The future of the Commission – One way Independence?

The future of the Commission – One way Independence?

Stanley Crossick and Giovanni Grevi reply to Eamonn Gallagher and John Temple Lang stressing the need for a Commission with more political clout, regardless of its size.

The problem of the future size and composition of the Commission cannot be addressed without taking into account the wider political picture at this stage of EU reform. In this perspective, prior to any technical discussion of how best to shape the college is recognition of the urgent need to enhance the political authority of the Commission itself. Looking at the future of European integration, the Commission should adapt to a changing environment, where public support and political clout will count more than arithmetical balance between its members and aseptic functionalist rigour (if such thing ever existed).

The European Union is faced with external and internal challenges that require political will and a sense of strategic direction from the top of the institutional framework. The European Council plays a vital role in this context, but its ability to shape a consistent agenda depends heavily on an efficient and determined Commission, able to table and defend ambitious proposals in the common interest.

This is why the political legitimacy and standing of the Commission in the institutional framework needs to be enhanced, and the fundamental step to this end is the election of the President of the Commission through the vote for the European Parliament.

Tinkering with the size of the Commission may have some merit but, in the absence of this major reform, it would basically amount to determining how many people should sit in a college charged with implementing somebody else’s political decisions. One may argue that not many leading politicians would like to be part of such club.

That being said, turning to the last contribution to this debate by John Temple-Lang and Eamonn Gallagher, I would like to express my disagreement, by extrapolating some key-points from their argument. The reader can find the full text of the contribution on the web page of Challenge Europe.

“The Commission, to do the job for which it was created, must be independent and fully representative.”

As I pointed out, I believe that the Commission, in order to do the job for which it was created and the job that it will be required to provide in a more political Union, needs to be independent and politically strong. Representativity is surely not a guarantee of independence, so much so that the authors say that “A Commission with fewer Commissioners than Member States…will be representative of the States which have nominated Commissioners to that Commission.” This is not my view. But in their view each Commissioner seems to be the representative of his or her own country and can not be assumed to be truly independent.

In fact, the current method for appointing the Members of the Commission is conducive to potential dependence or at least loyalty on the part of the individual Commissioner towards the government that has designated him. Applying qualified majority voting to the appointment of the President and of the college – an important reform at Nice – is a step forward. Even better would be no Treaty determination of the size of the college, with an elected President able to select his Commissioners according to necessity. In such scenario, a clause could be added to the Treaty providing for the President to respect geographical balance and the balance between large and small Member States.

“A Commissioner, however intelligent and independent…cannot be equally well informed about all Member States”

Quite self-evident: it is the case now and will be in the future. On the other hand, a good Commissioner has all the interest in being kept to speed with political developments and priorities across the Union, in order to avoid political struggle down the line of the legislative process. Furthermore, well-qualified members of the cabinets are there to support the activity of their Commissioner with appropriate information and liaise with other Commissioners, other EU institutions and government officials. In that respect, there is a case for providing each Commissioner with the necessary support for a very difficult job, without limiting the size of cabinets.

“A Commission on which one quarter of the Member States have no nominee cannot possibly be ‘fully representative’ of a very diverse Union.”

True, and in fact there is no need for full representation, as that does not add either to the efficiency or to the independence of the college. A strong President and a size of the college coherent with the range of tasks to be performed, on the contrary, do.

Besides, the point is not full representation, but fair representation, so that individuals from every region or category of state can be part of the college. That would of course be in the interest of the elected President, and is ensured by the need for approval both by the European Parliament and by the European Council. Or should we expect a conspiracy against, say, the four ‘Visegrad countries’, whereby they are excluded from the Commission and nobody supports them both in the Parliament and in the European Council?

“Independence does not compensate for lack of representation…the fully representative nature of the Commission is needed…[so that] each State will know that there is a voice that…can explain its special concerns”

First, Member States have the means to make their voice heard throughout the complex legislative process.

Second, it is well known that, even with majority voting, it is common practice for Member States not to vote but to seek consensus by mutually adapting their position. Also, no significant divide between small and large Member States emerged in the past.

Third, it is normal that in a growing political system the interests of the (large) majority prevail on the interests of a (small) minority. That is part of the quasi-constitutional pact that underpins, or should underpin, the Union. Would that be a healthy feature of the system if all specific interests had to be integrated in a compromise at all times?

Fourth, if there is a concern that the perspective of some Member States may not be properly presented, representatives of Member States whose nationals are not part of the college might be invited to make their case, so that the Commission can decide with full knowledge of the circumstances.

Finally, and more concretely, is the Commission aware of the distinctive preferences of Luxembourg in fiscal matters because of the presence of Ms Reding?

“A system under which [some] Member States do not have a Commissioner would introduce a new…inequality: there would be second-class States and first-class States.”

The authors add that large Member States would, as a consequence, enhance their influence. If that is the problem, then it should be noted that the rotation system envisaged at Nice put all countries on an equal basis. Large and small Member States would not have a national representative part of the college. Besides, that would change every five years, preventing the consolidation of categories of ‘ins’ and ‘outs’.

“Large Member States do not need to nominate a Commissioner, they can protect their interests in other ways…Small States do need to have a Commissioner at all times.”

Again, one may think that the authors see the Commissioner as somebody defending the interests of the State he or she ‘represents’. Moreover, small Member S tates are largely over-represented in the Council through a system of weighted votes based on degressive proportionality between population and the number of votes. The same happens with the seats at the European Parliament.

More generally, if one accepts the logic of political integration in Europe, then inevitably small or very small Member States will have less clout in the decision-making process. That by no means would lead to their interests being neglected, given the still consensual nature of decision-making, but it is a clear implication of the attempt to make the Union more democratic.

“The Commission is the only institution which provides small Member States with a safeguard that they will not simply be outvoted”

Should one draw from this and other statements that the independence of the Commission is one-way, to defend the interests of small countries, as opposed to defending the general interest?

Real independence in tomorrow’s Europe will consist of the ability to have free discussions where all points of view are represented, and of the political authority to advance a proposal to the common advantage and defend it against national pressures. The election of the President of the Commission and a small, cohesive college are key to that end.

Also, one should not take too an artificial view of the debates in the Commission. After all they are prepared by wide consultation with interested parties – public actors and civil society organisations. Some of the suggestions recently made in the White Paper on European Governance indicate willingness to develop a more participatory and integrated form of decision-making.

“A State simply cannot have as much confidence in a Commission on which it has no nominee”

Is this what European integration is about? One may argue that some degree of mutual trust would be a constructive contribution to the success of the Union.

If, alternatively, each member of the Commission was actually there to make sure that national interests are respected then some leader in large Member States would be rightly worried that a simple majority of Member States, maybe representing as little as 20% of the population of the Union, could block or impose decisions in a college expanded to all countries part of the Union. If one looks at Europe as more than the usual business of international cooperation, then this is hard to accept.

“All we have said is what the original authors of the Treaties knew, that the Commission needs to be independent and fully representative if it is to do the job for which it was set up.”

It is important to emphasise that at least part of the Commission’s remit will be in future more political and less regulatory or, rather, more explicitly political with a direct relation to national leaders in the European Council.

I put the question to my colleague, Max Kohnstamm at the EPC, who was first Secretary of the ECSC High Authority and close friend and colleague of Jean Monnet. The simplicity of his arguments is sometimes as convincing as disarming. First, with only six Member States, there was no reason to exclude anyone, and it would have been difficult to motivate. Second, there was no equality in ‘representation’, as large Member States had two Commissioners and Benelux countries only one. If size does not really matter, we may as well go back to this formula.

“The Protocol reducing the size of the Commission is not an isolated incident or a technicality, but…part of a campaign by large Member States to reduce the role and influence of the Commission”

I fully agree with the diagnosis: there are some forces in large Member States which would be delighted to see the role of the Commission reduced. However, one should point out that large Member States seem to be joined by qualifi ed representatives of small ones, such as Denmark or Sweden, whose leaders have never showed particular sympathy for this supranational body.

Of course, I disagree with the cure. Whether a secretariat is made of 20 or 30 members does not change much. The difference is made by the political clout of that college and its President. In this perspective, the reform of the Presidency of the Council and of the European Council should be watched as part of a broader balance to be found.

“The Commission is there to safeguard the interests of States which may be in a minority in the Council and Parliament”

This would require a Treaty amendment and is therefore a question for the Convention.

“In fact, a larger Commission would be stronger”

The authors themselves recognise that “a committee of one is the most efficient kind of committee”. However, they are ready to sacrifice the full efficiency of the college to its all-inclusiveness because, among other reasons, “proposals…would be more broadly based and would take a wider range of problems into account”.

One should maybe look at the difficulties that every Commission meets to shape a coherent and strong policy line on major issues, from institutional reform to social affairs, to realise how much internal divisions hamper the performance of the role of forceful initiator that the Commission should play. It goes without saying that the larger the college, the more diverse the preferences of each Commissioner, the lower the common denominator.

Finally, if one could accept a Commission with 25 members, what about a college with more than 30 Commissioners, as it will be after the inclusion of Balkan countries?

“A smaller Commission would be unlikely to be given the exclusive right to propose all Second or Third Pillar measures, which will be necessary insofar as majority voting may be adopted for them.”

I cannot share the optimism of the authors, who seem to believe that a large Commission could be the only initiator in matters of external relations, security, defence, criminal justice, police and border control, among others.  

As to the Third Pillar (Justice and Home Affairs), there seems to be growing consensus to progressively integrate it into the Community Pillar, while possibly preserving some transitory procedural differences. As to the Second Pillar (Common Foreign, Security and Defence Policy), it is unrealistic to think that the Commission – big or small – could be given exclusive right of initiative in the foreseeable future.

I have no problem with Member States taking initiative in the policy areas subject to both ‘Pillars’, maybe adding the requirement of a preventive scrutiny by the Commission of overall consistency with other policies, after the model established for closer cooperation. The greater the powers of the Commission, the better, but surely these powers will not be enhanced by the size of the college, but by personal skills of individuals, and by their political authority.

“It is the Commission…which makes majority voting in the Council and the Parliament acceptable”

Again, this assessment seems to be artificial in the light of common practice in the Council of Ministers, where no significant division between large and small countries has yet emerged. Divisions vary along different policy lines on every issue. It is pessimist to think that exactly those States that may not have a national in the college would be the ones outvoted in the Council.

“Ideally, the new framework for Europe … should be approved by all the peoples of Europe in referenda…It is hard to imagine voters being persuaded that [the reduction of the size of the Commission is not important], unless they are told that the Commission no longer matters much.”

Some conclusions. First of all, even though politically difficult to achieve, it would highly advisable that such a referendum, on a new project for Europe, be organised on a Europe-wide basis: a Community of peoples voting on a common project, showing renewed mutual confidence and a sense of shared priorities. 500 million people would not then be held back by the disagreement of a few thousands in a large or small Member State.

Second, the idea is already circulating that, with a view to avoid this danger, the new Treaty may enter into force once ratified by a certain number of Member States, say 20 out of 25 or so. As to those who do not ratify it, the old provisions might continue to apply to the “outer layer” of an integrated Europe.

Finally, in order to prevent this risk and meet the frustration of those whose national happened not to be in the Commission for five years, European citizens will have the power to identify and elect the President of the Commission. Most voters do not even know that the Commission exists, or may have heard about it but normally confuse it with the European Union! However, everybody can identify a face and understand a well-articulated political programme.

Giovanni Greviis a senior policy analyst with The European Policy Centre.

For more analyses see The European Policy Centre’s

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