The Convention on the Future of Europe has lost its way

The Convention on the Future of Europe has stalled and may fail to agree on the constitutional changes urgently needed by an enlarged EU. This analysis identifies what has gone wrong and how it should be put right.

The Convention on the Future of Europe is at serious risk of failure. With six weeks to go before the President of the Convention, Valéry Giscard d’Estaing, presents the Convention conclusions to European Union heads of government in Salonika, there is a real danger either that the Convention will not come to any consensus on the essentials of the proposed Constitutional Treaty or that it will be a consensus of the lowest common denominator. Either outcome would fail to equip a greatly enlarged Union either with the democratic legitimacy or the executive capacity to meet the challenges it now faces both internally and externally. Such a failure would deal a serious blow to prospects for European integration when it is most needed.

Until recently the Convention appeared to be making progress on its quest for a positive consensus on a number of issues. However developments within the Convention during the past month suggest that progress towards a coherent constitutional reform of the Union has been stalled. There is evidence that some national governments have succeeded in pushing the Convention backwards to the grossly unsatisfactory conclusions of the Nice European Council of 2000. With a few courageous exceptions – notably the input from the Benelux governments – the Convention has lacked any dynamic leadership or vision of a comprehensive, long term strategy.

Of course, the Convention has made important progress on a number of issues including giving the Union a legal personality, extending the co-decision rights of the European Parliament, a large measure of agreement on integrating aspects of justice and home affairs into the Community decision making system, and giving the Charter of Fundamental Rights legal force. But there are worrying signs that the debate has lost its way. Consequently the political initiative for deciding the future character and mission of the Union could, in effect, be simply handed over to the planned Intergovernmental Conference which is due to meet under the Italian EU Presidency later this year.

The most serious failures of the Convention to date may be summarised as follows:

1/ The absence of a serious system of economic governance for the European Union including any effective, collective decision making for economic policy within the Euroland. This at a time when both the European economies and the global economy face very grave problems.

2/ The failure to agree on the creation of an open and transparent law making Legislative Council which is essential for the future democratic legitimacy of the Union. Only on such foundations can a coherent structure for the Union’s executive governance be assured.

3/ The refusal of key Member States to give future Commission Presidents a clear democratic mandate by having them elected through the European Parliament. This is matched by a growing determination of some important forces in the Convention to weaken the Commission and the wider Community based legal and political system in the interests of a looser, more intergovernmental Union. Defence of a strong and independent Commission is not helped by those who object to streamlining the College in an expanding EU.

4/ The insistence of some of the large Member States on creating a long term President of the European Council who would do more than ensure a better functioning of this body but would also increasingly assume the responsibilities of both the Commission President and the proposed “European Union Foreign Minister.” The bureaucratic machinery to support such a President would duplicate and undermine the Commission services.

5/ The lack of willingness to replace the paralysing use of the national veto in EU decision making with the general rule that decisions should be on the basis of a majority vote. The application of unanimity to t he procedure to amend the Constitutional Treaty is a recipe for stalemate. The same is arguably the case when looking at Common Foreign, Security and Defence Policy, where unanimity remains the rule for main policy decisions. This in turn seems to reflect a reluctance to have a structure which requires Member States to define common strategies for the Union as a whole, and to implement them when defining their national positions. In developing common policy guidelines for foreign and security policy, binding on Member States, problems have less to do with arguments about institutions than about a fundamental lack of political will to define the collective values, missions and interests of the Union and to provide the resources to allow the Union to play a much more effective role in global affairs.

To judge by the Convention debates during the past year, there appears to be a clear majority of delegates from the European and national Parliaments, the Commission and Member State governments in favour of a serious Constitutional reform of the Union. But their endeavours have not been helped by the manner in which the different parts of the proposed Constitutional Treaty are being discussed in isolation from each other.

The rule of consensus will not make the final stage of Convention debate easier. On the contrary, the ambiguous definition of ‘consensus’ represents a serious obstacle and might prevent the Convention from achieving a set of recommendations shared by the vast majority of its members. The risk is determining whether or not consensus is achieved is something which will be established by a few people in the Praesidium rather than by an open deliberation of the Convention in plenary session.

Such an outcome would represent a missed opportunity of great importance. The setting up of the Convention represents a democratic break with the hitherto remote and elitist fashion in which Member State governments have negotiated new Treaties. Of course any Constitution must be endorsed by the European Council and by Member States. But for the Convention to have to confess failure on the vital issues of Constitutional reform and to leave all or most of the fundamental decisions to the IGC must risk further alienating an already suspicious public and result in a Treaty which fails the Union at a critical moment in its history.

Success is still possible

All members of the Convention must deploy the maximum effort to find an ambitious compromise and demonstrate the political added value of the Community method. The Praesidium bears a huge responsibility to produce a revised text which fairly and objectively reflects the debates in plenary and offers a constructive basis for reaching a consensus. In this perspective, European political parties represented in the European Parliament and national Parliaments should mobilize now to ensure that any Convention consensus is ambitious and positive and to minimize the risk of deadlock or a hopelessly inadequate set of conclusions. This is an imperative which transcends party affiliation or loyalty to large or small Member States. It could shape the future of European integration for years to come.

We believe a positive conclusion to the Convention is still possible. However the final report must propose some essential reforms:

1/ The strengthening of the Community system of EU decision making. Decisions based on appropriate forms of Qualified Majority vote should become the rule, including for any future amendments to the European Union constitution. Nothing must be done to weaken the authority of the Community institutions in the field of external economic policy.

2/ The Council should in future be divided between a Legislative Council, operating in a Parliamentary mode and an Executive Council.

3/ A strengthening of the economic governance of the Union, including an enhancement of the authority of the Commission in cases where the terms of the Stability and Growth Pact are in danger of violation. Eurogroup ministers should have the authority to take decisions on future Eurozone policies.

4/ The President of the Commission should be elected through the European Parliament so that the European political parties can propose their preferred candidates for the Presidency to voters in EP elections.

5/ If there is to be a long term chairman of the European Council the mandate for this office must contribute to the strengthening and not the weakening of the Commission.

Hywel Ceri-Jones is Chairman of the EPC, Hans Martens is Chief Executive, Stanley Crossick is Founding Chairman, John Palmer is Political Director, Fraser Cameron is Director of Studies, Giovanni Grevi is Deputy Director of Studies, Guillaume Durand is a Policy Analyst.

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