Towards an Executive for the Union?

Towards an Executive for the Union?

Jean-Luc Dehaene, Vice-President of the Convention on the Future of Europe, addressed an EPC dialogue on “Towards an Executive for the Union?” first giving a brief overview of progress so far and the next steps to be taken. Following an open discussion EPC Director and Founding Chairman, Stanley Crossick, presented the Centre’s current thinking on who should exercise the governing powers in the EU. A panel of Christine Roger, Head of Cabinet to Commissioner Michel Barnier, Frank Vibert, Director of the European Policy Forum in London and Franklin Dehousse, Director of the Royal Institute of International Affairs in Brussels discussed issues raised by the Chairman and from the floor. This is not an official record of the proceedings and specific remarks are not necessarily attributable.

Convention’s key areas of focus

Jean-Luc Dehaene described the first four months of the Convention’s work as a “listening phase” during which it had been important to listen to each other as well as to the voices of civil society. He said the Convention was looking for something that could be the basis of consensus, and the debate was now reaching the point at which concrete proposals could begin to be formulated, on the basis of work which had been devolved to a number of working groups. He singled out key areas upon which the Convention was now focusing:

A Constitution

The use of the term “constitution” was deemed sensitive when the Convention started work, but, as work progressed, it had come into common use. There was already wide support for a constitutional Treaty integrating the Charter of Fundamental Rights. This would give the EU one Treaty and one juridical personality, merging the pillars and establishing one “common approach.”

Competences

Competences had to be clarified, but there was no support in the Convention for a catalogue of competences. This issue boiled down to a test of subsidiarity, and there was wide support for a Community approach on issues such as internal security and cross-border crime. More discussion would follow on international affairs and defence, particularly on how to organise foreign policy.

Simplification

Simplifying the EU instruments and adopting clearer language when talking about the institutions and functions was a Convention priority. “We are not afraid to talk about a European framework law,” said Mr Dehaene. Co-decision across the board for the European Parliament and majority decision-making in Council in all areas are also on the agenda.

Institutions

In this debate, there were two (by no means mutually exclusive) tracks in the discussion on democratic legitimacy. The first is to transform the European Parliament into a “full” Parliament that would also have budgetary powers. The second concentrates on splitting the Council of Ministers into legislative and non-legislative modes. These issues were exerting “very strong pressure” on the Convention, along with the question of the election by MEPs of the Commission President. After the summer break, the Convention will look at a constitutional treaty framework and discuss whether there should be a complete revamp of the existing treaties, or a more synthesized treaty. The key issue in either case was how to bridge between old and new treaties. The Convention would have to confront a battle between those advocating a stronger Commission and those seeking a stronger Council. On the question of what and where is executive power in the EU, some are keener on the Commission’s dominant role, while others see a Commission-plus-Council structure.

Another issue is how to organise reinforced cooperation. There is “de facto” reinforced cooperation in Economic and Monetary Union, said Mr Dehaene, but it is not organised within the EU structure. There is a need to be clear what reinforced cooperation means, and it will be needed in areas such as defence.

Open discussion

Convention timetable

In response to a question on the Convention’s timetable, Mr Dehaene said it was unhelpful to be pinned down at this stage, on either timing or the chances of the IGC adopting the Convention’s recommendations. The Convention was following the one-year timetable established at the Laeken summit, but it might be what the French call a “bonne année” – and if taking longer produced a better result, the Convention would take longer.

President-Prime Minister structure

Asked whether the French political model of President and Prime Minister could apply to the EU structure, Mr Dehaene said he personally backed the Commission plan to have the foreign policy “High Representative,” currently Javier Solana, inside the Commission as a Vice-President. It would be an “integrated Solana/Patten role, as a sort of Minister of Foreign Affairs in the Commission.” The first objective was to integrate EU external relations policy, to establish one EU voice at international level on all issues, from the WTO to the World Bank. That would be an important step towards cementing Europe in global governance.

Veto and VotingAsked about the future of the national veto and the extension of qualified majority voting (QMV), Mr Dehaene said there was no point having QMV at Council level if you did not have it at summit level, as policy was still blocked but this time further up the chain.

Executive Power in EU

Following this open discussion, Stanley Crossick outlined the views of The EPC on the distribution of executive powers in the EU. The EPC felt the pillar structure should be abolished, and that all the EU institutions needed strengthening. The Union was not (and would not become) a State, but it should nevertheless develop an effective form of government to exert its powers. The institutional “triangle” of Commission, Council, and Parliament would in any case remain the core of the organization of those powers.

The Union had to be politicised. The Commission President needed a democratic mandate and the development of truly European politics, including real European political parties, is essential. Therefore, the President of the Commission should be elected by the European Parliament from among the candidates nominated by European political parties before each Parliamentary election. His appointment would then be confirmed by the Council by QMV.

There should be twenty Commissioners, rotating equally between all the Member States. This would not disadvantage those smaller countries, which currently felt they should each have a permanent Commissioner since they may well realise that a well-functioning, smaller Commission is more in their interests than a two-tiered Commission that would likely be dominated by larger Member States.

Streamlining measures

Meanwhile the Council had to be streamlined, with the General Affairs Council (GAC) responsible for policy coordination, drawing up agendas for European Council meetings and acting separately from a new Common Foreign and Security Council. A separate Legislative Council should be created and be the only body responsible for dealing with the European Parliament. Below the GAC and the Legislative Council, the number of Council formations should be limited.

The rotating Presidency should be abolished, and the GAC should be chaired by the Commission’s Vice-President responsible for policy coordination and relations with the Council. The other Council formations, and the new Legislative Council, would elect their own presidents for one or two years out of their members.

The CFSP Council, however, would be chaired by the High Representative, who would become the EU’s “Foreign Secretary,” separate from the Secretary-General of the Council. This “Foreign Secretary” should attend Commission meetings on relevant issues to report upon priorities in international affairs and debate with the College. However, he would not be a full member of the Commission and would have no right to vote. The Treaty should provide for the powers, responsibility and institutional position of the High Representative/Foreign Secretary to be reviewed by QMV after a set period of time.

European Councils should give political leadership by setting out strategic guidelines, and a President should be nominated from within the body for a period of six months or one year.

It would be for Commission’s to propose a five-year rolling EU strategic programme, which is then debated with Parliament and the Council. This programme would then be agreed between the three institutions and endorsed by the European Council. The same procedure should be adopted for the annual implementation programme.

Panel Comments

Following these introductory remarks, the three panel members to commented on whether the Commission President’s role should be strengthened, and how he or she should be chosen.

Christine Roger said there was no official position yet on this point within the Commission. There had been an internal debate in February about how the President should be chosen and a “conservative” view emerged. She said the Commission valued its legitimacy, “independent from Member States and political parties,” and there was concern that independence would be threatened by a directly elected President and that the Commission could be regarded as acting politically.

Others argued that the same problem existed now, because the President was chosen by EU leaders, all evidently with political views. Therefore, the President could be subject to political pressures as the collective political make-up of the EU’s leaders shifted. Ms Roger insisted that the current arrangement did maintain independence. In any event, the issue would be debated in Commission in September.

Frank Vibert said the Commission’s role was more that of regulator, occupying the mid-ground between politics and the judicial processes. He did not think the Commission President should be elected by Parliament, which already had sufficient means to hold the Commission to account. If the President were elected, the Commission would have to lose its quasi-judicial role in areas such as competition. People had not thought this through and “this is not the way to go.” Franklin Dehousse underlined that politicisation of the Commission was inevitable as it is not only an independent regulator but is also entrusted with highly political tasks. Indeed this politicisation process had already begun.

The panel went on to address the abolition of the six-month Presidency rotation system and the method of choosing the President of the European Council.

Mr Dehousse warned against tackling such issues individually. It was important not to make “piecemeal changes which would lead to collective results we do not want.” Mr Vibert said the six-month Presidency was highly inefficient. It was “hi-jacking” the EU and something longer term had to be put in place. But concentrating on such “institutional turf-wars” in the Convention was a big turn-off for public opinion, and he hoped the Convention would not become bogged down in such discussions. More important were legislative procedures and better lawmaking.

Ms Roger said the Commission was firmly against becoming “the government of Europe.” It was vital to avoid a “patchwork of different ideas, which do not fit together.” The challenge for Europe was to keep policies within the system and to retain political integrity. “The danger is that we create a model, but that the policies don’t fit.” Overall the Comm unity method had to be safeguarded.

The High Representative

On the High Representative, the Commission had already suggested merging his job with the external relations Commissioner, bringing him inside the Commission. But the exact status of this person remained an issue, and, when dealing with CFSP matters, the distinctive institutional arrangements and procedures established for security and defence should not be undermined.

Mr Vibert, on the other hand, believed the EU’s agenda-setting role had to reside in the Council and that the High Representative should stay there. Moving such a position into the Commission would undermine the credibility of the role and make the High representative “troublesome” to the Council.

Open discussion

Role of Commission President

During questions from the floor, surprise was expressed at the Commission’s attitude towards the Commission President’s role, as in the absence of a more direct democratic legitimation the President of the Commission would be the only member of the European Council deprived of democratic mandate. Others felt that, while the Commission was to some extent already political, it did have independence under the current arrangement of a nominated President. The view was taken that it was politically not feasible to have an independent regulator. People would not accept a stronger role for the Commission if its democratic legitimacy was not enhanced by the presence of an elected President.

Irish referendum on Nice

Asked about reports that there is no “Plan B” if the Irish reject the Nice Treaty for a second time, Mr Dehaene said the issue was simple: “If you don’t want to stop enlargement then vote for the Treaty.” He said it was obvious nobody would acknowledge a “Plan B”, because voters might take it as invitation to vote “no” again, in the knowledge that there was an alternative. He said everyone had to treat the forthcoming Irish referendum on the basis that there will be a “yes” vote.

Conclusion 

Mr Dehaene said that as discussions progressed, the Convention was trying to complete its work and agree the result on the basis of as large a consensus as possible. That was the only way that it could have any real influence on the EU’s future.

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