The Parliamentary dimension of EU integration

The Parliamentary dimension of EU integration

Further involvement of the European Parliament and of national parliaments in EU decision-making, with a view to enhancing the legitimacy of the process, should be balanced with the need not to further complicate the European institutional framework.

Discussion around the role of the European Parliament in future European political integration has been less central to the debate over the last two years than other issues, such as the delimitation of competences or reform of the Council and the Commission. This is not of course to suggest that no proposals have been tabled, but simply that the focus seemed to shift towards other institutional actors. Three considerations help to confirm this assessment. First of all, the European Parliament (EP) has been accumulating a growing range of powers over the last 15 years. While this trend has been somewhat curbed with the recent Treaty of Nice, such continuous expansion of its political and institutional role might well have led to a temporary consolidation of the parliamentary acquis. Second, the EP is not the only parliamentary actor on the European stage: increasing attention is being paid to the role that national parliaments could play to underpin further political integration, as reported below. The specific mandate to explore “the role of national parliaments in the European architecture” was provided by the Nice Declaration on the Future of Europe. Third, in particular after September 11, much political impetus and the pressure of national public opinions backed progress in two broad policy domains – internal and external security – where the powers of the EP are still relatively weak and emphasis is given more to the need for political leadership than to parliamentary control.

That being said, a number of actors have been calling for further expansion of EP powers, largely identified with the extension of the procedure of codecision – granting the final word to the EP in the interplay with the Council of Ministers – to virtually all legislative matters. This far-reaching position was supported, both before and after the Treaty of Nice, byGuy Verhofstadt,Michel Barnier,Jacques Delorsand theELDR(Party of European Liberal Democrats). Moreover, the upgrading of the EP to a condition of full equality with the Council as co-legislators is central to the vision outlined by many German leaders and political actors, ranging from theCDU/CSU(Christian Democrats) to theSPD(Social Democrats), and fromJoschka FischerandGerhard SchroedertoEdmund Stoiber. This project would lead to a fully-fledged bicameral legislature, where the peoples of Europe are represented in the Parliament, and the Member States in the Council.

More specifically, most participants in the debate called for the extension of the EP full budgetary powers to areas of compulsory expenditure – where the EP can only submit amendments but not reject Council’s proposals – which would include notably agricultural policy. Also, some discussion started with a view to enhance the powers of the EP in matters of external relations of the Union. The EP report itself (Mendez de Vigo-Seguro) asked for additional parliamentary scrutiny of common trade policy, which escapes the control of national parliaments. TheCSU/CDUargued that the EP should have the power to ratify international treaties concluded by the Union, and should be better informed of common actions and positions under the common foreign and security policy.

Most notably, however, a considerable range of political actors favoured the extension of the right of legislative initiative – currently a monopoly o f the Commission under the ‘Community Pillar’ – to the EP (ELDR) and even to the Council as co-legislator (CSU/CDU, Edmund Stoiber). According to theELDR, such power of initiative should be extended in due course to individual Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) as well.

As to the size of the EP, both theELDRand theEPP, and theMendez de Vigo-Seguroreport, recommended to cap the number of seats at 700 (as provided for by the Treaty of Amsterdam but then ignored at Nice, where the number of MEPs after enlargement was fixed at 732). Interestingly,Edmund Stoiber, theCDU/CSUand theEPPfelt that the distribution of seats should be more or less fully proportional to the demographic size of Member States, while small countries could still be over-represented in the Council, through the system of weighted votes.

As anticipated, the future expansion of EP powers is to a large extent the final stage of a process dating back at least to the Single European Act. The emphasis on the role of national parliaments is, on the contrary, a relatively new element in the debate on the future of Europe. No doubt, as acknowledged by a number of leaders, enhancing the involvement of members of national parliaments (MPs) in European affairs would help bridging the legitimacy gap widely perceived by national public opinions when looking at the work and initiatives of the Union. If many share this diagnosis, the ways to connect national parliaments to the functioning of the European institutional framework are subject of considerable disagreement.

On the one hand, a minority of important actors called for the creation of a specific body made up of national parliamentarians.Tony Blairspoke of a “second parliamentary chamber”; the thenDanish Government(August 2001) defined it as a “Council of nations” andLionel Jospinenvisaged a Permanent Conference of Parliaments, a “Congress“. The main task of such a new body would be to ensure that the principle of subsidiarity is properly implemented and Member State prerogatives’ protected. More recently,Jack Strawtabled a somehow more modest version of this proposal, suggesting that national parliaments could set up a European committee for the scrutiny of the principle of subsidiarity.Lionel Jospinbelieves that the Congress should also be responsible for the amendment of non-constitutional Treaty rules, following the simplification of the Treaties. Seemingly along similar lines,Jacques Delorssuggested to establish ad hoc parliamentary conventions, including both European and national parliamentarians, entrusted with the revision of EU constitutional arrangements, the ratification of accession treaties and decisions upon the direct financing of the Union.

Confronted with these proposals, a second set of actors, probably a slight majority and including theCommission, theEPP, theELDR,Goran PerssonandMichel Barnier, argued that setting up a new body would basically amount to further complicating an already complex institutional framework. In fact, they believe that national parliaments have two essential instruments to strengthen their contribution to European policy-making, namely the scrutiny of national government positions and the implementation of framework legislation. As to the control of the executive, constitutional traditions still largely differ within the Union and it is hard to imagine harmonisation from the top. However,Michel Barniersuggested that national MPs accompany their ministers to meetings at the Council. As to the capacity to implement framework legislation, the adoption at the European level of acts leaving sufficient flexibility for action at lower levels of governance, according to the principle of subsidiarity, is an essential preliminary requirement, and seems to be the prevailing orientation for the future.

Looking at the EP in the context of the wider inter-institutional balance, the central issue of debate is certainly the election of the president of the Commission through European elections. To begin with, the importance of consolidating European political parties is stressed by the Commission; and theELDRand theEPPbelieve that European political parties should designate their candidate before the elections. Also, theEPPcalled for European elections to take place on the basis of common principles of European electoral law, andMichel Barnierfelt that at least a proportion of MEPs should be elected through trans-national lists. The parliamentary election of the president of the Commission, backed by growing support as the debate unfolds, implies according to some contributors that the EP should accept the responsibility corresponding to such a central political function.Michel Barnierasked whether the EP should be dismissible by the Commission, andPascal Lamy and the Benelux countriessupported this option. TheBenelux countries, on the other hand, called for mechanisms to be set in place allowing for the dismissal of individual Commissioners by the EP and, according to theELDR, the EP should have the power to block the appointment of individual Commissioners.

To conclude, it should be noted that, consistently with the suggestion of all the actors mentioned above and others, the European and national Parliaments are already fully involved in the preparation of the next, fundamental stage of reform of the European Union before enlargement. By participating in the proceedings of the ongoing Convention, where they constitute the large majority of members, parliamentarians are likely to provide a decisive contribution to the definition of the political guidelines for the future of Europe. Beyond any potential institutional reform, this might well mark the point of no return in terms of the full involvement of the parliamentary dimension in European affairs, and consequently a stronger legitimisation of the whole process of integration.

Giovanni Greviis a senior policy analyst with The European Policy Centre.

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