clearly there and would be the potentially most complicated aspect of the IGC. Mr. Giscard d’Estaing had not “sold” the Convention results well in national capitals, choosing only to visit the “big” countries to rally support and the small countries clearly took this as a blow to their role in the European architecture.

With respect to the Commission, Mr. Dehousse said that Member States would have to get used to the fact that they would not have a ‘national’ Commissioner at the roundtable in the future. That this could potentially cause difficulties in the IGC was already tangible in his experience with drafting the Benelux compromise solution presented to the Convention. “If the ‘representative’ function of the Commission is terminated, then we must find other ways to increase its legitimacy toward Member States.” The Commission had to free itself from its “captivity” to Member States, but having the Parliament as the “controlling” body would also not necessarily be an ideal situation.

Member States will not be able to chose ‘their’ Commissioner in the coming years, as this will be left to the President of the Commission, which, in Mr. Dehousse’s view, was almost the best result achieved by the Convention in this context, still how this will work exactly looks to be a hard-fraught issue at the IGC.

Stanley Crossick reiterated his view, that he would not like to see the text reopened for negotiation at the IGC, especially not by the Commission, which, through such a move would hardly set a good example, yet he understood the reservations of the Commission and turned to Christine Roger for commentary.  

Ms. Roger summarized the Commission’s current position by saying there was “not enough ‘Community’ in the draft Treaty, not enough QMV and too much Council Presidency,” which was perceived as a clear rival to the Commission President from the Commission’s perspective. The Commission is pushing for a closer definition of the role of the future Council President to ensure non-conflictual relations. With respect to the number of Commissioners, Ms. Roger underlined that what was most important to the Commission was that the institution as such would be modernized and able to handle future challenges—this had less to do with size and nationality of its members then it did with structural questions. A reflection on these issues had been the basis of the Penelope study, which would be updated in September, to present the position of the Commission. She agreed that a Commission move to reopen the text for negotiation would perhaps set a “bad example” and a risk, but at the same time, the Commission could not stomach a loss of legitimacy or functionality.

Alain Lamassoure intervened by reflecting on the nature of the relationship between European and national parliaments, which had been distrustful and conflictual at the outset of the process a year and a half ago, and had now undergone an extreme maturation. This relationship needed to be fostered and the work on articles relative to the ‘day-to-day’ policy-making would have to continue. Giscard’s Congress idea had been a good one, albeit wrongly presented. There was a clear need for a sort of consultative body, either between the European Parliament and national parliaments, or solely between national representatives. The ‘old’ Europe, with the Franco-German tande m driving political progress had clearly been overtaken by events and the method of coordination in the Council was no longer tenable for a Europe of 25 or 28.

Franklin Dehousse picked up on this point by praising the work that had gone into the amendment proposals presented at the last Convention plenary sessions by parliamentarians, which had been, to a large extent, projects of the “three European political families.” He agreed that the synergy between national parliamentarians and MEPs had been good and that this process should continue. Referring to the tense moments in the last Convention session, Mr. Dehousse said that national governments were now “breaking” a fruitful collaboration by not giving these amendment proposals the attention they warranted for their ambitious and positive suggestions.

Responding to an audience question if a success on the Lisbon Agenda of making Europe the most competitive economy in the world by 2010 would also have an effect on the EU’s leadership on the global scale, Christine Roger said that it was not Europe’s intention to become the world’s leading global power by that date. The EU was trying to realize an economic, not a foreign policy or strategic objective with the Lisbon agenda. Nevertheless, the Convention clearly had an impact on the EU’s foreign role, making it more coherent and bringing together all the elements of the Commission’s to be used as tools by the Foreign Minister. Security and Defence policy now had a more “collective objective,” though it could still not rival the internal market. Allowing an avant-garde or a coalition of the willing to move ahead in defence questions was a positive way forward. The foreign policy tools had essentially existed since Maastricht, yet what was missing was the political will to give these substance.

Returning to the Lisbon Agenda as such, Mr. Dehousse remarked that a QMV battle over issues that pertained to economic and internal market affairs was likely to ensue. There was still not enough movement in Europe to follow the US example, particularly in research and development. National budgets for this had to be channelled increasingly into European resources, if Lisbon was to achieve its ambitious goal.

Alain Lamassoure agreed, saying that while Europe had achieved great progress, the world around it had moved even quicker. “The EU is on a bicycle and the rest of the world is overtaking us in an airplane,” he said. The two dimensions of the Lisbon agenda and Europe’s role in the world were interlinked. External coherence and solidarity among Member States was as crucial as a functioning and competitive internal market. Member States should consider a solidarity clause modelled on article 5 of the NATO Treaty, along the lines of what Commissioner Michel Barnier already proposed in case of terrorist acts against the EU.

While the Convention may have had “Philadelphia 1786” as its ambitious goal, Mr. Lamassoure reminded the audience that it took the US decades to become a unified country. “Europe was never in the same situation, and still it will take time for the work of the Convention to take its full effect. The US had 13 unilingual states to integrate—we have twenty-five distinctive countries to bring together under one constitution.”

Answering a final question on the EU’s role in multilateral institutions, such as the IMF and Bretton-Woods system, Franklin Dehousse clearly admitted that this was an “un-success” of the Convention. It had failed in making progress on issues that pertained to economic governance and financial relations. Alain Lamassoure added that it was admitted on the last day of the Convention Plenary, that more could have been done to shore up regulations for the Eurogroup in international financial bodies.

Thanking the participants for their commentary on many key aspects of the Conventions work, Chairman Stanley Crossick said that a “considered judgement” on the text was now needed, although one could already say that the method had been an overall success. The collaboration between the national and European parliamentarians was a clear example of this. The Convention had achieved a “marriage of integrationist and intergovernmentalist views” and the ways in which the work of the Convention had managed to influence opinions and change them in many cases to achieve workable results was remarkable. While he would have liked to have seen a readable Constitution, the Convention had at least achieved a Constitutional Treaty, and he expressed hope that out of this, an additional solemn declaration, a “Peoples’ Constitution” might be drafted.

Was it a success or a failure? It was a positive development that the European Parliament had been strengthened, JHA had moved forward and closer cooperation between the Member States was now possible, though he was doubtful that this would happen in areas other than defence and the Euro area. CFSP had “not gone down the road we had hoped” and the Iraqi crisis had a dividing, rather than unifying effect on the EU. The incumbents of the newly created positions would define how these were evaluated in hindsight, thus they should be chosen with care. The Commission compromise had perhaps not been the best possible, but it was the only tenable possibility at the time and should be evaluated as such.

With an eye to the IGC and as much as he would want the text to remain closed, it was likely to be reopened, though the crucial question on who would then set the agenda remained. The Convention had shown that progress can be achieved in a public arena and the Member States should justify their positions in the IGC by holding their meetings in public. While Europe would await “the drama that would unfold, the play had been given a positive review.”

For more analyses on this and other topics, visit the

EPC website.