Transatlantic Meltdown Over Iraq: is France villain or hero?

Transatlantic Meltdown Over Iraq: is France villain or hero?

As France continues to push for a peaceful solution to the Iraq crisis, most of the US media and large sections of the British media are engaged in a ferocious assault on the French position, accusing France of hubris and posturing, of still imagining itself a great world power, of being isolated, irrelevant and, of course, pace Rumsfeld of being ‘old Europe’. Both Rumsfeld and much of the media seem to think that ridicule and insults are preferable to persuasive argument and intelligent diplomacy. Any disagreement with the US view is to be seen as cause for rupture with long-standing allies.

But to argue that France is isolated is simply wrong. And to suggest that France and Germany can be sidelined as irrelevant or unimportant to new European politics is either to seriously misunderstand the European Union or, perhaps in the case of Rumsfeld, to deliberately misunderstand European politics in the hope of weakening both the EU, and the Franco-German couple within it . What is stranger and more difficult is to understand why so many European countries – the Wall Street Journal 8 and the Vilnius 10 – are also apparently so keen to weaken and undermine the European Union.

As France strengthens its arguments within the UN Security Council, in particular with the publishing of a ‘non-paper’ laying out the case for intensified inspections, it is receiving support from two of the other permanent members, Russia and China, and from non-permanent members.

Nor is it isolated in Europe. Only five of the current 15 EU members signed the WSJ letter. Out of the 25 countries that will make up the enlarged EU in 2004, 13 of the 25 were included in the WSJ 8 and the Vilnius 10 (accounting for around half of the enlarged EU’s population). So the EU is certainly split down the middle, but France is not isolated. And in terms of public opinion across the 25, it is clear that France is speaking for Europe. While in the UK, despite Tony Blair’s consistent support for the US, opinion polls remain not only against the war, but increasingly so.

Both the WSJ 8 and the Vilnius 10 statements emphasised the need for transatlantic unity. But there can by definition be no such transatlantic unity, if Europe is divided – a division which these 18 countries have both intensified and publicised. Although fingers have pointed at Germany, and Schroeder’s anti-war performance in the elections, as a key early cause of European division, in fact the UK took a high profile position many months earlier, identifying itself closely with the US with little consultation or coordination with European allies.

Some of the WSJ 8 claim to have been stung into action by Franco-German common statements on Iraq at Versailles on 22nd January and at the UN two days earlier. But the Franco-German statements did not show the contempt for EU solidarity and consultation that distinguishes the WSJ 8. France and Germany emphasised the importance of the UN Security Council astheroute to deal with Iraq, and stressed that war is evidence of political and diplomatic failure. Their statement was also made in advance of agreement of a EU common position on Iraq the following Monday (27th) – and was not out of line with it – and they consulted with the current EU presidency (led by the Greeks).

Meanwhile, the five EU signatories of the WSJ letter sat with their fellow foreign ministers on the Monday to agree a common position which they knew they were going to divert from and undermine on the Wednesday, when the letter was printed. They did not consult the Greek presidency (only too aware perhaps of the likely response) or Javier Solana, the EU’s foreign policy supremo. It is worth noting that the Netherlands, while close to UK and Spanish positions on Iraq, refused an invitation to sign the letter clearly seein g it as an anti European move.

The WSJ letter was at best a piqued and childish response to an unexpected renewal of the Franco-German relationship – both in ‘getting back’ at France and Germany and in the aim of impressing and mollifying Rumsfeld. At the worst, it has the potential to seriously damage relations within Europe at the point of enlargement and to aggravate rather than help the crisis in transatlantic relations.

In the face of strong negative reactions within Europe – including within the countries of some of the signatories of the letter – it was even more surprising that the Vilnius 10 then chose to aggravate the situation further, with a statement many times removed from the EU common line. Five of the Vilnius 10 will join the EU in 2004 and many of the East European accession states say they do not want to have to choose between the US and the EU.

But in this case actions seem to speak louder than words – at the least, the accession countries have shown a disregard over how to manage European differences, and certainly disdain for the EU’s attempts at a nascent common foreign and security policy. Some suggest that a wider lesson is that the enlarged EU will be one of many changing and transient internal alliances. But a more worrying issue is that so many of the current and future members seems so little concerned with the political role and image of the EU. If the enlarged EU develops into little more than a free trade area, without political cohesion, then ‘old Europe’ may well react by forming itself into a highly integrated inner core, perhaps not the outcome Rumsfeld was looking for.

Some suggest that the splits simply show the EU’s attempts at a common foreign policy to be a pretence. Certainly, it is now many months too late to forge a genuine common position. But if political will and intelligence had been shown earlier in 2002, a common position was not inconceivable. What would it have looked like? It would have: stressed that only the multilateral UN route was acceptable to deal with Iraq (a position that Blair has now been almost forced into accepting, with his proviso of ‘unreasonable’ vetoes); demanded lengthy and heavy inspections; rethought sanctions which currently hit only the Iraqi people and not Saddam; insisted on a new initiative for the Israel-Palestine conflict; emphasised that the fight against terrorism was the top priority; and set out when, if ever, pre-emptive action is acceptable (probably taking existing closely delimited UN principles on this).

Such a position would have required some movement and restraint from both Britain and Germany, but could have received solid EU backing and allowed constructive dialogue with the US, if it was willing to engage in such dialogue. It would certainly have required the UK not to align itself quite as closely with the US as it has, but in the process Blair would have had much more chance to act as a genuine bridge between Europe and America – supposedly one of the aims of British foreign policy. The EU might also have started to look a little more like the stable pole and model in the world that it declared as its aspiration when it launched its constitutional convention one year ago.

But the chance has gone. The summit of EU leaders called for the 17th February seems likely to be able to do little at this late stage either to overcome intra-European divisions or to limit the damage done by the WSJ 8 and Vilnius 10 – it may indeed aggravate the damage already done. France and Germany have already blocked proposals by the Greek presidency to invite the candidates as well, in conflict again with the UK on this.

Attention now is rightly on the arguments at the level of the UN. There, world opinion remains unconvinced that Saddam poses a threat that requires pre-emptive action and that among all the many totalitarian countries in the world regime change should be forced by military action in Iraq (w hose totalitarianism it should not be forgotten was long accepted by the US). Many rightly argue that many other countries are more likely to provide terrorists with a route to weapons of mass destruction, while the impact of a conflict in Iraq on stability in the Middle East may be seriously negative, neither conducive to a peace settlement in Palestine nor to success in the wider fight against international terror. France and Germany are not the only countries making these arguments, but France in particular is certainly taking the lead, using its position at the UN – and in NATO – to counter the drive to war.

Much hangs in the coming days on the next reports of the weapons inspectors. But unless their reports uncompromisingly condemn lack of Iraqi cooperation, there is no guarantee that the US and UK will succeed in getting a second UN resolution. One possibility is abstention by China, France and Russia – this would allow the UK some UN cover but would hardly be a resounding statement of support from the international community.

If France does use its veto, and the US still goes to war, then in the crisis that will ensue over the role and position of the UN, it should be clear that it is the US – who for months has insisted it will not be bound in any event by the UN – who has undermined its credibility and chosen the unilateral route. Dangerous though such a moment will be, it is preferable to a situation where countries vote for a second resolution only to try to keep the US within UN bounds, and not because they genuinely accept the case for war. That would be the most damaging for the UN’s credibility and in the long run for transatlantic relations.

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