Will Europe’s BSE crisis bring about a new relationship between food and health?

BSE or ‘mad cow disease’, seen until very recently as “a peculiarly British affair”, has now spiralled out of control and become a Europe-wide problem. And it may not stop there. Last month, the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization warned that at least 100 countries are now at risk from ‘mad cow disease’.

BSE is exposing the soft underbelly of food globalization as a single country’s food and health tragedy fast develops into an unprecedented global crisis for the food industry and for human health.

While BSE is a beef problem, the fallout from the crisis is starting to impact the whole food chain. The crisis is posing numerous critical questions about the way food is produced and regulated. For example:

• the handling of BSE calls into question the nature of the relationship between the food industry and regulators
• the way ‘experts’ are used, especially to quell public fears about health and food safety concerns
• and, last but no means least, the whole topic of risk management and risk communication

We can now, without any exaggeration, speculate whether the European public will ever again trust policy-makers on questions of human health and food production. For this reason, in this article we outline some of the key areas of concern being raised by the BSE crisis and its implications for the future of food and health. The BSE crisis may – for the moment – be a European one. The implications may be truly global in their effect.

THE END OF FACTORY FARMING METHODS?

Some commentators are already suggesting that the BSE crisis might change the way food is produced in the future, but in our view this has to be set alongside a sense of resignation among many consumers. For example, more than 80 people have died in the UK from new variant CJD, the human form of BSE (see box on page 23), experiencing horrible lingering declines before dying. Yet in some ways there has not been a sustained sense of public outrage in the UK at this tragic loss of life.

Earlier this year, it was reported that beef sales in Britain, although in long-term decline, had returned to their pre-BSE levels. The British government only saw fit to announce compensation for the human victims of BSE in October last year, although the first announcement of the link between BSE and vCJD in humans was made on March 20, 1996. After a long-drawn out campaign by the families of the victims of vCJD, an initial £1 million ($1.5 million) is being set aside for compensation. The British government has already compensated farmers to the tune of more than £4 billion ($6 billion).

But intensive farming practices are now starting to be seriously challenged. The report of the Phillips Inquiry into the BSE crisis in the UK, published in October, clearly identified intensive farming methods as one of the factors contributing to the BSE crisis in the UK.

In the February 26 issues of international news magazines Time and Newsweek, both carried cover stories on the BSE crisis in Europe. Time chose to concentrate on how fears of ‘mad cow disease’ are changing the ways Europeans eat. Newsweek also took a similar story line, with a headline “Europe Goes Organic” on its cover, suggesting the ‘mad cow’ mania is spurring a return to natural foods.

Both magazines highlighted how there has been increasing consumer demand for organic products prompted by BSE and for non-beef dishes in restaurants. For example, Newsweek reported that since the first BSE reports in Germany, market surveys had shown that the number of self-proclaimed vegetarians in the country had doubled to 6.6 million. The number of Italian vegetarians has risen from 1.5 million to 2.5 million in the past 12 months.

But while the BSE hysteria currently sweeping across Europe is real, it is our analysis that sales of organic produce, wh ile experiencing spikes as a result of BSE, are being driven equally, if not more, by European consumer concerns about GM agriculture.

THE NEW BSE HYSTERIA IN EUROPE

The panic over mad cow disease in Europe is also new – less than three months old – although momentum was gathering pace throughout 2000. For many years, and with some arrogance and complacency, many European countries saw BSE as a British problem and something they would be immune from. By banning sales of British beef in Europe, policy-makers thought they would be safe from the beef crisis engulfing the UK. But as more and more confirmed cases of BSE started to be reported in European countries that had declared to their public that they were ‘safe’ from BSE, there was been a swift backlash from consumers.

One of the early triggers was the recall of beef by three French supermarket chains after it was revealed that cattle infected with BSE in France had been sold into the human food chain. Then came the report of the first case of BSE in Germany in November last year, quickly followed by reports from other countries thought to be free from the epidemic. The latest, and most shocking announcement, being a suspected case of BSE in Sweden, long thought of as a country that would be free of BSE because of their very high animal welfare standards. Across the European Union beef consumption has collapsed, down an average of 27% in January. In Germany, Spain, and Italy sales have plunged between 40 and 50%. In France, where the large supermarket chains account for around two-thirds of all beef sales, turnover was down nearly 40% at the end of January. The cost to the EU this year alone will be at least £2 billion, more if the crisis escalates.

HIGH LEVEL CALLS FOR NEW ‘ECOLOGICAL’ FARMING MEHTODS

However, unlike the UK, one of the results of the escalating BSE crisis has been high level political calls for new policies supporting an ‘ecological’ approach to farming and the end of intensive farming practices. Most prominent here has been Germany, Europe’s largest food market. In response to the BSE crisis Gerhard Schroder, the German chancellor, has created a powerful new consumer protection ministry headed by a Green party minister to oversee far-reaching reform of the agricultural sector.

The new ministry heralds the possibility of a radical ‘ecological’ approach to food production in Germany – reportedly to the dismay of the German farm lobby. Mr Schroder said the BSE crisis demanded the reversal of practices dating back decades and: “a new politics that stands for consumer protection, improved food safety and natural, environmentally-friendly farming.”

Germany’s first case of BSE was made public only as recently as November 24 last year, and to date there have been 31 confirmed cases (see table on page 23). The discovery of BSE in Germany came as a profound shock to the meat-loving Germans. As consumer panic set in and sales of beef collapsed, German health minister Andrea Fischer and agriculture minister Karl-Heinz Funke were portrayed in the media as mishandling the BSE issue and by January 9 the pressure had led to their resigning within minutes of each other.

The double resignations, unprecedented in post-war Germany, and the government’s handling of the BSE crisis was also seen by some commentators as a reflection of weaknesses in the Schroder government. But the chancellor reacted strongly by appointing Renate Kunast, a senior German Green politician as head of the new super-ministry for consumer safety.

Kunast immediately set her goals as restoring consumer confidence, securing the farming industry’s future, and the switch to natural agricultural production. She said the ministry would argue that farm subsidies should be directed solely at ecologically-friendly production. Consumer safety, not the interest of the agricultural lobby would take priority, she said.

RE-EXAMINING HOW FOOD IS PRODUCED

Germany’s BSE crisis looks miniscule in comparison to the disaster in the UK which has around 180,000 confirmed cases of BSE in cattle, and more than 80 deaths from vCJD. Yet the contrast in political action between the two countries could not be greater. True, the Germans have the benefit of hindsight to study the long and painful saga of constant assurances of public safety by UK politicians during the early 1990s.

But the events which led to the resignations of two top ministers in Germany shows that these lessons must have been poorly.

But once the prospect of BSE in the German food chain became apparent and consumer outrage at political bungling started to gain momentum, the action taken was decisive and, more importantly, cut to the heart of food production methods. Contrast this to the years of playing the politics of food, bureaucratic secrecy and reliance on streams of ‘experts’ in the UK as revealed by that country’s inquiry into BSE.

The Germans have put in place what look like long-overdue measures to prevent BSE in cattle, such as banning meat and bone meal in animal feed, but they have also gone further, sending out strong signals that the way our food is produced must be critically re-examined – what the Germans are calling ‘ecological’ production methods. If the political will is really there to implement ‘ecologically sound’ animal and crop production methods it will be an extraordinary and radical about-face after a decades-long intensification and industrialisation of farming. Such a policy will have far reaching implications, not only for Germany’s own conventional farming, but, because of Germany’s power within Europe, for the rest of European farming.

But more importantly in terms of the future of food, ‘ecological’ methods challenge the mega corporations controlling global agribusiness and the kind of dynamics driving their business models and strategy. For example, will there be a place for biotechnology in rearing animals and crops in a ‘natural way’ and using ‘ecologically sound farming methods’?

The aftermath of Europe’s BSE crisis may lead to a redefinition of food and food production that will impact on food processing from ingredients to final products.

EUROPEAN COMMISSION TO TACKLE BEEF CRISIS BY SUPPORTING ‘ORGANIC’

German concerns about production methods were echoed when the European Commission agreed an emergency ‘7-point plan’ in February, to address the serious disruption to the beef and veal market resulting from the BSE crisis. Part of the plan includes encouraging further extensification (as opposed to ‘intensification’ methods) of beef production with the aim of actually reducing beef production in the future. The plan aims to further promote farming methods in tune with the environment, and support for organic production is reinforced, including an exemption to use set-aside land for organic farming. Part of the plan also includes limiting the number of cattle each producer can hold to 90.

Presenting the proposal, Commissioner for Agriculture, Rural Development and Fisheries Franz Fischler said: “Our plan will increase the environmental and social sustainability of EU beef production. It will limit the production potential in the future. But the measures are also essential to allow the beef producers’ incomes to recover. Avoiding the beef mountains looming on Europe’s horizon is in the interests of consumers, taxpayers and farmers alike. Immediate action to curb beef production by boosting less intensive and organic production is the only way forward.”

NEW MEASURES REASSURE CONSUMERS THEY CAN EAT BEEF WITH CONFIDENCE

In a separate speech to farmers and their representatives, David Byrne, European Commissioner for Health and Consumer Protection warned against complacency when dealing with BSE. He said: “It is less than three months since the current crisis broke out. Consumer confidence and beef consumption have both fallen sharply. Export markets to third countries have seized up.”

Mr Byrne went on to say that for him the most important factor was a loss of consumer confidence that the authorities were taking the necessary measures to protect them from the risk of BSE. He said that this required even greater efforts to restore the credibility of measures to tackle BSE.

He continued: “I would warn against any complacency. There have too many twists and turns in the BSE story to conclude that any Member State is clear of crisis. The process of rebuilding confidence throughout the Community will take time, effort and resources. You can describe this approach as irrational, exaggerated and disproportionate. But it is the reality. And if we are to restore confidence in beef, we have to face up to that reality. This largely explains the range of new measures which have been introduced in recent weeks.

“This series of measures is extraordinarily complete. In fact, I have very great difficulty in thinking of what additional measures, if any, could be added to the present range. Consumers should take great reassurance that everything possible s now being done to ensure that they can eat beef with confidence.” However, as the UK experience has demonstrated, it is the implementation and enforcement of safety measures that is important. Widespread lax compliance of the measures introduced to control BSE in the UK literally kept BSE in the food chain for years after it should have been eradicated.

LESSONS FROM THE UK: A ‘NATIONAL TRAGEDY’ LAID BARE

In a sombre and subdued tone, the UK’s Agriculture Minister Nick Brown officially put the results of the two-and-a-half year BSE inquiry into the public domain on Thursday October 26, last year. The findings of the 16 volume, 4,000 page, BSE inquiry report are equally sombre – currently 80 UK citizens have died, but no one is to blame -apparently – for what the Minister described in his Parliamentary statement as ‘a national tragedy’.  

On the same day, the UK government announced a comprehensive care and compensation package for the human victims of the fatal and horrific brain disease, caught from BSE, that has become known as new variant CJD.

In their report, Lord Phillips and his inquiry team of Mrs June Bridgeman and Professor Malcolm Ferguson-Smith, although pointing out errors of judgement, do not ‘name and shame’ politicians and top civil servants in the manner some commentators had expected.

Instead, while detailing examples of civil servant, political, and scientific bungling, they also paint a picture of actions taken by officials that helped towards the eradication of BSE in the UK thus protecting animal and human health. Lord Phillips, speaking at his Press conference on the day the report was made public, said: “We have made it plain that the primary object of our Inquiry was fact-finding not fault finding.”

But, at the same time, a careful reading of the Phillips’ report is also a damning indictment of the UK food system and its method of production and governance. The Inquiry was also unable to answer why BSE is a peculiarly British affair – BSE originated in the UK and much of the incidence in other countries can be traced back to British sources. However, there are lessons for every developed-world food-producing nation.

THE SCOPE OF THE BSE INQUIRY

The BSE Inquiry reviewed the history and emergence of BSE and new variant CJD (see box on the right for explanations) in the UK, and of action taken in response to it up to March 20, 1996 – the day it was announced that BSE could be caught by humans.

Over the total period of the BSE crisis nearly 180,000 cattle had been identified as contracting the disease, but 4.7 million cattle have be en slaughtered and disposed of to contain its spread. The UK Government, including European Union contributions, through compensation payments to farmers and other costs associated with BSE have spent more than £4.2 billion on the crisis. However, up to March 20, 1996, the Inquiry found the BSE crisis had a ‘relatively marginal’ economic impact in the UK, saying: “The economic impact of BSE before 20 March 1996 pales into comparison to what happened after that date.”

For example, it was after the March 20, 1996, announcement that the European Union imposed the ‘beef ban’ on British exports wiping out the UK’s £720 million beef and cattle export market overnight, and the regulation banning cattle over 30 months old for use as human food or animal feed was introduced.

SOUND POLICY DECISIONS TAKEN?

But on the way the BSE crisis was handled in the UK, Lord Philips said: “We have concluded that, in general, our system of public administration has emerged with credit from the part of the BSE story we have examined. Sound policy decisions were taken, both with a view to eradicating the animal disease and with a view to protecting humans against what was believed to be a remote risk of transmission.” The

Inquiry report does detail what it calls the ‘failings’ on the part of some individuals, naming names and specific errors. But the report asks readers to see that: “It is vital that criticisms are considered in their context because BSE imposed demands on officials who were working at full stretch and it was those who were working hardest who were most likely to make the occasional mistake.”

‘BEEF IS SAFE’

The Inquiry report leaves no doubt as to the major error in the BSE crisis and what turned out to be, quite literally, the fatal error of the government, its scientific experts and civil servants – the repeated reassurance to the public that beef was safe to eat.

Yet even here the Inquiry report is somewhat generous – stating that it was poor ‘risk communication’ on the ‘uncertainty’ about the risks posed by BSE including a failure to adequately explain to the public that some people might have been infected before precautions had been taken, that was the problem. The implication being that if such ‘uncertainty’ had been discussed, the public loss of confidence would not have been so great. Lord Phillips, in dealing with this issue, said: “A false impression was conveyed that BSE posed no risk to humans.”

The report states on this topic: “The Government did not lie to the public about BSE. It believed that the risks posed by BSE to humans were remote. The Government was preoccupied with preventing an alarmist over-reaction to BSE because it believed that the risk was remote. It is now clear that this campaign of reassurance was a mistake. When on 20 March 1996 the Government announced that BSE had probably been transmitted to humans, the public felt that they had been betrayed.

Confidence in government pronouncements about risk was a further casualty of BSE.” Among 167 ‘lessons’ listed in the BSE Inquiry report, one of the more important is that public trust can only be established if communications about risk are frank and objective. In particular, the report says, “there must be openness about uncertainty”.

SHORTCOMINGS IN HANDLING THE CRISIS

The BSE Inquiry report details a number of ‘failings’ in the handling of the BSE crisis, but not all of these were specific to the crisis itself. For example, for some commentators the culture of secrecy and protracted bureaucracy in the UK’s Ministry of Agriculture Fisheries and Food (MAFF) was nothing new, but it played out tragically in the case of BSE. From reading the report, liaison between MAFF and the Department of Health over BSE was at times appalling, resulting in delays in introducing vital measures to protect human health. The Philips report use s the phrase: “not always adequate” to describe this relationship.

The meat industry itself came out of the Inquiry surprisingly unscathed – from the major supermarkets (which are some of Europe’s largest butchers) to meat product and manufacturing companies. Parts of the food chain that come out with little credit, and some might think deserve harsher criticism, are the animal feed industry and slaughterhouses. Many slaughterhouses appeared to have systematically flouted regulations about removing the dangerous bits of the cow from the carcass, thus allowing the potential for infected animal parts to enter the human food chain. Allied to this was a failure by MAFF and other authorities to implement regulations designed to keep the potentially dangerous bits of the cow out of animal feed.

TIME FOR A HISTORIC CHANGE IN FOOD PRODUCTION?

The UK’s BSE Inquiry report is massive and complex and it will be years before the implications of its findings are thoroughly analysed and disseminated.

TOTAL CASES OF BSE IN EUROPE (UP TO END JAN. 2001)
UK	179,506
Ireland	597
Portugal	509
Switzerland	366
France	248
Belgium	22
Germany	31
Netherlands	9
Denmark	3
Italy	3
Luxembourg	1
Spain	17

The BSE crisis is very unusual – an unknown, horrific and fatal new disease in cattle, then humans, that spiralled out of control before most people realised the scale of what was happening. One of the remarkable events revealed by the Inquiry report is the speed with which the disease was first tackled in the late 1980s, resulting in an animal protein feed ban being put in place, crucial in controlling the spread of BSE.

But from then on it was a sorry tale of misinformation, departmental turf wars and blatant flouting by parts of the food industry of regulations put in place to protect human health.

The scientific ‘experts’ come across as hapless, their advice and findings poorly communicated, they were often forced into the position of, in effect, making policy -something they should have resisted as outside their remits. The future role of ‘experts’ and ‘expert advice’ in the area of science should become a major area of change if t he lessons of the Phillips’ report are implemented.

While the Inquiry report is generous to many of the perpetuators of ‘mistakes’, it fails to mention at all the small band of scientists and others who risked careers and reputations to keep BSE in the public spotlight – and who were as a result treated with derision by politicians and Whitehall officials. Without these unsung heroes it may be BSE would have become a much more tragic story than it already is.

Also we can not forget the bravery of the relatives of those who have died from vCJD. They have had to campaign hard to win the care and compensation package announced by the Government. These will not alleviate the suffering they have been through, but will help the future victims of BSE. Of the estimates of future ‘cases’ of vCJD the only certainty is that there will be many more -from a few dozen to tens of thousands – no-one has said there might be no more cases of vCJD.

HISTORIC MOMENT

If there was ever a ‘mad cow disease’ outbreak in the United States, especially if it resulted in human deaths – and we certainly pray that this will never happen – then it is almost certain there would be a global food panic. With the lessons from the UK, the spiralling crisis in Europe, and the global risk of BSE, if ever there was a catalyst for whole-scale reassessment and change in the food system then this is the historic moment. It is time to develop business models for the food system built on integrated – ‘ecological’ if you prefer – ideas of food and health. The question many in the food industry should perhaps be asking is why wait any longer? And why wait for a crisis in the U.S.?

100 COUNTRIES AT RISK FROM ‘MAD COW DISEASE’

In February, the UN Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) called for action to protect the human population, as well as livestock, feed and meat industries from BSE in countries around the world. The FAO said: “There is an increasingly grave situation developing in the European Union, with BSE being identified in cattle in several member states of the EU which have, until recently, been regarded as free from the disease.”

All countries, which have imported cattle or meat and bone meal (MBM) from Western Europe, especially the UK, during and since the 1980s, can be considered at risk, according to the UN agency. Regions that have imported sizeable quantities of MBM from the UK, identified as the cause in the spread of BSE among cattle, during and since the 1980s include the Near East, Eastern Europe and Asia. The FAO said: “There is an urgent need to refine the risk assessment and to extend it to other countries and regions. Countries at risk should implement effective surveillance for BSE in cattle and controls on the animal feed and meat industries.”

However, there is good news for some countries. According to the FAO study Argentina, Australia, Chile, Norway, New Zealand and Paraguay are ‘highly unlikely’ to have the BSE agent present. The FAO also says Canada and the USA are unlikely to have BSE in their herds.

CAUSE OF BSE IN CATTLE AND vCJD IN HUMANS Scrapie is a brain disease in sheep that has been prevalent for more than 200 years without infecting humans. Many people were under the impression that BSE (bovine spongiform encephalopathies) was a form of scrapie in cattle, but this is not the case. Scrapie from sheep has not been transmitted to cattle. BSE is a new, and more potent disease than scrapie, and originated in cattle.   Nobody knows why the first cow or cows got BSE or when.The first officially identified case of BSE was in 1986, but scientists believe that from a single source (possibly as early as the 1970s), infection spread widely in the British herd before anyone realised that a new d isease had come into existence.This happened because of a long-standing practice of making cattle feed out of the bits of the cow not fed to humans, resulting in feeding parts of infected cattle to healthy cattle in the form of ruminant protein (meat and bone meal). Researchers have found that infected feed the size of a peppercorn is enough to pass BSE onto healthy cattle. As the chairman of the UK’s BSE Inquiry Report describes it:”In this way BSE spread rather like a chain letter and thousands of cows had been infected before the first cows were diagnosed.” BSE, a disease of cattle, and variant CJD (Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease – vCJD) a disease of humans, are varieties of a rare group of diseases known as Transmissible Spongiform Encephalopathies (TSEs).TSEs cause the appearance of microscopic holes in the brain, giving it a sponge-like appearance.They are usually fatal to both animals and humans.The link between BSE and new variant CJD in humans is now clearly established – vCJD is caused by the transmission of BSE to humans, though the manner of infection is not clear. Thus far (up to the end of January 2001), 92 people have died or are dying from vCJD, 88 in the UK, 3 in France, and 1 in Ireland. Expert estimates for further cases of vCJD vary widely, from as few as 50 to more than one million.

and are Co-Directors of a London-based think-tank,

The Centre for Food and Health Studies.

For more Commentaries and Features, see the Centre for Food and Health Studies:

Newsby Dr. Michael Heasman and Julian Mellentin.