Momentum Lost: The IGC in Brussels 12-13 December 2003

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This CEPS commentary explains that while negotiations on all other issues have been closed, talks on the definition and scope of qualified majority voting remain open for the indefinite future.

Momentum Lost: the IGC in Brussels 12/3 December 2003

Shortly after 1 pm on Saturday, the political leaders of the EU states established that the IGC was not going to be concluded under the Italian presidency. As had been expected all along, the definition of a qualified majority of votes in the Council proved the decisive obstacle. Where in Nice three years ago the IGC actually did achieve a conclusion at the cost of bitter acrimony, this time negotiations were suspended but with all involved cherishing the constructive spirit that was preserved. Underlining this point, the political leaders first chose to enjoy their lunch together before they went out to officially break the news. Insisting that the absence of agreement should be considered “a setback but not a calamity”, European Parliament President Pat Cox well-reflected the general spirit.

The IGC did succeed in settling some unresolved issues. A basic agreement was reached that in the future, each member state will have one Commissioner with one vote. Also the minimum number of seats in the European Parliament per member state was determined at five rather than the four proposed by the Convention. No agreement was found on the possible extension of qualified majority voting in the domains of social policy, tax, the financial perspectives and cooperation in legal domains. Negotiations on this were, however, overshadowed by the absence of agreement on the definition of qualified majority voting (QMV).

For a long time the Italian presidency suggested that it still held a number of possible compromise solutions up its sleeves. Nevertheless, the difference appeared unbridgeable between, on the one hand, the weighted-votes system of Nice as defended vigilantly by Poland and Spain and, on the other hand, the double-key system (decisions can be passed by a majority of member states representing 60% of the EU population) as proposed by the European Convention and most markedly promoted by Germany and France.

As the presidency entered the negotiations on the basis of the Convention’s double-key system, its strategy focussed initially on Poland and Spain. Looking back, Italian Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi praised these two governments for having offered some genuine openings. As it turned out, however, these openings fell far short of what was deemed acceptable for certain other governments. Further, the possibility of postponing a decision on this issue until 2009 or so, at which time the Union would also be in a position to evaluate the performance of the Nice-formula in practice, offered no solace.

Although no one was willing to attribute the deadlock to any government in particular, in the corridors French President Jacques Chirac was widely credited for having been the first to conclude that the negotiations were not on the road to a good solution. Many delegations were willing to subscribe to this assessment, recognising the danger of downward accommodation and sticking to the line (notably popular since the negotiations in Nice) that no compromise at this point would be preferable to a bad compromise.

This position being established, it was at the same time decided that the agreements reached on all other issues would be closed for further re-negotiation. Thus, with the exception of the issues of definition and scope of QMV, the draft Constitutional Treaty proposed by the Convention and amended by group of legal experts and the Italian presidency can be considered an “acquired acquis” (Italian Deputy Prime Minister Gianfranco Fini). This decision in principle precludes the possibility to agree on a QMV definition as part of a broader package. More importantly, it also defines clear lines beyond which no regression will be allowed.

Thus the questions of QMV are carried over to the Irish presidency. For now, the Irish seem to head towards a determinedly cautiou s approach, indicating that first they will explore the situation through bilateral contacts with the various member states. At the next European Council in March, they will give the first report of their findings.

Notably there is no new time-frame for the conclusion of the negotiations. Indeed various individuals (including, for one, German Bundeskanzler Gerhard Schröder) hinted that the negotiations may well be carried over to the Dutch presidency that takes over from the Irish in the second half of 2004. Mr Berlusconi noted that Europe has some heavy-going months ahead of it, including the elections in Spain and the European Parliament elections in June. It may only be possible to conclude the IGC after that time.

Many excuses can be invoked for the summit’s failure. At its start, Mr Berlusconi had already declared that conclusion of the negotiations would require a miracle, which – as is well-known – are rare to happen. By Saturday afternoon many were ready to concede that expecting agreement on the Constitutional Treaty at this point might have been expecting ‘too much, too soon’. Basically, however, agreement on the Constitutional Treaty was only one decision away. With the momentum of the last two years gone, one may well wonder how soon we will get that close again.

Ben Crum is a Marie Curie Research Fellow at the Centre for European Policy Studies in Brussels.


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