The Brussels European Council – A new mood of grim political determination

John Palmer, Political Director of the European Policy Centre, analyses the outcome of the meeting of the Spring European Council 2004.

The Brussels European Council – A new mood of grim political determination

It´s results that count

None of the epithets habitually used to describe summit meetings of European Union leaders – “upbeat,” “downbeat,” “optimistic,” “pessimistic” – throw any revealing light on either the mood – or the results – of the European Council meeting in Brussels. If there is one word which best summed up the atmosphere of the summit it might be “seriousness” – even a grim, determined seriousness.

The important outcomes of the meeting included:

• the reopening of the Inter-Governmental Conference (IGC) on a Constitutional Treaty;
• the commitment to strengthen Europe’s collective means of combating terrorism;
• a sharper definition of the Union’s stance on key global issues – notably the Middle East;
• a new focus on implementing existing commitments by Member States to reform set out in the “Lisbon Process” objectives.

Everything now depends on whether this changed political climate really produces a new ‘political will’ at EU level to achieve results in practice. The absence of this critical ingredient in recent years has directly contributed to the stagnation and even disarray evident in so many important areas of European Union policy. It is too soon to judge whether the constitutional negotiations are now “doomed to succeed.” But the negotiations led by the Irish Presidency in the next weeks should fairly quickly reveal if there really will be a signed and sealed agreement by the new deadline of the last summit under the Irish Presidency to be held on June 16/17.

It will take longer to know whether the new determination to convert commitments by Member State governments at EU level into practice on the ground will break the log jam which threatens to paralyse progress in achieving the 2010 goals in the “Lisbon Process.” These are designed to make the EU the most competitive, knowledge based, socially cohesive and environmentally sustainable economy in the world.

The original, prime purpose of the spring European Council was a major review of the problems facing Lisbon Process and the urgent steps needed to give it renewed vigor and focus. The practical conclusions of the meeting contain little that is really new, which may encourage critics to dismiss the entire exercise. This would be a mistake. There is an unmistakable acceptance now that success or failure in meeting the Lisbon goals will have far-reaching implications, not only for Europe’s capacity to maintain decent living standards in a global market which includes challenging new competitors in Asia and elsewhere, but for the very survival of Europe’s sense of what a civilized economic and social model should be.

Even more urgent will be the conversion of the detailed commitments by EU Member States about coordinating their legal, judicial and intelligence services, together with Europol and Eurojust, to forge a coherent and fully integrated strategy against terrorism. Of course the horror of the Madrid atrocity has played a decisive role in injecting the new mood of determination. But so too has the growing acceptance that an increasingly dangerous and unstable world situation imposes new responsibilities and a pressure to “show results” in the field of foreign, security and defence policy.

This was also reflected in the strikingly critical tone of the summit conclusions on the crisis in the Middle East – following the Israeli assassination of the Hamas leader Sheikh Ahmed Yassin – and in the leaders’ worried conclusions about the deteriorating security situation in the Balkans.

An EU Constitutional Treaty at last?< /b>

Inevitably much attention has been focused on the decision to reopen the IGC with a view to agreeing the new treaty by mid-June. In this context the change in political mood was truly dramatic. The decisive rejection in recent elections, of the outgoing Spanish conservative government, led by Jose Maria Aznar, has resulted in an unmistakable realignment of Spain closer to “old Europe” on most if not all the key constitutional and strategic issues. The consequential impetus for Poland to fundamentally reassess its hitherto dogmatic defence of its voting rights entitlement under the largely discredited Nice Treaty was given added drama at the end of the summit when the Prime Minister, Leszek Miller, announced his forthcoming resignation. This followed a political revolt within his own party by political leaders who want a more pro-European orientation in Warsaw.

The note struck by the Irish Prime Minister, Bertie Ahern, the President of the European Council, at the end of the meeting was positive, while avoiding any trace of triumphalism. “We have a changed atmosphere and a new willingness to compromise,” he declared. “We all want to see a new constitution in place as soon as we can.” For his part Mr Ahern and many other EU leaders – including the President of the Commission, Romano Prodi, and European Parliamentarians – insist the treaty should be agreed before the 340 million EU citizens in the 25 Member States are asked to vote in the European Parliament (EP) election in June. At the very least all the EU chiefs accept that the longer the agreement on the constitution is left the harder it will be to settle.

In spite of the striking change of mood from the depression and near despair when the IGC negotiations failed under the Italian Presidency last December, no one underestimates the numerous and highly sensitive issues which remain to be resolved. The breakthrough is primarily that everyone now accepts that EU decisions should in future be made on the “double majority” principle: that is a majority both of states and of the peoples of the enlarged Union. But there are still a wide range of options on the table as to what the actual percentages should be for both categories.

Most governments seem to accept that a threshold of 55 % for Member States makes most sense. Many believe this should be balanced by 55 % for population (notably Germany) but others are talking about figures of 60% or more for population. Some also want an explicit formula for what would comprise a blocking minority (in terms of both states and population) in the text as well. There is also an unresolved issue of when exactly the new system would come into force with dates ranging from 2007 to 2014.

For the moment the Irish Presidency (which has won plaudits from all quarters for the quiet but unrelenting work it has undertaken to draw the basis of an agreed solution out of the ruins of last December’s IGC deadlock) has to await the inauguration of the new Spanish socialist government which will probably be fully in office by April 19. The planned meeting of EU foreign ministers at the beginning of May will provide a key moment for judging whether the project is really back on track.

Quite apart from the issues surrounding the voting system, some highly sensitive questions about the possible extension of majority voting in the field of Justice and Home Affairs must also be agreed. There are some indications that the British government may accept some qualified majority voting in this area not only for matters affecting cross border fraud but possibly also in the fight against terrorism. However London seems confident that its insistence on retaining the national veto over defence, tax and social security will not be seriously challenged. These are issues which also concern Ireland but its government knows that it must put overriding priority on its Presidency fu nction of achieving agreement.

Two other questions are still very much open. The first is whether – or rather when – to implement the promised reduction in the size of the number of Commissioners as enlargement continues and, linked to that, how to rotate among Member States their right to a Commissioner in a future, smaller college. The earliest such a reform would come in would be 2014 when the EU might consist of more than 30 Member States. A more serious issue in the short term has to do with British government-led efforts to reduce the role of the European Parliament as a budget negotiating partner with the Council of Ministers. So seriously do MEPs take this attempt to reduce their role as elected representatives that – in the April session of the European Parliament – the President, Pat Cox, may be invested with powers to negotiate with EU governments even after the outgoing Parliament has held its last plenary session.

Even if an agreement can be reached on an outline treaty in the next eight weeks, some fears were expressed during the summit that – for domestic political reasons – both President Chirac of France and the beleaguered British Prime Minister, Tony Blair, might want to delay the new treaty until after the June EP elections. However, after the meeting Mr Blair insisted that he wanted an agreement “as soon as possible.” Implying that he now accepted confrontation with the eurosceptics in the UK Tory opposition and the tabloid press was inevitable, he went on: “(The treaty) will help the enlarged European Union to work better and to do more for its citizens – in the end that is the most important thing.”

For his part President Chirac insisted that he had imposed no conditions about the timetable for agreement but much may depend on whether the opposition Socialists, who had been talking about forcing a referendum and voting “no,” would quietly drop this now that the recent regional elections had confirmed a sharp improvement in their domestic political fortunes. But with at least seven of the existing EU Member States committed to holding referendums no one minimizes the enormous political risks in ensuring ratification in all 25 countries – perhaps most obviously in Denmark.

Terror – a threat against one is threat against all

The fact that some 20 pages of the summit’s conclusions were devoted to combatting terrorism came as no surprise. The leaders have in effect adopted the goal of a Solidarity Clause in the new Constitutional Treaty which will oblige all Member States to come to the aid of one of their number subject to terrorist attacks. Following the recent meeting of EU Justice and Home Affairs ministers – the summit prioritized the practical (if highly problematic) steps needed to be taken to ensure maximum cooperation by Member States at many different levels (police, legal, financial, intelligence) to confront this new global threat.

To this end the former Dutch MEP and Secretary of State for Justice, Gijs de Vries, was appointed to the post of “Counter-Terrorism Coordinator.” He will now have to deliver on the maximum sharing of intelligence among the traditionally closed security services of the Member States. This will be no easy matter. The big Member States already coordinate closely but they will need convincing that any extension of this to all EU members – including some of the new accession states – will itself be fully secure. Mr de Vries’ most immediate task will be “to bully” – in the words of Mr Ahern – the five foot-dragging EU governments (Germany, Italy, Greece, Austria and the Netherlands) into fully adopting the provisions of the European Common Arrest Warrant. Moreover, not all the current 15 Member States have yet agreed an EU wide definition of terrorism, nor on national legislation laying down minimum sentences for terrorist crimes nor even the legal implementation of powers to allow cross border communications intercepts and monitoring of (suspected terrorist) bank accounts. A revised European Action Plan against terrorism – with seven key objectives – was adopted. These include the crucial international dimension of the fight against terrorism where the Union may be ready to use its aid programmes as both incentive and possible penalty to ensure third country cooperation. This is already giving concern to humanitarian and aid organizations who fear that the peoples of poor countries may suffer for matters which are the responsibility of their governments.

Mr de Vries has been specifically charged with ensuring “… optimum and effective use of existing EU bodies such as Europol, Eurojust and the Police Chiefs Task Force.” There was no real discussion of the more ambitious idea for a European Union FBI or CIA – on American lines – as suggested among others by Belgium and Austria. But many experts believe this issue will come back on the agenda unless there is discernible progress in making the complex system of cooperation and information exchange between the national authorities work in practice.

Work on strengthening border controls will be stepped up with proposals for the exchange of information on DNA, fingerprints and visa data brought forward to the June European Council. By the end of this year the EU leaders say the Commission’s proposals for the incorporation of biometric features into passports and visas should be adopted. There is clearly substantial public support for tougher and more effective EU wide measures against terrorism. But it will not be easy to balance this with assurances that the new counter-terror strategy will not threaten European citizens’ rights and civil liberties. For his part the EU High Representative for Foreign and Security Policy, Javier Solana, insisted that this must not be allowed to happen because the fight against terrorism was explicitly in defence of European democratic values.

Meeting the Lisbon Challenge – But how? 

The challenge of the Lisbon agenda for reform has shared one crucial feature with the fight against terror – it critically depends on Member State governments delivering in reality what they have committed themselves to do in theory. Now they share a second common characteristic. Another Dutch politician, the former prime minister of the Netherlands, Wim Kok, was appointed by the EU leaders to head a high level group to assess the mid-term progress in meeting the 2010 objectives and what measures of governance and communication to civil society as a whole will be necessary to ensure the goals are met.

The European Council left no doubt that the immediate priority is without question “better implementation of commitments already made.” However some eyebrows will be raised at the relatively upbeat assessment in the summit conclusions that “the economic recovery that started in the second half of 2003 is gathering pace.” This does not seem immediately consistent either with the latest, disappointing economic data from Germany – the EU’s largest economy – nor the renewed pressure on the European Central Bank to cut interest rates to head off a possible reversal of the recovery.

The EU leaders agreed on the need for sound budget strategies, increased investment in physical and human capital, completion of the still unfinished internal market, better regulation, a radical expansion of investment in Research and Development and a drive to improve the competitiveness of the European economy. But contrary to what some suggested in advance of the Brussels meeting, no decision was made to appoint an overall “competitiveness supremo” in the next Commission. Instead the next Commission President was merely invited &ldqu o;to consider how to ensure the competitiveness agenda is effectively supported.” In the corridors of the summit the general expectation is that a senior Commission Vice-President will be appointed with oversight of economic policy and competitiveness but that the next President will retain final authority for the implementation of the Lisbon process as a whole – which also includes social cohesion and sustainability

Also contrary to some expectations, no attempt was made to downgrade or relegate the Lisbon commitments to social cohesion and sustainable growth. Before the summit, fears had been expressed by the European Trade Union Confederation and some important NGOs that this broader view of Lisbon might be at risk. Some diplomats now think that the Nordic economic and social model – which has shown the best results on competitiveness while maintaining welfare standards and defending the environment – may have broader appeal in future to other EU Member States. In any case recent political trends in Spain, France and elsewhere mean there is unlikely to be a radical change in the balance of objectives for reform agreed in Lisbon in 2000.

One important innovation agreed by the European Council is the creation of “Reform Partnerships” in all Member States involving the social partners, civil society and the public authorities to win broader public support for the Lisbon strategy. What is certain is that from here on, Member State governments will come under increasing scrutiny and EU wide judgment for their record in putting the Lisbon objectives into reality. If after 2005 the results in terms of practical achievements do not show significant improvement, a discussion on the limits of “soft law” or the Open Method of Coordination, compared with a more EU legislative process, could well be reopened.

Defining Europe´s role in a troubled world

Although the new Constitutional Treaty – which will create an EU foreign minister and a Union diplomatic service – is not yet adopted, the extensive summit time devoted to world crises reflected the ambitions of the European Union to be a serious global player. This European Council provided further evidence of the EU’s intent to define increasingly detailed policies not only in its own “neighbourhood” but more widely. However the first of a series of declarations focused on the crucial final phase of the United Nations negotiations to achieve a political settlement in Cyprus before the Republic of Cyprus joins the EU on May 1. In the days ahead we will know whether the political will on all sides exists to achieve this much desired breakthrough.

EU foreign ministers and their heads of government discussed the worsening Middle East crisis at some length at dinner on Thursday night. While clearly condemning suicide bombing, the EU pulled no punches in condemning “the extra judicial killing of Hamas leader Sheikh Ahmed Yassin, and in demanding that Israel reverse its policies both on settlements on occupied land and over “the construction of the so-called security fence on Palestinian land.” Indeed the European Union has now laid down conditions which should be observed in the promised Israeli withdrawal from Gaza including no transfer of settlements to the West Bank, acceptance of withdrawal in the context of the peace “Road Map” and a negotiated handover of responsibility to the Palestinian Authority.

No public reference was made to two critical developments. The first is the meeting between the Israeli Prime Minister, Ariel Sharon and the United States President, George Bush, in Washington on April 14. But the implicit message to Washington is that Bush must not accept any Israeli withdrawal from Gaza outside the wider strategy contained in the Road Map (already adopted by the US, the EU, Russia and the UN). A failure to do this seems certain to add ye t another strain to the already seriously weakened relationship between the EU and the Bush Administration.

The second unnamed fear is that events in Palestine are leading to growing public support for Hamas and an undermining of the already weak and sometimes corrupt Palestinian Authority. But off the record, EU leaders were adamant that without a peace settlement between Israel and the Palestinians, the wider fight against terrorism and global terrorism could be fatally weakened. In the meantime the European Union is developing its own wider strategy for reform and development in the Middle East region – in response to the initiative already launched by Washington. This is likely to be a major point on the agenda of the June European Council.

In spite of the deep split within the EU over the US/UK led invasion of Iraq and the recent declaration by the new Spanish government that it will withdraw its troops from Iraq unless the UN is given a central role there in the hand over of power to the appointed Governing Council, the summit discussion on Iraq revealed few obvious tensions. There was unanimous agreement that the EU should assist in Iraq’s transition to full democracy, while the UN should oversee the transfer of sovereignty, the preparation of elections and the reconstruction of the country.

What was less clear was whether this emerging consensus would translate into agreement on the precise mandate the UN should be given in Iraq in any new Security Council resolution. The appalling security situation on the ground is recognized as a major obstacle but EU governments seem uncertain about how the future responsibility for tackling security should be organized after the transfer of power to the Governing Council in June. In a further sign of EU Member States’ willingness to shoulder formidable international responsibilities, its commitments to security and reconstruction in Afghanistan was also underlined.

Nearer to home, the Heads of Government did not disguise their alarm (and surprise) at the recent outbreak of ethnic violence in Kosovo which it concluded “was a serious setback for Kosovo and endangered the progress made in recent years.” A finger of accusation was pointed squarely at the Kosovo Albanian leadership which was told to take full responsibility for confronting the violence and working to restore displaced persons in Kosovo and rebuild homes and places of worship. Everyone knows that the issue of Kosovo’s final status – almost certainly as an independent entity – must soon be resolved and that any repetition of ethnic conflict could trigger wider unrest in the entire Balkans region.

In spite of the recent expressions of concern about the questionable democratic context of the recent Presidential election in Russia, condemnation of its human rights violations in Chechnya and concern about the more bellicose tone adopted by Russian leaders towards an enlarging European Union, the summit communiqué concentrated on the EU’s desire to build a strategic partnership with Russia “based on respect for common values.”

The tenor of the communiqué may also have been influenced by reports from Moscow that most of Russia’s economic concerns about EU enlargement have now been resolved which should make it possible to extend the present Partnership and Co-operation Agreement to the ten new EU Member States. However some sensitive issues concerning the rights of Russian speaking minorities in the Baltic states remain to be finally resolved before the EU-Russia summit to be held on May 21.

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