An Integrated Civil Police Force for the European Union

An Integrated Civil Police Force for the European Union

The European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) enjoys the support of a larger percentage of the European public than does the EU itself (74% vs. 48%). The “war against terrorism” that followed the September 11th attacks on the US has proven once again the ineffectiveness of Europe’s response and presence. Like all common threats, this one has also fostered solidarity, cooperation and integration, but it has done so in the context of bilateral relations between the US and individual European states. Within Europe, these feelings have merely led to the approval of certain measures, such as the single European arrest warrant, which, whilst undoubtedly important, are of only marginal value to Europe’s international presence.

If they are to meet the challenges of the 21st century, the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and especially the ESDP cannot base their effectiveness on intergovernmental mechanisms alone. There are significant gaps both between the public’s expectations and the actual EU political and strategic decision-making capabilities, and between Europe’s technical and military capabilities and its ambition to be a serious geopolitical actor on the global stage. The political-institutional gap can only be closed at the IGC scheduled for 2004, which should reduce the duality between the Council and the Commission. This duality, in fact, deprives the EU of its main competitive advantage vis-à-vis other international organisations: the advantage of having all-round competences and resources. The High Representative/Secretary General of the European Council (HR/SG) could become a European Commissioner or be made equal to the President of the Commission.

Closing the gap in operational military capabilities in order to carry out the “higher spectrum” of Petersberg missions seems even more difficult. It is unlikely that this can be achieved by the deadlines specified in the Helsinki “headline goal” and in subsequent European Council meetings. Although the IOCs (initial operational capabilities) were established by the scheduled date of late December 2001, the FOCs (full operational capabilities), whose attainment is scheduled for December 2003, will have to be postponed, since bridging the existing differences seems impossible both from a financial and industrial point of view.

All of this highlights the role of the civilian components of ESDP, and especially of an integrated EU civil policy force (or EUCIVPOL), whose importance has also increased owing to more objective factors.

Crisis prevention and area stabilisation interventions in regions outside the EU are no longer carried out from outside the involved society, but rather from within it. This is true not only because the concept of security has become much broader and more comprehensive than in the past, but also because security has become inclusive. These observations especially apply to Europe’s peripheries.

Moreover, military occupation regimes and the implementation of international mandates are no longer as popular as they were in the past. An ever-increasing number of conflicts are internal, and not between states. No peace agreements are concluded – but only truces, which must be turned into a durable, self-sustainable peace by means of peace-building and post-conflict reconstruction and rehabilitation. These interventions also involve state institutions and apparatuses, including foremost the state’s “coercive power”, which must be made efficient and put to the service of the public, rather than of the various warlords and belligerent factions. If it is not, no stabilisation or development process is possible. On the other hand, the local leaders with whom the truces have been concluded have opposite interests. Instability enables them to keep their political power on the strength of a consensus based on fear that hostilities might resume, and to amass personal riches by controlling the economy, be it legal, underground or criminal. The chances of achieving stabilisation closely depend on the successful severance of the links between politics on the one hand and common and economic crime on the other.

The hard experience acquired in the course of past interventions, especially in the Balkans, has made it possible to correct the unrealistic assumptions that informed our approaches in the past. First, there was the illusion that a truce equals full-fledged peace, rather than being a mere step on the path towards stabilisation. Secondly was the expectation that the political leaders who signed a truce were actually prepared to cooperate. Lastly – and most important of all – was the presumption that civil society should be changed prior to the transformation of the state and its institutions. Conversely, priority is given today to the latter task, and first of all to the reconstruction of the state’s “coercive power”, formed by the law-enforcement triad of the police, judiciary and the penitentiary system. Clearly, this coercive power cannot exist in a void, but must refer to a legitimate political power.

EUCIVPOL can be employed in two different situations: as a substitute for a non-existent local police force (in the case of failed states, such as Kosovo), which implies taking over the executive powers of the police; or as assistance to the local police (including monitoring and training, although the possibility to carry out some robust public order operations and to protect international organisations should not be ruled out), as happens in Bosnia-Herzegovina (BiH). Clearly, the second situation is also a subsequent phase of the first. In no sector is the impact of the local ethical and juridical culture and social structures felt as much as in that of crime prevention and repression. Therefore, local elements must be involved from the start and, as soon as there is a legitimate political power, the whole law-enforcement system must be transferred to it, although with continued monitoring, assistance and support by the international community. The Bosnian experience taught us that the process should progressively gravitate from the local police station to the central administration (focusing on management functions, including legislation, and on control, including compliance with democratic policing rules and human rights).

The action of the civil police (CIVPOL) component, moreover, must always be immediate, to provide international leaders – whether military or civilian – with specialised capabilities in public order and security maintenance from the very first stage of the intervention, as well as to prevent local warlords from exploiting emergency aid and the beginning of reconstruction in order to consolidate their power over the territory and the economy. The economic-financial police component can also play a crucial role. Agreement on the strategic and operational direction of all the intervention components is essential, as is preventing short-term measures from hampering long-term stabilisation.

The basic principle, which should be implemented at all levels – political, strategic and operational or theatre – is unity of command. Clearly, this does not mean total uniformity of the relevant bodies at the various levels, for the peculiarities of each component must be taken into account. Nevertheless, unity of command has not yet been achieved, which has a negative impact on EUCIVPOL effectiveness.

At a political level, the Police Unit is providing valuable advice to the HR/SG and to the Political and Security Committee (PSC). However, there is no single body or position that can use it authoritatively. The establishment of a Deputy HR/SG for the police sector (who may extend his competences to the whole “coercive power” spectrum) has been proposed. He would also avail himself of the Police Unit, after it has been appropr iately reinforced. The individual national representations at the PSC should include a police leader who is also a representative of the national Chief Commissioner. These representatives would operate in close contact with the Police Unit in case of emergency. At the strategic level, the Police Unit should also take over warning, situation and force requirement assessment, strategic planning and force constitution roles. It must be stressed that, whilst the EU will rely on NATO for the military forces, it must possess its own planning capabilities for the police forces. At any rate, the Police Unit must report to the PSC and work in coordination with the EU Military Staff (EUMS), especially in the first stages of any intervention, which are the most difficult and risky. Moreover, it should have the capability to immediately dispatch an advance party into the theatre, which would be in charge of assessing the local situation as well as determining quantitative and qualitative force requirements. It can be incorporated into the High Police Commissioner/Police Commander (PC) Headquarters in the employment theatre.

The operational level must be headed by the PC, in his dual task of advisor to the EU Special Representative (with the status of his Deputy) and of the person responsible for all the activities carried out by EUCIVPOL. The idea that the PC should be hierarchically subordinate to the Deputy HR/SG for Police should be ruled out in favour of a functional coordination link only, for instance in the sector of new force requirements. Theatre OPLANs (operational plans) should be approved in-theatre, and not in Brussels, as much relates to the peculiar nature of police activities, which are more specific and closely linked to the local realities than those of the more centralised military forces. This suggestion also corresponds to the fact that, especially in the first phase of intervention, the latter have a more reactive character, whereas police action is more preventive and pro-active, especially in the intermediate and final stages of intervention, when a reasonable level of public security has been reached. Moreover, whilst the military follow a top-down logic, the police (clearly, within limits) adopt a bottom-up logic, since they operate from within the involved societies rather than outside of them.

The PC should be immediately appointed by the EU or pre-designated according to a rotational mechanism (ideally, on a three-year basis) among the countries that contribute at least 300 EUCIVPOL personnel, to which minor countries would be associated. The EU member country that provides the EUCIVPOL Commander should also keep its HQ, complete with the necessary C3 (command and communications control) system, available. This system would also make it possible for the EU (Deputy HR/SG for Police and Police Unit) to direct the appropriate training activities (especially command post exercises (CPX) and field exercises (FTX)). In the case of especially exacting operations, such as those in Kosovo or in peacemaking, it may be desirable to assign the major nations’ first-intervention police units with the same sectors of the respective military units, clearly maintaining the option of inter-sectoral manoeuvre. This would simplify logistical support, decrease language barriers, enable better cooperation and stimulate the member states to provide all the necessary forces, even beyond their pledged contributions. Training courses may be carried out with the support of the Central European Police Academy (CEPA) and the Association of European Police Colleges (AEPC).

The above-described organisation seems appropriate both for EU-led interventions and for cases in which the intervention is led by another international organisation and the EU is entrusted with the “police” sector. If the EU is not granted a complete and well defined sector of activity, it is preferable that it does not interfere in the bilateral relations between the member states and the lead organisati on, in order to avoid delays, misunderstandings and red tape.

Member state contributions should not be merely quantitative, but also qualitative, meaning that the whole spectrum of police activities should be covered. National specialisation could be interesting, since the various European police forces have widely different statutes and cultures. For instance, those countries that have military-statute police forces might provide the bulk of the multi-specialised units (MSU); others might specialise in the field of economic-financial police; while others still might be responsible for training, and so forth. As a general rule, command positions within the European forces should be assigned on the basis of the share of the total represented by any member state’s contribution. Lastly, financial sanctions could be envisaged against states that fail to meet their contribution pledges for whatever reason.

The Police Unit, with the assistance of the Central European Police Academy, the Association of European Police Colleges and possibly the WEU Institute for Security Studies, should develop a doctrine of democratic policing – harmonised with the UN Department of Peace Keeping Operations (UNDPKO), the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and the Council of Europe doctrines – as well as framework documents on the SOFAs (Status of Forces Agreements), the SOMAs (Status of Mission Agreements) and (SOPs) Standard Operating Procedures, etc. Special provisions should regulate the following functions: personnel selection, especially regarding personnel from non-member countries; logistical support and C3 systems to be adopted; cooperation with other international organisations and with the military forces; the use of experts in human rights; the actions of non-governmental organisations (NGOs) (including defence counsels, prosecutors, judges, etc.); and the disciplinary powers entrusted to the HQ and the financial sanctions that the EU can adopt against member states in the event of non-compliance.

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