Ukraine: Leeching the poison?

Compromise dominates the Ukrainian political scene, despite
confirmation that Viktor Yushchenko was poisoned, according
to Ivan Lozowy in Transitions
Online.

One of the long-standing mysteries of Ukraine’s protracted and
deeply controversial presidential elections was cleared up on 12
December, when Austrian doctors announced that dioxin poisoning was
the cause of the illness that laid opposition candidate Viktor
Yushchenko up for several weeks during the election campaign and
that continues to disfigure his once telegenic face. 

Tissue samples showed that Yushchenko had levels of dioxin 1,000
times higher than occur naturally in the human body. 

The doctors’ findings, and their statement that “there is the
suspicion of third-party involvement,” significantly increases the
possibility that Yushchenko may have been poisoned
deliberately. 

Who might have been responsible remains a matter of speculation.
Some have pointed to the Ukrainian secret services: Yushchenko had
supper with the head of the secret services shortly before he fell
ill. Others suspect the mafia, whose members may have been worried
by Yushchenko’s promise to fight corruption, or possibly even the
Kremlin, which was very open in its support for Yushchenko’s rival,
Prime Minister Viktor Yanukovych, ahead of the elections.

The Ukrainian authorities have promised to open an
investigation. 

The timing of the announcement, two weeks before a repeat
presidential runoff, has added to the skepticism among Yushchenko’s
opponents. Volodymyr Sivkovych, head of a special parliamentary
commission that investigated Yushchenko’s illness (it reached no
conclusion), has called the diagnosis “nonsense.” He says he
personally believes that the cause was herpes. 

When first taken to hospital, Yushchenko suffered from a swollen
liver, pancreas and intestines, ulcers on his digestive tract,
terrible back pains, and lesions and cysts on his face.

Yushchenko’s misfortune may win him additional sympathy and
strengthen his support. With the state-controlled and previously
highly partial pro-government media now covering the story
objectively and in detail, there is even the possibility that the
doctors’ findings will win Yushchenko some additional votes. But
the battle lines between supporters of Yushchenko and Yanukovych
may be too clearly drawn for this incident to have a substantial
impact. The more significant gains for Yushchenko this week may
have been breakthroughs that should ensure that the 26 December
vote is fairer than the 21 November runoff, which was subsequently
annulled by the Supreme Court. 

Kuchma makes concessions

Yushchenko, who has always maintained that he was poisoned, said
repeatedly during the election campaign that his face represented
the scarred face of Ukrainian politics. But instead of the incident
poisoning the political air, Ukraine’s politicians have been busy
making compromises–and have continued to do so even after the
announcement.

President Leonid Kuchma has played an instrumental role in this,
making concessions to Yushchenko on a range of personnel issues. On
9 December, he removed the prosecutor general, Hennady Vasilyev,
and on 10 December reinstated Sviatoslav Piskun. Piskun was
appointed in July 2002 with Yushchenko’s support but removed 15
months later. Just before his dismissal, he had claimed he was
close to resolving the case of the murdered journalist Georgy
Gongadze, in whose disappearance Kuchma has been implicated. (In a
questionable coincidence, a local Kiev court ruled on 9 December
that Piskun had been unlawfully dismissed.)

Then, on 13 December, Kuchma announced that he would nominate
Volodymyr Stelmakh as governor of the National Bank of Ukraine to
replace Serhiy Tyhipko, Yanukovych’s former campaign manager.
Stelmakh was Yushchenko’s deputy when he was governor and is still
considered one of his associates.

Critically, on 8 December, Kuchma exercised his right to disband
the Central Election Commission (CEC) and then submitted a new set
of names to be approved by parliament. Eleven of the 15 names are
in fact old–they served on the previous CEC–but the four new
members are all seen as allied to the opposition. The most
significant change was the dismissal of the CEC’s chairman, Serhiy
Kivalov, who had run the commission with a heavy hand and ignored
numerous complaints of election violations. 

To read the article in full, visit the Transitions Online website.