The EU convention – an experiment that needs to succeed

The EU convention – an experiment that needs to succeed

On Thursday, February 28, delegates assembled for the opening session of the EU convention, which marks the beginning of an institutional experiment that will raise great expectations.

At the EU’s last intergovernmental conference (IGC) in Nice (December 2000) the heads of state and government were not willing to go ahead with the future-oriented Treaty reforms which are necessary inter alia for EU enlargement. This led to massive criticism of the role played by the European Council and fanned public debate on reform of the Union and its ability to cope with future challenges. One year later, in the “Laeken Declaration on the future of the European Union”, those heads of state and government said, with justification, that Europe stood at a crossroads. They looked back soberly at the EU’s shortcomings and problems and then announced a visionary task: a special constitutional convention was mandated “with no taboos” to deal with the urgent issues in the EU and to work out proposals for a far-reaching reform of an enlarged Union. The list of 53 issues facing the convention is indeed so comprehensive that the participants can feel free to examine all the EU’s structures (including areas of competence), institutions (incl. the rotating presidency and the possibility of creating a European multi-chamber system) and decision-making processes (incl. majority resolutions).

The work of the convention is likely to draw a lot of attention, not only because of the wide-ranging tasks entailed (which naturally also harbour the risk that the process might lose focus). This form of cooperation is a venture into new territory for all participants. The convention has to strike a balance between the prolongation of government-set targets and an unfettered discussion forum. It has to seek ambitious results but must not stray far from reality, because ultimately the governments of the member states will be the ones to decide on the institutional framework of the future Union. The mandate of the member states leaves it up to the convention to choose whether it will conclude with several reform options or a joint draft for the subsequent intergovernmental conference. The more coherent and consistent the convention’s draft, the easier it will be to overcome the egotistic national interests and small-scale thinking of the member states in the next attempt at reform. Even if the results are not (legally) binding on the member states, the latter will hardly be able to ignore proposals supported by a broad majority of the convention delegates.

If the participants take the demand to conduct an open, honest debate on the future of Europe seriously (and the member states’ initial proposals on potential reforms, such as those outlined in the joint letter from Gerhard Schröder and Tony Blair to the EU’s Spanish Presidency, indicate that they will), then the lines of conflict between the advocates and opponents of increased integration will manifest themselves even more clearly at the convention than has been the case in the IGCs to date. Therefore, expectations for the outcome of this institutional experiment will be high: we might ultimately see both the grand achievement of a draft European constitution for an enlarged Union as well as the realisation that a common deepening of integration in an EU-25+ is no longer possible, with variously intensive forms of cooperation between the EU member states coming to the fore instead. This would naturally be a disappointing result, but a necessary clarification process.

The envisaged timetable indicates that the convention’s work is to finish by early 2003. Interim reports are to be presented to the European Councils of Seville (June) and Copenhagen (December). The EU member states will assess the results of the convention at an intergovernmental conference and resolve the appropriate changes to the Treaty. To keep up the reform momentum, much argues in favour of convening the next IGC shortly after the convention wraps up its work. However, in Nice it had been decided not to schedule the next IGC until 2004.

The composition of the convention should allow broad discussion and participation of democratic forces. It includes 105 members, of whom 66 hold full voting powers: each of the 15 member states is sending one representative of the government and two members from the national parliament; the European Parliament is represented by 16 delegates, and the European Commission by two. Each of the accession candidate countries is sending one representative from government and two from parliament. The significance attached to the convention can be seen in the fact that many member countries (and candidate countries) have picked active members of the government, including ministers in some cases. The participants will be joined by 13 observers from other EU institutions (such as the Committee of the Regions and the Economic and Social Committee). The convention will be headed by a praesidium of 12 members under Mr. Valéry Giscard d’Estaing (chairman) and Messrs. Jean-Luc Dehaene and Guiliano Amato (vice-chairmen), who will structure and guide the work of the convention in terms of content.

Barbara Böttcher

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