Dividing along the Polish-Ukrainian frontier?

When Poland enters the EU, visas will be
required to cross the Polish-Ukrainian border. The likely
consequences of this provide a vivid example of the divisive
effects of the current EU approach to enlargement.

Currently there are more than one million
crossings of the Polish-Ukrainian border per month. The number of
cross-border movements this year looks set to be the highest since
Ukraine became independent in 1991. The previous record was in
1997, with more than 15 million border-crossings. But in the
following years, the number of persons crossing the
Polish-Ukrainian border fell considerably. This was caused by
several factors, some of which were introduced at the behest of the
European Union and the wider international community.

On December 27, 1997, the Polish Law on
Foreigners came into effect. Requirements for additional
documentation clearly stating the identity of individuals crossing
the border were introduced. Since there was little information
available about these changes, and because they were introduced
during the holidays, they caused long delays and confusion on the
border. The cost of acquiring the newly required documents was an
additional irritant.

Earlier in 1997, Ukraine had introduced a new
taxation system, which among other things included new custom
tariffs and a 15% value-added tax. The new system was introduced
primarily in order to qualify for funding from the IMF. There is
considerable corruption at the border, as many shuttle traders now
prefer to bribe officials rather than to accept the costs and
bureaucracy of the new system. But for most people the costs of the
new taxes, or alternatively, the size of the bribes (rumoured to be
approximately 200-300 US$ per truck), were prohibitive.

The Russian financial crisis in autumn 1998 led
to a further reduction in trade across the Polish-Ukrainian border.
Then in 1999, Poland added a requirement of a minimum amount of
money which people would have to bring with them in order to enter
Poland.

The effects of the new rules and regulations
introduced in 1997-1999 have been considerable. Cross-border
traffic fell by almost 50%. In South-East Poland the already high
level of unemployment rose, from 10% to 14%. Resentment towards the
central authorities grew. The sizeable Polish minority in Western
Ukraine could not understand why the Polish government would do
this to them. Among those who knew the background of the new
measures, the EU and the IMF fell in esteem.

However, the effects of the new rules and
regulations were minimal compared to what one can expect when
Poland enters the EU, assuming that current EU visa-policies are
not changed. Some very rough arithmetic illustrates this.

Shuttle trade accounts for much of the movement
across the Polish-Ukrainian border. After Poland’s accession to the
EU, hundreds of thousands of people will be affected by the new
visa requirements. Although there has been some speculation that
Ukraine will not reciprocate and introduce visa requirements for
Poles wishing to enter Ukraine, the latter has indeed reciprocated
when other neighbouring EU accession candidates like Slovakia have
introduced visas.

It is possible, but not certain, that the
three-month visas stipulated by the Schengen Agreement will allow
for an unlimited number of crossings. If the current volume of
cross-border movements is to continue, a very large number –
probably hundreds of thousands – of visa applications would have to
be processed by Polish consulates in Ukraine every month. And since
most of the cross-border traffic is local, it is likely that most
of the Polish visas will be issued by the Polish consulate in
L’viv. This consulate is currently able to issue only about a dozen
visas per day. By comparison, the German consulate in Kyiv, which
has almost twenty clerks working full time on processing visa
applications, issues app roximately 2000 visas per day.

Without a substantial upgrade of Polish consular
facilities in Western Ukraine, the significant flows across the
border could be reduced to a trickle of a few thousand per month.
The Polish Consulate in L’viv would have to be of gigantic and
unrealistic proportions if a substantial reduction in cross-border
traffic is to be avoided. Of course, a similarly enormous Ukrainian
Consulate on the Polish side of the border would have to be
established.

The time-consuming process of getting visas, in
particular for people who do not live close to L’viv, will in any
case deter a significant number of the people who today cross the
border regularly. If visas are not issued for free, the cost will
have an additional restrictive effect. Fortunately, this will not
in any case occur for a few years, as the current Polish position
is that visa requirements for Ukrainian citizens will not be
introduced until the first day of Poland’s accession. This gives
time for both the EU, Poland and Ukraine to find a good
arrangement.

In contrast to the particular issue of visa
requirements between Poland and Ukraine, which has effectively been
deferred for a few years, the negative effects of EU visa policy
are already visible in other areas of the future borderlands of the
EU. Candidate countries such as Estonia, Latvia, Slovakia and
Romania have, at the request of the EU, already introduced visas
for future ‘outsiders’ such as Russia, Moldova and Ukraine in the
last year. This has had the predictable effect of reducing the
number of travellers between the countries concerned. The decisions
and ensuing recriminations have also strained several of the
already fragile bilateral relationships in Central and Eastern
Europe.

The EU can alleviate some of the problems that
will follow the introduction of visa requirements on the
Polish-Ukrainian border. The Schengen Agreement stipulates that the
detailed rules on procedures and conditions for issuing visas, as
well as the standards and procedures for carrying out checks on
borders, are to be determined by the EU Council of Ministers. These
measures were to be adopted during the five years following the
entry into force of the Amsterdam Treaty, i.e. between May 1999 and
May 2004. Most of these measures have not yet been taken. When they
are, the Council could decide on ‘user-friendly’ rules that would
facilitate crossing the EU’s external border. Visas might for
example be issued at the border and be free of cost. Multi-entry
visas would be important for shuttle traders, who constitute a
substantial proportion of the traffic across the border.

Furthermore, more of the pre-accession
assistance could be targeted towards measures alleviating the
negative effects of the emerging visa regime. The burden of
implementing EU visa policy should be shared among all Member
States and not be based on geographic position. The costs of such
implementation need to be worked out. More importantly, such
‘flanking measures’ could also be extended to the immediate
neighbours of the enlarged EU, such as Ukraine and Russia, enabling
them to handle the new regime. Finally, the EU could do more to
inform the public on both sides of the EU’s future border on the EU
rules and standards being introduced by candidate countries.

Currently the most likely scenario is that visas
will be introduced for the Polish-Ukrainian border on the first day
of accession at the latest. However, alternatives should not be
abandoned at this stage. Chancellor Schroeder has recently proposed
a transition period of seven years after Poland’s accession before
the free movement of labour between Poland and the EU takes effect.
This raises the issue of consistency of EU policy. If there is to
be a transition period for the free movement of people between
Poland and the rest of the EU, the urgency and need to introduce
restrictions on the movement of people across Poland’s Eastern
border is reduced. This raises the possibility of a transition
period before the Schengen visa regime is implemented by acceding
countries. This could give both candidates and non-candidates time
to adjust. A debate on this issue is needed now, before crucial
decisions are made.

Marius Vahl, Research Fellow, CEPS

For an in-depth analysis, see CEPS

Commentary.