EU-Russia positioning in the changing security field

EU-Russia positioning in the changing security field

Dr Dimitry Danilovspells out the issues posed for the Russia-EU relationship as a result of the shifting dynamics of the Russian/America/European triangle.

Having agreed to create the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP), the Europeans were anxious about probable Russian concerns. Moscow’s initial vague position was replaced with its “positive interest” in the EU “militarization”. The principal reason was to try to use the European Union’s ESDP channel to fill the gap in the Russia-West security dialogue left by frozen Russia-NATO contacts. It also met Western aspirations, and especially those of the EU, which is interested in a positive Russian response to its ESDP project. So the Russia-EU security and defence dialogue has developed progressively, but as an instrumental one for both partners. The instrumental significance of this area of Russia-EU relations has limited its genuine potential and it was clear by the May 2001 Summit that further substantial progress would not be possible outside of the Transatlantic dimension.

The possibility for progress emerged after the September 11 tragedy. A new window of opportunity has been opened towards qualitative improvements in Russian-Western relations just as in the larger transatlantic context. Already the October 2001 EU-Russia Summit in Brussels undertook important steps to enhance mutual security and defence co-operation. It resulted not only in insertion of the struggle against international terrorism in the scope of co-operation and in the special joint declaration. Besides these quite natural developments, it was decided to establish a permanent mechanism of consultations on security and defence issues, which was assessed by President Putin as a prototype for eventual joint Councils to co-operate in this field.

But even these very positive changes in Russia-West relations, giving new advantages for the strengthening of Russia-EU security and defence co-operation, do not guarantee progress. The principal question, namely, whether this co-operation can move beyond its instrumental role to take on substance, remains unanswered. Both parties’ political will and decisions are strongly influenced not only by the new rapprochement but also by the new big uncertainties of the rapidly changing international security situation.

What does the US want?

The matter of special importance is how durable and productive are the motives and incentives for rapprochement between Russia and the US and NATO. Indeed, both Russian and European hopes that the US would move away from its foreign policy unilateralism proved to be illusory. Even in today’s circumstances, when Russia’s weighting within American policy has increased, it reflects a US interest in co-operating with Russia to achieve US goals, but not an interest in establishing a special partnership. And even in the field of strategic dialogue and arms control, which remains the only sphere of special Russian-American relations, the United States demonstrates unilateral approaches.

While the interests and policy of the US as the only global power do not induce it to establish a strategic alliance with Russia, that certainly does not exclude the development of mutual co-operation. While the threat from the “evil empire” in the USSR induced the West to create the Atlantic Alliance, for the US, the struggle against the “axis of evil” is not conditional on the creation of an alliance with Russia. On the contrary, the “coalition” gives the Americans the opportunity to count on co-operation with Russia while retaining flexibility and a free hand.

Consequently, the “common threat” of international terrorism as a strong consolidating factor is being transformed into the “axis of evil”, which, on the contrary, is sowing political discord in the antiterrorist camp. The US presence in Central Asia and the Caucasus could be perceived by Russia rather positively if simply in the framework of an enlarging and mutually beneficial partnership. However, unilateral US approaches in resolving international problems, with the use of force in particular, could provoke new serious disputes with Russia.

Moreover, President Putin’s current pragmatism and ability to smooth over the contradictions has visible limits, beyond which such political behaviour could be assessed domestically as anti-Russian and a loss of state political sovereignty (the Gorbachev-Kosyrev syndrome). Taking into account the remaining (and even growing) breakaway from President Putin’s strategy of moving towards the West, on the part of Russian political elites, domestic critics could force him to “show his teeth” to the West, especially with approaching Presidential elections. Even if the probable differences between Russia and the US were not acute, they in any case could result in a decrease in American interest in a partnership with Moscow. Taking into account American leadership in the transatlantic community, one could expect similar difficulties might appear in the development of NATO and EU relations with Russia.

EU must take up the challenge

So to prevent these destabilizing trends in the changing security field, the EU, which is particularly interested in a pro-European Russia, has to become a more active and influential actor in structuring a new transatlantic relationship with Russia. From this point of view, the “Twenty” in NATO offer great potential as an important partner in the emerging political triangle EU-Russia-US. At the same time, the responsibility of Europe is increasing, taking into account the rather weak American interest towards institutionalizing and strengthening of the NATO-Russia relationship. This is because NATO has diminished in importance in American foreign and security policy and out-of-Europe regions have become increasingly important for the US.

It is also important for both Europe and Russia to realize that the US does not like to complicate its policy and flexibility towards each party by adding tri-lateral constructions. From Europe’s angle, on the contrary, the new NATO Council of twenty firstly would give an opportunity to move away from the serious transatlantic limitations on EU-Russia foreign and security policy co-operation and, secondly, it could be perceived as an instrument to strengthen the political role of NATO in the reshaping of international relations and respectively to consolidate American interest towards the Alliance.

Paradoxically, not only could an optional slowing down of American-Russian relations and limp dynamics of the NATO-Russian ones damage EU-Russia co-operation on security and defense, but also the successful development of the Russia-NATO partnership in the Council of Twenty. On the one hand, Russian interest in the EU could decrease relatively, taking into account the prospects for the new partnership with NATO. On the other hand, the European countries, when co-operating with Russia, could also put more emphasis on NATO and bilateral ties. The ESDP shortfall has already affected the nature of security interaction among the European states. After September 11, the leading EU members showed that they preferred to accelerate multilateral contacts outside the framework of the EU and ESDP, which provoked much criticism from the other Member States as well as from Brussels. Russia, in turn, is also apparently canalising, even if not so clearly as the US, its security policy into bilateral relations with the Europeans.

Therefore, firstly, if the EU displays a weakness in its ESDP or, secondly, if Russia is unsatisfied with the development of respective relations with the EU, the Russian course towards partnership with the EU on security and defense issues could be con siderably damaged.

Strengthening the EU-Russia partnership

What could be proposed to prevent this negative option in order to strengthen the strategic partnership between Russia and the EU? First of all, the dependence of the Russia-EU political and security co-operation on the character and content of relations between Russia and NATO and the US should be perceived not as a limitation but rather as an incentive. If Russia and NATO succeed in establishing the new Council of Twenty, respective corrections will have to be made at the Russia-EU level. On the basis of already existing co-operative structures that were reinforced in the wake of the October 2001 Summit, it is possible to create permanent mechanisms for elaborating common positions, mutual initiatives, which then may lead to joint or coordinated actions. Certainly, for co-operation under this new formula, it is important, as in the Russia- NATO case, to determine priorities – such as crisis management or preventive policy, for example.

Such co-operation mechanisms would have certain very important goals. First of all, they would significantly strengthen the autonomous line of Russian-European relations and the EU-Russia partnership in general. Secondly, in reference to security and defense, this direction of mutual co-operation would have its own internal dynamic and be less influenced by external conjuncture. Thirdly, these new kinds of institutions could be oriented towards the broader agenda in comparison with NATO (taking into account the natural functional differences between the EU and NATO). Fourthly, compatibility of the institutional structures of EU and NATO co-operation with Russia paves the way for an interoperability in the tri-lateral EU-NATO-Russia partnership.

In the other words, it would be short-sighted for the EU not to benefit from the “persistent Russian intention” (in the terminology of European officials) to strengthen security and defense co-operation with the EU, taking advantage of the new window of opportunity and taking into account the political imperatives. Indeed, the ball is in the EU’s court. With the new NATO-Russia Council, the EU attitude towards the security and defense dialogue and co-operation reflects not so much a European choice, as the EU’s readiness and ability to perform an active role in international relations and European security. The question is not how much is a “Europe of security and defense” interested in co-operation with Russia, but whether such Europe is interested in itself.

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