The “Day After” in Iraq: An Ally’s Perspective

The “Day After” in Iraq: An Ally’s Perspective

Turks have never fallen in love with Saddam Hussein. He just happens to be the leader of a neighboring Iraq that was ruled for centuries by the Ottoman Empire, the predecessor of modern Turkey. Both countries host a sizeable Kurdish population, and there is a substantial Turkoman minority, a population of Turkish origin, living in Iraq. Moreover, when the 1991 Gulf War broke out, Iraq topped the list of countries providing business for Turkish exporters and construction companies. This complex set of ties between Turkey and its neighbor highlights Turkey’s unique vulnerability to the effects of a US intervention.

In contrast to the US emphasis on ousting Saddam, Turks are preoccupied with the aftermath of a war on Iraq. While American sensitivities and concerns related to Saddam are generally understood in Turkey, most Turks believe that their concerns regarding a post-Saddam Iraq are not paid sufficient heed. Even after intensive discussions concerning Turkish unease over the “day after” during Turkish PM Ecevit’s official visit to Washington in January of this year and, later, during the subsequent visits of VP Cheney and Deputy Secretary Wolfowitz to Turkey, the current debate in the US reveals a lack of elaboration on the post-Saddam period.

The “day after” has a broad meaning in the Turkish context. On the economic front, a war next door will severely harm an emerging economy currently trying to overcome a major economic crisis through an IMF-backed stabilization program. Turkey still remembers the economic losses incurred after the Gulf War. The cessation of economic activities in the underdeveloped Southeastern provinces aggravated the Kurdish issue and led to increased support for the PKK, a Kurdish terrorist organization, thus multiplying the number of casualties and delaying the PKK’s defeat. Trade activities that have recovered somewhat over the past decade would be halted indefinitely after a US intervention. More importantly, the tourism sector, which represents 10% of the Turkish economy, would be severely hurt, along with prospects for attracting the new foreign investments Turkey desperately needs.

It is argued by the proponents of a War on Iraq that new trade and reconstruction opportunities would emerge once the operation is over. Although Turkey would definitely benefit from the emergence of a stable oil-exporting neighbor, toppling Saddam would not assure the creation of such a fertile environment. Even if the intervention reaches a swift conclusion, it may take several years to stabilize the country. Nor is there a guarantee that Turkish companies would be among the main beneficiaries of the business opportunities that would arise out of a post-Saddam Iraq.

The political implications are equally important. Turkey fears that a US operation relying on Iraqi Kurds might lead to an independent Kurdish state in Northern Iraq, an area that currently enjoys an autonomous status. This, in turn, could ignite Kurdish secessionist movements in Turkey. Although Kurdish leaders and some American officials claim that an independent state is not on their agenda, statements made by some of the Kurdish leaders hint at just the opposite. With the capture of the PKK’s leader in 1999 marking the end of Turkey’s long struggle with terror, the country has recently been able to take bold steps toward further democratization. These include granting rights to education and broadcasting in Kurdish. However, a war in Iraq might lead Turkey to revert to a security-oriented perspective, thereby stalling current reform efforts.

Whether Turkey is directly involved or not, an intervention in Iraq would destabilize the country at a time when stability is the key component to both improving its domestic situation and continuing to contribute to the global fight against terrorism. As the dialogue between Islam and the West has acquired unprecedented significance in the post-9/11 era, the US should exert all means to encourage Turkey to become a role model for the Muslim world, elevated upon the pillars of a functioning democracy, a prosperous market economy, and secularism.

One of the major shortcomings of US policy toward Turkey in the context of the current war speculations is that Turkey’s role in the fight against terrorism is reduced to merely critical (for some, indispensable) logistical support. Both a US decision to fight a war in Iraq and Turkey’s involvement in such an operation must be assessed in a wider context. The US should demonstrate to the international community that the global fight against terrorism encompasses not only military considerations, but also a broad vision that takes long-term strategies into account. In this sense, the potential politically and economically destabilizing effects a war with Iraq would have on Turkey should be given adequate consideration, and the “day after” in Iraq should be thoroughly contemplated.

is the US Representative of TUSIAD, Turkish Industrialists’ and Businessmen’s Association.

The views expressed in this article do not necessarily reflect the positions or the opinions of TUSIAD, unless stated otherwise.

For more analysis from T·SIAD see the

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