Reforming the Commission and the Council: convergent parallelism?

Reforming the Commission and the Council: convergent parallelism?

As the work of the Convention on the Future of Europe gets underway, difficult choices approach as to the reform of the EU institutional framework. After the so-called ‘listening’ stage, dedicated to defining the missions and values of the Union, and the ongoing debate on key policy areas including Justice and Home Affairs (June), and Common Foreign and Security Policy (July), Members of the Convention and observers know that the ‘institutional package’ is next in line, after the summer break.

The debate on institutional reform has, however, not been waiting for the formal Convention agenda to unfold. It has kicked off with particular intensity following the controversial proposal by Tony Blair and Jacques Chirac that the President of the European Union should be appointed for five years to chair the European Council by Heads of State and Government, possibly selected out of former members of this body. This idea has triggered a number of reactions. It won the support of some national governments (Spain), but also led to some reservations (or outright rejection) on the part of Germany and small Member States, the Commission and Members of the European Parliament.

There were fears that this project, and the subsequent debate, would eventually pre-empt the task of the Convention to address comprehensive institutional reform and the future functioning of the Union. The European Council in Seville, in particular, was expected by some observers to pose a threat to the development of a transparent exchange and to the free identification of final solutions within the Convention. European leaders did address the reform of the Council of Ministers, of the European Council and of the Presidency system. But they held back from any decisions on Treaty reforms.

Before entering a more detailed analysis of the outcome of Seville, it is important to emphasise that any discussion on institutional reform should be undertaken with a view to strengthening all the institutions essential to the functioning of the Community method: the Commission, the Council and the European Parliament. Each institution is surely best suited to advance proposals as to its own organisation and working procedures, but such reform initiatives would lose much value if they were uncoordinated or even contradictory.

In this context it is worth taking a closer look at two recent texts of considerable relevance: the paper submitted by President Romano Prodi on June 17, focusing on improving the functioning of the Commission, and Annex II of the conclusions of the Seville European Council, tackling the functioning of the of the Council of Ministers.

The re-organisation of the Commission

The background

The paper produced by the services of President Prodi could be considered as the most significant contribution on the internal reform of the Commission since the appointment of this college, explicitly addressing the wider implications for comprehensive institutional reform.

The primary, stated purpose of the paper is to ensure that the EU institutions – and notably the Commission – function effectively under the existing Treaties over the period between 2004, when enlargement is supposed to take place, and the moment when the relevant provisions of the Treaty of Nice on the size and composition of the College should be applied (assuming that the Treaty is ratified by Ireland next autumn). This is of fundamental importance, since up to ten new Commissioners may be knocking on the door of the Commission on January 1, 2004.

Furthermore, this proposal should be seen as a response from the Commission to the ongoing reform process in the Council – leading to the ‘Solana Report’ submitted to the Seville summit – and in the Parliament, following the report by Richard Corbett MEP amending the internal rules of procedure.

Finally, the background of this paper is arguably also of a more contingent and personal nature. Following evidence of dissent – some of it given public expression – within the Commission, many observers felt that President Prodi decided to re-state his authority over the college. From this standpoint, the powers of the President of the Commission have been constantly enhanced since the Treaty of Amsterdam (TAM) and Declaration 32 annexed to the TAM , up to the new Article 217 of the Treaty of Nice . In the absence of the latter’s coming into force, however, it is legally questionable whether the President would have the authority to introduce the reforms indicated without Treaty changes.

The reform of the Commission

As to the substance of the innovations outlined in this proposal, these can be summed up in three main points:

1. “Reorganising the responsibilities of the college around a limited number of essential tasks”

   The President of the Commission would designate a number of Vice-Presidents consistent with the number of essential tasks identified by grouping policy domains in clusters. These macro-areas would include:

   • External relations, international trade, development aid and humanitarian assistance;
   • Employment and social affairs, training and research;
   • Economic, fiscal and customs policies;
   • Industry, transport, energy and trans-European networks.
2. “Rationalising the Commission’s internal decision-making process”

   The President would establish the policy guidelines along which the College should work. The College would meet once or twice a month to:

   • Set its priorities and plan its work;
   • Determine the basic political guidelines governing its work;
   • Adopt decisions in principle, including the ’empowerment’ of Vice-Presidents and Commissioners to adopt more specific decisions in this context.
3. A weekly meeting between the President and the Vice-Presidents would prepare the work of the College.

   “Any action to improve the way the institutions function could clearly only be fully effective if it forms part of an inter-institutional approach and of a concerted process”.

The paper puts much emphasis on the inter-related nature of reforms in different institutions. It draws a significant parallel between the spirit of the earlier ‘better regulation’ initiative of the Commission and the move towards ‘better organisation’. In this perspective, the reorganisation of tasks within the college should be consistent with the reorganisation of the configurations of the Council and of the responsibilities assigned to parliamentary committees.

Evaluation of the implications

Aside from inevitable tensions between individual Commissioners as to who should be appointed to become Vice-President, wider political implications for the future of the Commission and its role should be explored.

The size of the Commission

First of all, while contradictory interpretations have been provided on this point, sources close to President Prodi rule out the supposition that the distinction between Vice-Presidents and other Commissioners is related to any final decision as to the size of the Commission. On the one hand, the entry into force of the Treaty of Nice would entail capping the number of Commissioners and establishing a mechanism of equal rotation. On the other, while the envisaged division of labour within the College does not imply that each Member State should have a national in the Commission, it has been argued that alternative solutions would be politically unacceptable. Were Nice to enter into force, therefore, it would require amendment.

Be that as it may, the reflection on the size of the College and its internal organisation should be clos ely linked to the definition of the core tasks of the Commission in the enlarged Union. The Commission itself issued an important Communication on May 22. This outlined a Commission role and mandate, whereby its powers as agenda setter, legislative initiator and representative of the Union in key policy areas should be not only preserved but enhanced.

The three fundamental tasks ahead are: to consolidate the Union’s model of economic and social development; to build an EU-wide area of freedom, security and justice; and to exercise the responsibilities of a world power. The proposed review of the functioning and organisation of the Commission seems consistent with equipping the institution for these new tasks. However, one could legitimately doubt that a large College, with 25+ members, would be best suited to express clear political lines and act speedily. While the two aspects of reform do not completely overlap, solutions to both should be reconciled into a broader picture.

The President of the Commission

The definition of priority areas for the Commission cannot be separated from wider considerations as to the future position of the Commission in the institutional framework. If the Commission, as claimed in the Communication of May 22, is to evolve into a strong institutional actor in the framework of the EU, taking over new responsibilities requiring the ability to set the agenda in sensitive policy areas, then what will be needed is first and foremost a sense of direction. The way to appoint/elect the President of the Commission should therefore be a key part of the debate, given the obvious implications as to his/her actual authority over the other members of the college. For example, the election of the President following the results of European elections, on the basis of the candidates indicated by European political parties, would probably lead to a more politically cohesive college, and perhaps reduce sensitivities as to the distinction between Vice-Presidents and other members.

The monopoly of legislative initiative

At the same time, however, the further politicisation of the Commission is perceived to be at odds with the pursuit of some of the current tasks, considered to be politically ‘neutral’, of a legal or technical nature. Most importantly, the monopoly of the right of initiative of the Commission is put into question, both in general terms and, more specifically, with a reference to the perspective of a more ‘political’ college. The balance to be defined here is of crucial importance, as the Commission’s monopoly of legislative initiative has so far been central to the promotion of the general interest, and it is arguable that this would furthermore be the case in the presence of 25+ members.

The Vice-Presidents: powers and tasks

The actual power and status of the Vice-Presidents remains slightly ambiguous, and the identification of their tasks should be further developed. Fears of a two-tier Commission, with an inner cabinet surrounded by a larger group of ‘junior’ Commissioners were immediately voiced. In fact, these concerns are not fully justified by looking at the division of labour between the group of Vice-Presidents and the college. If the issue is mainly terminological, then it would be a good idea to describe the Vice-Presidents as ‘coordinators’ or to define their powers more through a modulation of internal procedures than through job titles. More generally, regardless of the likelihood of a two-tier cabinet emerging in the medium-term, it would be paradoxical if those opposed to a smaller college protested against a better division of tasks within the Commission, inevitably leading to some Commissioners being busier than others.

Turning to the identification of the tasks entrusted to such a new category of Commissioners, the delimitation submitted by the paper is established according to policy areas: it is a verti cal delimitation. It would be interesting to explore what sort of horizontal tasks could be entrusted to the Vice-Presidents, including for example relations with the European Parliament and with the Council. Some have been calling for a Commissioner to be charged with a special responsibility to monitor the implementation of the principle of subsidiarity. While the actual value of this proposal in making Europe closer to its citizens is questionable, there could be some merit in entrusting one Commissioner with the media policy of the institution.

The structure and functioning of the Council

Annex II to the conclusions of the European Council of Seville is dedicated to a review of the structure and functioning of the Council, and addresses five main points:

• The future functioning of the General Affairs Council (GAC).
• The reduction in the number of Council configurations.
• The programming of the Council’s activities.
• The reform of the Presidency system.
• The opening of Council meetings in the context of the co-decision procedure.

Overall, it should be stressed that the agreed reform falls short of being ambitious and leaves a number of questions open. Paradoxically, this could be a positive remark, bearing in mind that the Convention will develop its reflection and provide suitable recommendation on these issues in due course. However, the ‘conservative’ attitude emerging from the overall consideration of these decisions upon non-Treaty reform provides the wrong signal with a view to the wider efforts. Moreover, some indications seem to be anti-systemic, in the perspective of shaping a balanced reform of the EU institutional framework. It is interesting to develop the following analysis by way of comparison with the reform proposals submitted by the Secretary General of the Council, Javier Solana.

The new General Affairs and External Relations Council 

The old GAC changes its name, and the new configuration will hold separate meetings, with separate agendas and possibly on different dates, depending on the areas of activity. These should be separated into the preparation for and follow-up to the European Council, institutional questions and horizontal dossiers on the one hand, and the whole of the Union’s external action on the other.

In the light of the clear preference expressed in the Solana Report for splitting the old GAC into an External Relations formation, composed of the Ministers for Foreign Affairs, and a General Affairs formation, where each Member State would be free to send the Minister of its choice, the ‘outcome-expectations’ gap appears quite clear. This decision is the result of the opposition of some Member States to such a development. It strengthens the position of Foreign Ministers, whose role seems ‘consolidated’ in both ‘formations’ within the same ‘configuration’.

This evolution does not promote greater simplicity. It disregards the fundamental concerns expressed as to the ability of Foreign Ministers to properly manage the huge task of coordinating EU policies and preparing the European Council, together with leading decision-making in the increasingly central area of foreign affairs. In fact, the operational change with respect to the current situation will be rather small. Also, any evolution towards a stronger role of the High Representative for Common Foreign and Security Policy in the External Relations Council seems to have stalled for the moment.

The reduction in the number of Council configurations

Council configurations are reduced from 16 to 9, in line with the suggestions submitted in the Solana paper. Also, the proposal is accepted to the letter whereby “several Ministers would be able to participate as full members of the same Council formation”. This is a constructive development on the path towards more streamlined decision-making. It may be questioned whet her much will change in practice, since different Ministers will actually alternate or sit together at the same meeting. This could be especially burdensome following enlargement. Perhaps a two-layer structure of the Council, including a few fully-fledged Council configurations and Ministerial Committees of a technical nature (which would forward their proposals for decision to Council configurations) would be suitable to avoid crowded meetings with overburdened agendas.

The reform of the Presidency

The solution adopted out of the various models submitted by the Solana Report goes in the direction of enhanced cooperation between successive presidencies. Such cooperation would not go beyond an operational association, since the creation of a fully-fledged collective Presidency would of course require the amendment of Article 203 TEC. In fact, the two Presidencies concerned should reach an agreement in order for the second Presidency to chair meetings of Committees (other than COREPER) and working parties during the mandate of the first Presidency. Also, the chairmanship of five specific working parties is granted to the Secretariat General of the Council.

As to the wider reform of the six-monthly rotating Presidency, the Seville conclusions ask the Danish Presidency to submit an initial report to the European Council in December 2002. That will necessarily address the key issues affecting the equality of Member States as well as the balance between the Council and the Commission. The Solana Report itself stresses that any solution to this conundrum is for the next Intergovernmental Conference (and therefore for the Convention designed to prepare for it), and should be shaped “in the light of other elements of the institutional system which may also be addressed in that framework”.

In conclusion it is interesting that one previous version of the Solana Report, prepared with a view to the summit in Barcelona in March, insisted that the present system of the rotating presidency “est devenue une source de déséquilibre et de rupture permanents dans l’Union, et le sera davantage encore après l’élargissement”. The latest version, in June, reports that “according to some Member States, it has not been objectively proven that maintaining the current system without any amendment would pose difficulties”. Serious disagreement seems to loom ahead.

Opening Council meetings

When the Council debates acts to be adopted in accordance with the procedure of co-decision with the European Parliament, meetings will be open to the public. This is a constructive step towards more transparency when the Council acts as co-legislator within a bicameral legislature. However, publicity is limited to the initial stage of the procedure – presentation by the Commission of its legislative proposal – and to the final stage – vote and explanation of voting. This contrasts with the option, still present in the March version of the Solana Report (but having disappeared in the June text submitted at Seville) to open Council deliberations to the public for the whole legislative procedure.

One could argue that, in practice, what is opened to the public is little more than a statement by the Commission and the final voting declarations – following in the vast majority of cases an agreement already achieved – but not the actual decision-making process. However, it should also be stressed that the new provisions should enhance the public profile of the Commission as legislative initiator. It may also help to avoid dilatory practices within the Council, aimed at avoiding divisive votes and the reaching of watered-down consensus behind the scenes.

Programming of Council’s activities

Of all the innovations introduced by the European Council in Seville, this set of measures is surely the most relevant in the long-term, and (significantly) the most unexpected. Looking at the So lana Report, all that was envisaged consisted of more rational planning of the Council’s activities with annual programmes drawn up jointly by the two presidencies, in the light of medium term strategic directives set by the European Council.

The text of Annex II goes much further. In this case, it is useful to report the full text of the relevant paragraphs:

C.4 “In keeping with the role conferred upon it by the Treaty of defining the general political guidelines of the Union, the European Council shall adopt, on the basis of a joint proposal drawn up by the Presidencies concerned in consultation with the Commission and acting on a recommendation by the General Affairs Council, a multiannual strategic programme for the three years to come. The first such strategic programme will be adopted in December 2003.

C.5 In the light of the multiannual strategic programme referred to above, an annual operating programme of Council activities shall be submitted to the General Affairs Council in December each year. This programme shall be proposed jointly by the next two Presidencies in line and shall have regard, inter alia, to relevant points arising from the dialogue on the political priorities for the year, conducted at the Commission’s initiative. The final version of the annual programme shall be drawn up on the basis of the General Affairs Council’s discussions.

With a view to implementing these arrangements as quickly as possible and by way of derogation from the first subparagraph, the first annual operating programme of Council activities shall be drawn up in December 2002.”

While progress on the part of the Council towards a better organisation of its proceedings is to be welcomed, the ambiguity of this text and the scarce attention to the inter-institutional dimension of the work programme raises several reservations.

First of all, looking at the multiannual strategic programme, the question should be put whether this is a programme for the Council or for the Union. If, as is arguable through reading the (deliberately?) vague description in the Annex, the latter interpretation were correct, then such a programme would risk duplicating the Strategic Objectives outlined by the Commission. Moreover, it would largely pre-empt the ability of the next Commission to develop its own objectives, since a three-year multiannual programme would already be in vigour. The same goes of course for the annual political strategic programme produced by the Commission.

In fact, looking at the procedure leading to the multiannual programme of the Council/Union, one finds a “joint proposal” by six presidencies, a “recommendation” by the GAC and merely “consultation’ envisaged with the Commission. Close observers even report that such reference to the Commission was inserted at the very last moment, following pressures from one national delegation at the summit.

Secondly, the involvement of the Commission in drawing up the annual operating programme of Council activities seems quite marginal. The degree of detail, and rigidity, of the annual programme should therefore be watched with a view to allow a constructive operative interaction between the Council and Commission in establishing Council meeting agendas, as is currently the practice.

Concluding remarks: towards an overall assessment

Following the analysis of these two important contributions, it should first of all be acknowledged that they have the merit of existing. This contrasts with the situation a few weeks ago, when the Commission did not seem able to produce a serious contribution to the debate, and gossip concerning the reform of the Council circulated in an atmosphere of conspiracy.

Now there is a much clearer and more detailed basis for debate, submitted by the Commission and the Council respectively. It is legitimate that each institution is mainly focused upo n its own internal reform, and as such the two documents should be welcomed.

However, a qualitative difference should be emphasised. The Prodi paper on the internal reform of the Commission is clearly drafted against the background of broader reflection concerning the overall institutional framework. This inspiration is explicitly stated. However Annex II to the conclusions of the European Council of Seville, addressing the reform of the functioning of the Council of Minister, does not unfortunately show the same broad perspective. On the contrary, while the role of the Commission as decision-making partner seems underestimated, the procedures outlined to establish work programmes for the Council/Union would directly undermine, in practice if not by law, its right of initiative. It is therefore time for the two institutions to start talking to each other at all levels, and determine how best to cooperate to promote efficient and transparent decision-making.

That discussion should, of course, fully involve the European Parliament, included in the reform outline of the Commission, but so far not mentioned in the parallel Council project. Furthermore, such an exchange cannot be separated from considerations as to the political role of each institution in the future enlarged Union. No doubt this reflection belongs to the mandate of the Convention. However, each institutional actor is free to submit its own political vision of its future position, and of the institutional implications. The Commission kicked off this process with its Communication in May, important insofar as it provides a sense of perspective, whether one agrees with it or not. The Commission will issue a second communication drawing the institutional implications of its political vision in the autumn.

With respect to these developments, the governments of the Member States have submitted some considerably divergent proposals, ranging from the Blair proposal on the Presidency of the Union to the recent staunch defence of the Commission by Chancellor Schroeder. The Danish Presidency has been entrusted with preparing an initial report on the reform of the Presidency system, to be submitted at the European Council in Copenhagen next December. Anders Fogh Rasmussen, the Prime Minister of Denmark, already declared that he does not support the Blair proposal to appoint a President of the European Council/Union for five years, since that would favour large Member States.

Regardless of the merits of the many positions advanced over the last few months, it is clear that Member States are far from sharing a common vision of the future institutional framework of the Union, and of the balance between the Commission an the Council in particular. More work by the Presidency on these subjects is good news. However, it is of crucial importance that the Convention abandons any residual hesitation and takes full responsibility in addressing these and other key institutional issues after the summer break. A new Working Group should be set up by the end of September with the mandate to submit proposals for a balanced and workable institutional system, drawing upon the useful contributions made by each relevant EU institution.

Giovanni Grevi is Senior Policy Analyst with the European Policy Centre

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